The Winners Curse In Bilateral Negotiations Classic Reprint PDF Download

Excerpt from The Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations The economic theory of bargaining is built on the cornerstone of self-interest: when the Opportunity arises, profit-seeking individuals will negotiate and attain mutually beneficial agreements. Indeed, negotiation is often viewed as an analogue of or substitute for competitive markets that is, under the right conditions bargaining will generate Pareto efficient economic allocations, as will perfectly competitive markets.1 But perfect negotiations presuppose a number of conditions, in particular, that negotiators are perfectly rational and have perfect information about the bargaining situation. However, Bazerman and Neale (1983; Bazerman, 1983) have provided substantial evidence that negotiators deviate from rationality in systematically predictable ways. Short of the ideal of fully rational behavior, how will negotiations proceed? How should an individual negotiate when only imperfect or limited information about the negotiation setting is available? When he or she has worse information than the other side and both know it? What negotiating procedures are successful in reaching mutually beneficial agreements? About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.