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There Will be Dancing

There Will be Dancing
Author: Susan E. Keats
Publisher:
Total Pages: 584
Release: 2000
Genre: Capitalists and financiers
ISBN:

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Samuel Johnson was born in Massachusetts in 1792. He married Charlotte Abigail Howe and they had seven children. Biographical sketches of Samuel and Charlotte and their descendants, as well as records of their ancestry is given in this volume. Descendants continue to be leaders of their communities and live in Massachusetts, and elsewhere.


Slaves of the Passions

Slaves of the Passions
Author: Mark Schroeder
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Total Pages: 237
Release: 2007-12-13
Genre: Philosophy
ISBN: 0199299501

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Mark Schroeder presents an original theory of reasons for action. This theory is broadly Humean, in holding that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires. Slaves of the Passions will be essential reading for anyone interested in metaethics, practical reason, or explanatory moral theory.


Weighing Reasons

Weighing Reasons
Author: Errol Lord
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Total Pages: 256
Release: 2016-02-01
Genre: Philosophy
ISBN: 0199315205

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In recent decades normative reasons-considerations that count in favor of one thing or another-have come to the theoretical fore in ethics and epistemology. A major attraction of normative reasons is that they have weight or strength. Reasons are particular considerations that count in favor of actions or attitudes to some degree. This feature is attractive to theorists who want to explain more complex normative phenomena in terms of a notion that is weighted. This volume aims to provide the beginnings for a theory of weight. The fourteen new essays fall into three groups. One set of essays addresses questions about the nature of weight. Topics include the relations between reasons and conditions and modifiers, between reasons and other weighted notions such as commitments, and different models of the interaction of reasons. A second set of essays addresses substantive questions: questions about weight relevant to value-first, desire-first, evidence-first and other normative research programs. A third set of essays applies issues in the theory of weight to broader ethical debates. The book thus not only makes novel contributions to debates in ethics and epistemology about the nature of normative reasons and their weight, it also makes a strong case for the theoretical fruitfulness of the ideology of normative reasons.


Explaining the Reasons We Share

Explaining the Reasons We Share
Author: Mark Schroeder
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Total Pages: 256
Release: 2014-05-22
Genre: Philosophy
ISBN: 0191022926

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Normative ethical theories generally purport to be explanatory—to tell us not just what is good, or what conduct is right, but why. Drawing on both historical and contemporary approaches, Mark Schroeder offers a distinctive picture of how such explanations must work, and of the specific commitments that they incur. According to Schroeder, explanatory moral theories can be perfectly general only if they are reductive, offering accounts of what it is for something to be good, right, or what someone ought to do. So ambitious, highly general normative ethical theorizing is continuous with metaethical inquiry. Moreover, he argues that such explanatory theories face a special challenge in accounting for reasons or obligations that are universally shared, and develops an autonomy-based strategy for meeting this challenge, in the case of requirements of rationality. Explaining the Reasons We Share pulls together over a decade of work by one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. One new and ten previously published papers weave together treatments of reasons, reduction, supervenience, instrumental rationality, and legislation, to paint a sharp contrast between two plausible but competing pictures of the nature and limits of moral explanation—one from Cudworth and one indebted to Kant. A substantive new introduction provides a map to reading these essays as a unified argument, and qualifies their conclusions in light of Schroeder's current views. Along with its sister volume, Expressing Our Attitudes, this volume advances the theme that metaethical inquiry is continuous with other areas of philosophy.


The Fundamentals of Reasons

The Fundamentals of Reasons
Author: Mark Schroeder
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Total Pages: 245
Release: 2024-05-02
Genre: Philosophy
ISBN: 0192650084

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The concept of a reason is now central to many areas of contemporary philosophy. Key theses in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of the emotions, among others, have come to be framed in terms of reasons. And yet, despite their centrality, theorists seem to take inconsistent things for granted about how reasons work, what kinds of things can be reasons, what reasons favor, and more. Somehow reasons have come to be both indispensable and impenetrable. The Fundamentals of Reasons offers a comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of reasons. Focusing on the twin roles of reasons in explanation and deliberation, the book not only emphasizes what has made reasons central across philosophy but it also explores why philosophers have such incompatible pictures about what reasons are and how they work. Working from the inside out, Howard and Schroeder identify contentious assumptions about not only the internal structure of reasons but also their relationship to other important concepts, and then show how these contentious assumptions shape the many downstream applications of reasons in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and beyond. This mildly opinionated exploration of key questions about the significance and nature of reasons helps the reader to navigate this important part of the philosophical landscape and to get clearer about why reasons seem important and what their import, ultimately, is.


The Factive Turn in Epistemology

The Factive Turn in Epistemology
Author: Veli Mitova
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 257
Release: 2018-03
Genre: History
ISBN: 1107175658

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First comprehensive treatment of the ontology of epistemic normative notions including reasons, justification, and rationality, reflecting important current debates.


The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism

The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism
Author: Kelly James Clark
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Total Pages: 552
Release: 2015-12-23
Genre: Philosophy
ISBN: 1118657780

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The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism provides a systematic introduction to philosophical naturalism and its relation to other schools of thought. Features contributions from an international array of established and emerging scholars from across the humanities Explores the historical development of naturalism and its ascension to the dominant orthodoxy in the Western academy Juxtaposes theoretical criticisms with impassioned defenses, encapsulating contemporary debates on naturalism Includes discussions of metaphysics, realism, feminism, science, knowledge, truth, mathematics, free will, and ethics viewed through a naturalist lens


Humean Nature

Humean Nature
Author: Neil Sinhababu
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Total Pages: 224
Release: 2017-03-16
Genre: Philosophy
ISBN: 0191086479

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Neil Sinhababu defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. Desire motivates us to pursue its object, makes thoughts of its object pleasant or unpleasant, focuses attention on its object, and is amplified by vivid representations of its object. These aspects of desire explain a vast range of psychological phenomena - why motivation often accompanies moral belief, how intentions shape our planning, how we exercise willpower, what it is to be a human self, how we express our emotions in action, why we procrastinate, and what we daydream about. Some philosophers regard such phenomena as troublesome for the Humean Theory, but the properties of desire help Humeans provide simpler and better explanations of these phenomena than their opponents can. The success of the Humean Theory in explaining a wide range of folk-psychological and experimental data, including those that its opponents cite in counterexamples, suggest that it is true. And the Humean Theory has revolutionary consequences for ethics, suggesting that moral judgments are beliefs about what feelings like guilt, admiration, and hope accurately represent in objective reality.


The Theosophist

The Theosophist
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 694
Release: 1907
Genre: Theosophy
ISBN:

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Commonsense Consequentialism

Commonsense Consequentialism
Author: Douglas W. Portmore
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Total Pages: 287
Release: 2011-02-01
Genre: Philosophy
ISBN: 0199794685

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Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should be ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can. What's more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain. Although the primary aim of the book is to defend a particular moral theory (viz., commonsense consequentialism), Portmore defends this theory as part of a coherent whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not only to those working on consequentialism and other areas of normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics. Beyond offering an account of morality, Portmore offers accounts of practical reasons, practical rationality, and the objective/subjective obligation distinction.