The Journal Of Philosophy Psychology And Scientific Methods Volume 3 PDF Download

Excerpt from The Journal of Philosophy, 1906, Vol. 3: Psychology and Scientific Methods Cognitive experience, as a category, is a reflexive and secondary accomplishment of the mind. This does not mean! That it is a crea tion, nor that it is a discovery, as of some elusive and almost invisible content, but'that it is as a category an after-view. In direct living we are in presence of things; we know nothing of cognition. The cognitive experience, as direct, reports not itself, but its object; and its most immediately empirical language is, 'the thing is, ' or 'is here, ' or 'i know the thing, ' but never 'the thing is held in cogni tive experience.' Whatever the change may be that makes this last language possible, it is a change which throws into relief a new environment of the object. Previously, a thing was known by virtue of its simple presence; now it is seen to be known quite as much by virtue of the presence of something else than itself. The necessary conditions of knowledge are, first, that the thing known be present in some way in the stuff of experience; but, second, that it be present under specific inner auspices. Knowledge, from this angle, is no longer transparent, and its transcendence is wrapped up in these now visible auspices of the thing therein known. In fact, it is here that we come upon that ingredient of transcendence which Professor Bakewell has brought into the field: to this envelope, as other than the experience known, is referable in some way that 'pointing be yond itself' which is characteristic of experience as known. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.