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The Value of Relationship Banking During Financial Crises

The Value of Relationship Banking During Financial Crises
Author: Giovanni Ferri
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Total Pages: 48
Release: 2001
Genre: Bancos - Corea
ISBN:

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Relationship banking, with surviving banks, has a positive value during a systemic financial crisis. For many viable small and medium-size businesses in the Republic of Korea, relationship banking reduced liquidity constraints and thus diminished the probability of unwarranted bankruptcy during the country's financial crisis of 1997-98.


Psychology of Relationship Banking

Psychology of Relationship Banking
Author: James Lynch
Publisher: Woodhead Publishing
Total Pages: 248
Release: 1996-07-31
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9781855732445

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Jim Lynch's latest book focuses on one of the major threats to the banking industry - customer defection. The tradition of customers remaining loyal to their banks is fast disappearing. The economic and social threads which linked banker and client have become frayed and easily broken by recession and other forces of change. Customer relationships in all sectors are in need of repair, not just economically but psychologically. This book is a guide to bankers and others in financial services on how to forge, renew or strengthen banking relationships.


Relationship Banking and the Pricing of Financial Services

Relationship Banking and the Pricing of Financial Services
Author: Charles W. Calomiris
Publisher:
Total Pages: 73
Release: 2010
Genre:
ISBN:

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We investigate how banking relationships that combine lending and underwriting services affect the terms of lending, through both loan supply- and loan demand-side effects, and the underwriting costs of debt and equity issues. We capture and control for firm characteristics, including differences in the sequences of firm financing decisions (which we argue are likely to capture important cross-sectional heterogeneity, and which previously have been ignored in the literature). We construct a structural model of lending, which separately identifies loan supply and loan demand. Our approach results in significant improvement in the explanatory power of our regressions when compared to prior studies. We find no evidence that universal banks under-price loans to win underwriting business. Instead, we find that universal banks charge premiums for loans and underwriting services to extract value from combined lending and underwriting relationships. We also find that universal banks (as opposed to stand alone investment banks) enjoy cost advantages in both lending and underwriting, irrespective of relationship benefits. Part of the advantage borrowers may enjoy from bundling products may be a form of liquidity risk insurance, which is manifested in a reduced demand for lines of credit. We also find evidence of a acirc;euro;oelig;road showacirc;euro;? effect; firms that engage in debt underwritings enjoy loan pricing discounts on the loans that are negotiated at times close to the debt underwritings.


Banking and Trading

Banking and Trading
Author: Mr.Arnoud W.A. Boot
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 48
Release: 2012-10-02
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1475511213

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We study the effects of a bank's engagement in trading. Traditional banking is relationship-based: not scalable, long-term oriented, with high implicit capital, and low risk (thanks to the law of large numbers). Trading is transactions-based: scalable, shortterm, capital constrained, and with the ability to generate risk from concentrated positions. When a bank engages in trading, it can use its ‘spare’ capital to profitablity expand the scale of trading. However, there are two inefficiencies. A bank may allocate too much capital to trading ex-post, compromising the incentives to build relationships ex-ante. And a bank may use trading for risk-shifting. Financial development augments the scalability of trading, which initially benefits conglomeration, but beyond some point inefficiencies dominate. The deepending of the financial markets in recent decades leads trading in banks to become increasingly risky, so that problems in managing and regulating trading in banks will persist for the foreseeable future. The analysis has implications for capital regulation, subsidiarization, and scope and scale restrictions in banking.


Foundations of Relationship Banking

Foundations of Relationship Banking
Author: Bruce W. Morgan
Publisher:
Total Pages: 267
Release: 1994
Genre: Banks and banking
ISBN: 9780948394959

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Relationship Banking, Fragility and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem

Relationship Banking, Fragility and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem
Author: Fenghua Song
Publisher:
Total Pages: 50
Release: 2008
Genre:
ISBN:

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We address a fundamental question in relationship banking: why do banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarily with core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance such loans with purchased money? We show that not only are relationship loans informationally opaque and illiquid, but require the relationship between the bank and the borrower to endure in order for the bank to add value. However, the informational opacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawal risk that makes the bank fragile. Core deposits are an attractive funding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidity services to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihood of premature deposit withdrawal, thereby facilitating the continuity of relationship loans. That is, we show that banks will wish to match the highest value-added liabilities with the highest value-added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizes the bank's fragility due to withdrawal risk and maximizes the value the bank adds in relationship lending. We also examine the impact of interbank competition on the bank's asset-liability matching and extract numerous testable predictions.