The Us Approach To Post Conflict Stability In The Southern Balkans And Its Consequences 1999 2001 PDF Download

This study focuses on the U.S. policy approach to stability in the southern Balkans in the two year period following NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo. To fully investigate how U.S. policy may have contributed to the spillover of inter-ethnic conflict in the southern Balkans, this study specifically undertakes a detailed examination of two inter-related cases--that of the South Serbia's 2000-2001 Presevo Valley insurgency, and that of the 2001 Macedonia internal conflict. It categorizes and defines the character of both of these conflicts as insurgencies, demonstrates their inter-relationship, traces their development, and examines how the United States formulated policies and counterinsurgency strategies in response to them. The study attempts to demonstrate that the 2001 internal conflict in the Republic of Macedonia represents an outcome of U.S. and NATO decision-making rooted in the problem of Kosovo and South Serbia, and that the spillover of conflict from South Serbia to Macedonia in 2001 was in large part a consequence of the success of the U.S. approach to dealing with the Albanian guerrilla movement based in the Ground Safety Zone. A central theme of this study has also been to highlight not only the development of a successful policy approach to dealing with a complex ethnically-based security problem, but also to underscore how even a successful strategy may have negative second or third order consequences. The study also examines in detail the bureaucratic processes of the U.S. policymaking process during this period and highlights the existence of a shared image of Balkan security problems on the part of the actors within the U.S. governmental bureaucracy.