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Three Essays on Regulatory Economics

Three Essays on Regulatory Economics
Author: Muharrem Burak Onemli
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2010
Genre:
ISBN:

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Mandatory network unbundling is one of the foremost topics in regulatory economics today. The concept has crucial importance in the deregulation of many previously regulated industries including telecommunications, gas, electricity and railroads. Moreover, the topic has emerged as one of the more prominent issues associated with the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunication Act in the United States. Upon initial examination, establishing the correct costing standards and/or determining the correct input prices would seem important for sending the correct price signals to the entrants for their efficient make-or-buy decisions. Sappington (AER, 2005) uses a standard Hotelling location model to show that input prices are irrelevant for an entrant's make or buy decision. In this first essay, we show that this result is closely related to the degree of product differentiation when firms are engaged in price competition. Specifically, it is shown that input prices are irrelevant when firms produce homogeneous products, but are relevant for make-or-buy decisions when the entrant and incumbent produce differentiated products. These results suggest that, in general, it is important for regulators to set correct prices in order to not distort the entrants' efficient make-or-buy decisions. The second essay investigates optimal access charges when the downstream markets are imperfectly competitive. Optimal access charges have been examined in the literature mainly under the condition where only the incumbent has market power. However, network industries tend to exhibit an oligopolistic market structure. Therefore, the optimal access charge under imperfect competition is an important consideration when regulators determine access charges. This essay investigates some general principles for setting optimal access charges when downstream markets are imperfectly competitive. One of the primary objectives of this essay is to show the importance of the break-even constraint when first-best access charges are not feasible. Specifically, we show that when the first-best access charges are not feasible, the imposition of the break-even constraint on only the upstream profit of the incumbent is superior to the case where break-even constraint applies to overall incumbent profit, where the latter is the most commonly used constraint in the access pricing literature. Bypass and its implications for optimal access charges and welfare are also explored. The third essay is empirical in nature and investigates two primary issues, both relating to unbundled network element (UNE) prices. First, as Crandall, Ingraham, and Singer (2004) suggested, we will empirically test the stepping stone hypothesis using a state-level data set that spans multiple years. To do this, we will explore the effect of UNE prices on facilities-based entry. Second, in light of those findings, we will investigate whether the form of regulation (e.g. price cap and rate of return regulation) endogenously affects the regulator's behavior with respect to competitive entry. Lehman and Weisman (2000) found evidence that regulators in price cap jurisdictions tend to set more liberal terms of entry in comparison with regulators in rate-of-return jurisdictions. This paper investigates whether their result is robust to various changes in modeling, including specification and econometric techniques.


Essays in Regulatory Economics

Essays in Regulatory Economics
Author: Santiago Guerrero
Publisher:
Total Pages: 162
Release: 2011
Genre:
ISBN:

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This dissertation consists of three essays. The objective of the essays is to study the impacts of different regulations on the behavior of regulated agents. The first two essays focus on the analysis of non-traditional regulatory policies that complement traditional regulations consisting of inspections and fines for plants that violate regulations. The third essay studies the impacts of the Minimum Legal Drinking Age regulation on alcohol and marijuana consumption. The first essay of this dissertation analyzes the effects of disclosing information online and through the newspapers about Mexican gas stations that cheat the consumer by selling chiquilitros (liters that are less than a true liter). The information about gas stations that commit fraud is revealed through random inspections that the Consumer Protection Agency (PROFECO by its Spanish acronym) conducts on all gas stations in Mexico and is disclosed in PROFECO's website. Newspapers in different municipalities also publish reports with lists of gas stations that are reported by PROFECO as being in violation of regulations. Using data on inspection histories and local news reports, we estimate the impact of disclosing information online and through the newspapers on the probability of future regulatory compliance. Our findings show that disclosing information online significantly improves compliance with regulations. In contrast, newspaper reports are only effective at improving compliance rates for those gas stations that had been found in violation prior to the publication of the reports. One of the main reasons gas stations improve their behavior is that their sales are negatively affected as a result of bad publicity in the newspapers. Using a unique dataset with monthly gasoline sales at the gas station-level, we show that gas stations that were reported in the newspaper reports suffered a loss of sales of 2.2% to 2.4% in the month of the publication. The results suggest that public disclosure of firm's behavior through the media can serve as a complementary tool for inspections and fines in contexts were fines and sanctions are limited. The second essay studies the impacts of self-policing policies to induce environmental audits. State-level statutes in most of the states of the US provide firms that engage in environmental self-audits and that self-report their environmental violations, with a variety of different regulatory rewards, including "immunity" from penalties and "privilege" for information contained in self-audits. These regulations have been controversial in the environmental arena. Critics argue that they provide with incentives to polluters to reduce the level of care, increasing toxic emissions and inspection costs. Proponents argue instead that these regulations can effectively induce more care by polluting plants and lower EPA's enforcement costs. We find that, by encouraging self-auditing, privilege protections tend to reduce pollution and government enforcement activity; however, sweeping immunity protections, by reducing firms' pollution prevention incentives, raise toxic pollution and government inspection oversight. We conclude that self-policing policies that grant limited incentives to firms to self-audit are effective at reducing both toxic emissions and government enforcement effort, whereas those regulations that grant excessive protection by reducing the penalty from disclosed violations, increase both toxic emissions and enforcement costs. The third essay estimates the causal effect of increased availability of alcohol on marijuana use. We exploit the Minimum Legal Drinking Age regulation that restricts the consumption of alcohol for people younger than 21 and compare alcohol and marijuana consumption in individuals just below and just above the age of 21. We show that both the probability and frequency of marijuana consumption decrease sharply at age 21, while the probability and frequency of alcohol intake increase, suggesting that marijuana and alcohol are substitutes. We further find that the substitution effect between alcohol and marijuana is stronger for blacks than whites and for women than men. Overall, our results suggest that policies designed to limit alcohol use have the unintended consequence of increasing marijuana use.


Three Essays on Competition and Regulation

Three Essays on Competition and Regulation
Author: Dong-Ryeol Lee
Publisher:
Total Pages: 108
Release: 2010
Genre: Cell phone services industry
ISBN: 9781124380476

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