The Republic Of Vietnam Armed Forces PDF Download

An American army general presents an insider's history of the Vietnam War with “a tough, dispassionate, common-sense analysis” of what went wrong (Baltimore Sun). On April 30, 1975, Saigon and the government of South Vietnam fell to the communist regime of North Vietnam, ending twenty-five years of struggle for American military forces. This is the story of what went wrong there militarily, and why. General Bruce Palmer experienced the Vietnam War in the field and in the highest command echelons. America's most serious error, he believes, was committing its armed forces to a war in which neither political nor military goals were ever fully articulated by our civilian leaders. Our armed forces, lacking clear objectives, failed to develop an appropriate strategy, instead relinquishing the offensive to Hanoi. Yet an achievable strategy could have been devised, Palmer believes. Moreover, our South Vietnamese allies could have been bolstered by appropriate aid but were instead overwhelmed by the massive American military presence. Compounding these errors were the flawed civilian and military chains of command. The result was defeat for America and disaster for South Vietnam. “Perhaps the best single account of the Vietnam War by a military man.” —Baltimore Sun