"We Have Not Learned how to Wage War There"
Author | : Matt Matthews |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 86 |
Release | : 2011 |
Genre | : Afghanistan |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : Matt Matthews |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 86 |
Release | : 2011 |
Genre | : Afghanistan |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Matt Matthews |
Publisher | : War College Series |
Total Pages | : 90 |
Release | : 2015-02-16 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781297048470 |
This is a curated and comprehensive collection of the most important works covering matters related to national security, diplomacy, defense, war, strategy, and tactics. The collection spans centuries of thought and experience, and includes the latest analysis of international threats, both conventional and asymmetric. It also includes riveting first person accounts of historic battles and wars.Some of the books in this Series are reproductions of historical works preserved by some of the leading libraries in the world. As with any reproduction of a historical artifact, some of these books contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. We believe these books are essential to this collection and the study of war, and have therefore brought them back into print, despite these imperfections.We hope you enjoy the unmatched breadth and depth of this collection, from the historical to the just-published works.
Author | : Matt Matthews |
Publisher | : CreateSpace |
Total Pages | : 84 |
Release | : 2012-02-14 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781470084325 |
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present its latest publication in the Occasional Paper Series, "We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There" The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan,1979-1989, by Mr. Matt Matthews. For this work, Mr. Matthews collected a wide variety of sources on the subject, many of them of primary accounts, and used these materials to provide an overview of the evolution of the Soviet operational approach in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. This Soviet experience offers a number of useful insights for American military professionals who are, as of this writing, conducting operations in Afghanistan. Mr. Matthews begins his study by examining the Soviets' planning for its invasion of Afghanistan and initial goals for that campaign. The author then looks closely at how the Soviets adapted their tactics and organization to meet the committed and resilient insurgent threat that emerged to do battle against Soviet forces. Despite conventional interpretations of this campaign in Afghanistan which emphasize the rigidity of Soviet methods, Matthews' study suggests that the Soviets were flexible in their overall approach. The Soviet government did, for example, launch nation-building initiatives that would look familiar to American military officers who served in Afghanistan in the first decade of the 21st century. These efforts, however, were seriously hindered by a Soviet military culture that opposed a more comprehensive campaign to foster a popular central Afghan government. Matthews concludes his study by examining Soviet operations to extract their forces from Afghanistan while nonetheless leaving a viable, if not popular, Afghan government in place.
Author | : Combat Studies Combat Studies Institute |
Publisher | : CreateSpace |
Total Pages | : 76 |
Release | : 2014-10-30 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781503027978 |
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present its latest publication in the Occasional Paper Series, "We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There" The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan,1979-1989, by Mr. Matt Matthews. For this work, Mr. Matthews collected a wide variety of sources on the subject, many of them of primary accounts, and used these materials to provide an overview of the evolution of the Soviet operational approach in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. This Soviet experience offers a number of useful insights for American military professionals who are, as of this writing, conducting operations in Afghanistan.
Author | : Carl von Clausewitz |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 388 |
Release | : 1908 |
Genre | : Military art and science |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Department of the Navy |
Publisher | : Vigeo Press |
Total Pages | : 84 |
Release | : 2018-10 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781948648394 |
The manual describes the general strategy for the U.S. Marines but it is beneficial for not only every Marine to read but concepts on leadership can be gathered to lead a business to a family. If you want to see what make Marines so effective this book is a good place to start.
Author | : Mao Tse-tung |
Publisher | : Courier Corporation |
Total Pages | : 130 |
Release | : 2012-03-06 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 0486119572 |
The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.
Author | : Craig Whitlock |
Publisher | : Simon and Schuster |
Total Pages | : 384 |
Release | : 2022-08-30 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 1982159014 |
A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.
Author | : Richard H. Shultz |
Publisher | : Columbia University Press |
Total Pages | : 342 |
Release | : 2009 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0231129831 |
By focusing on four specific hotbeds of instability-Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq-Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew carefully analyze tribal culture and clan associations, examine why "traditional" or "tribal" warriors fight, identify how these groups recruit, and where they find sanctuary, and dissect the reasoning behind their strategy. Their new introduction evaluates recent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the growing prevalence of Shultz and Dew's conception of irregular warfare, and the Obama Defense Department's approach to fighting insurgents, terrorists, and militias. War in the post-Cold War era cannot be waged through traditional Western methods of combat, especially when friendly states and outside organizations like al-Qaeda serve as powerful allies to the enemy. Bridging two centuries and several continents, Shultz and Dew recommend how conventional militaries can defeat these irregular yet highly effective organizations.
Author | : Aaron B. O'Connell |
Publisher | : University of Chicago Press |
Total Pages | : 387 |
Release | : 2017-04-03 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 022626579X |
American and Afghan veterans contribute to this anthology of critical perspectives—“a vital contribution toward understanding the Afghanistan War” (Library Journal). When America went to war with Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, it did so with the lofty goals of dismantling al Qaeda, removing the Taliban from power, remaking the country into a democracy. But as the mission came unmoored from reality, the United States wasted billions of dollars, and thousands of lives were lost. Our Latest Longest War is a chronicle of how, why, and in what ways the war in Afghanistan failed. Edited by prize-winning historian and Marine lieutenant colonel Aaron B. O’Connell, the essays collected here represent nine different perspectives on the war—all from veterans of the conflict, both American and Afghan. Together, they paint a picture of a war in which problems of culture, including an unbridgeable rural-urban divide, derailed nearly every field of endeavor. The authors also draw troubling parallels to the Vietnam War, arguing that ideological currents in American life explain why the US government has repeatedly used military force in pursuit of democratic nation-building. In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, this created a dramatic mismatch of means and ends that neither money, technology, nor weapons could overcome.