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| Author | : Paul Steel Clyde |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 242 |
| Release | : 1990 |
| Genre | : Institutional investments |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Malik M. Hafeez |
| Publisher | : Universal-Publishers |
| Total Pages | : 333 |
| Release | : 2015-12-16 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1627340505 |
Corporate Governance and Institutional Investment focuses on corporate governance and the legal nature of institutional investors in the corporate system. Its aim is to expose the complexity of the relationships that exist between companies on one side, and their shareholders, stakeholders, and monitors on the other. Various types of investors, including trusts and companies, are discussed, including how they function under different legal guidelines. The role of investment managers acting on the behalf of institutional investors is examined, as well as why fund managers overlook the corporate governance problems of their investee’s companies when they are performing well financially. This complexity is one of the main reasons why corporate scandals still occur, despite the existence of an extensive academic literature on corporate governance and the sustained efforts by the corporate community around the world. An analysis of how the monitoring role of institutional investors became effective in the light of company law and trusts is presented by using a comparative model involving the U.K., the U.S.A., Pakistan, and continental Europe. Financial scandals of the last decade such as Enron, Northern Rock, and the banking crisis are also examined. Finally, a review of regulatory approaches which rely upon formal rules and institutions backed by the state legal system, and non-regulatory approaches emphasizing the market mechanism and contractual arrangements, is included.
| Author | : Incheol Kim |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 52 |
| Release | : 2016 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This paper studies the drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of institutional investors in curbing earnings management in an international setting. We identify three distinct drivers and propose two competing hypotheses: the hometown advantage hypothesis predicts that because of proximity to monitoring information, domestic institutions have a comparative advantage over foreign institutions in deterring earnings management, whereas the global investor hypothesis predicts that foreign institutions have a comparative advantage because of their proclivity toward activism and ability to deploy superior monitoring technologies. Consistent with the hometown advantage hypothesis, in aggregate, domestic, but not foreign, institutional ownership is associated with less earnings management; the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves as they gain proximity to monitoring information. Consistent with the global investor hypothesis, the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves in environments of greater agency conflicts or weaker governance controls or when the gap in monitoring technology between foreign and domestic institutions widens.
| Author | : OECD |
| Publisher | : OECD Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 78 |
| Release | : 2011-07-01 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9264116052 |
This report reflects long-term, in-depth discussion and debate by participants in the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance.
| Author | : Miriam Schwartz-Ziv |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 62 |
| Release | : 2018 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Widely-cited theoretical models predict that large shareholders will monitor management, while small shareholders will free-ride. However, we find that institutional investors are particularly likely to oppose management on Say-On-Pay for their small-scale shareholdings; the presence of a large blockholder further catalyzes their opposition. We also find that the scale of investment at the institutional level predicts voting patterns better than the scale of investment at the fund level. Overall, our findings demonstrate that, when a low-cost monitoring opportunity is available, small positions that aggregate to a large level of ownership across institutions can play a meaningful role in corporate governance.
| Author | : Ted Seides |
| Publisher | : Harriman House Limited |
| Total Pages | : 197 |
| Release | : 2021-03-23 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 0857198874 |
The chief investment officers (CIOs) at endowments, foundations, family offices, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds are the leaders in the world of finance. They marshal trillions of dollars on behalf of their institutions and influence how capital flows throughout the world. But these elite investors live outside of the public eye. Across the entire investment industry, few participants understand how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. What’s more, there is no formal training for how to do their work. So how do these influential leaders practice their craft? What skills do they require? What frameworks do they employ? How do they make investment decisions on everything from hiring managers to portfolio construction? For the first time, CAPITAL ALLOCATORS lifts the lid on this opaque corner of the investment landscape. Drawing on interviews from the first 150 episodes of the Capital Allocators podcast, Ted Seides presents the best of the knowledge, practical insights, and advice of the world’s top professional investors. These insights include: - The best practices for interviewing, decision-making, negotiations, leadership, and management. - Investment frameworks across governance, strategy, process, technological innovation, and uncertainty. - The wisest and most impactful quotes from guests on the Capital Allocators podcast. Learn from the likes of the CIOs at the endowments of Princeton and Notre Dame, family offices of Michael Bloomberg and George Soros, pension funds from the State of Florida, CalSTRS, and Canadian CDPQ, sovereign wealth funds of New Zealand and Australia, and many more. CAPITAL ALLOCATORS is the essential new reference manual for current and aspiring CIOs, the money managers that work with them, and everyone allocating a pool of capital.
| Author | : Theodor Baums |
| Publisher | : Walter de Gruyter |
| Total Pages | : 725 |
| Release | : 2011-05-02 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 311089338X |
The volume contains 23 articles by international experts, both scholars and practioners dealing with the development of institutional investors (such as banks, insurances, investment companies, pension funds etc.), their investment and voting policies, the impact on managements of the companies concerned and related issues. The consequences of the international development on capital markets as well as policy implications for the respective national legislations are treated.
| Author | : Jeffrey L. Callen |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2013 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This study tests two opposing views of institutional investors -- monitoring versus short-termism. We present evidence that institutional investor stability is negatively associated with one-year-ahead stock price crash risk, consistent with the monitoring theory of institutional investors but not the short-termism theory. Our findings are shown to be robust to alternative empirical specifications, estimation methods and endogeneity concerns. In addition, we find that institutional ownership by public pension funds (bank trusts, investment companies, and independent investment advisors) is significantly negatively (positively) associated with future crash risk, consistent with findings that pension funds more actively monitor management than other types of institutions.
| Author | : David M. Smith |
| Publisher | : John Wiley & Sons |
| Total Pages | : 418 |
| Release | : 2011-10-27 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1118148762 |
An informative look at institutional investment management methods and practice The policies, practices, and decisions of institutional investment managers worldwide affect the economic health of not only the institutions themselves, but of countless individual clients as well. Overall, this area of finance has great impact on the capital markets. Filled with in-depth insights and practical advice, Institutional Money Management is an important basis of knowledge regarding both the theory and practice of this ever-evolving area of finance. Part of the Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance, this book on institutional investment management showcases contributed chapters from professional and academic experts in banking, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, and endowments. Along the way, issues covered included everything from the role of institutional investors within the financial system and the structures that have emerged and evolved to industry standards of ethical practice and investment performance presentation. Provides a detailed examination of the objectives, constraints, methods, and stakeholders for the dominant types of institutional investors Focuses on the portfolio management strategies and techniques used by institutional investors Contains contributed chapters from numerous thought-leaders in the field of finance The practice of institutional investment management presents a diverse set of challenges. But with this book as your guide, you'll gain a better understanding of how you can overcome these challenges and manage your portfolio more effectively.
| Author | : Hanmo Zhong |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2020 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Prior studies conceptualize institutional monitoring by the terms "concentration of institutional investors" and "heterogeneity in institutional investors". This paper focuses on the frequency of institutional investors' corporate site visits (CSV) in relation to firms' performance. In the context of acquisition, I hypothesize that bidding firms with more institutional investors' CSV will have higher abnormal announcement-period return. However, the results indicate that more institutional investors' CSV cannot predict better acquisition decisions, unless they meet firms' CEO or high-level managements during site visits. The reason could be that internal communication in companies is not efficient due to the hierarchy of the organization. These findings survive a number of robustness tests, including tests after winsorizing data, alternative measures for corporate site visit, and alternative samples. Moreover, further analysis shows that institutional investor' CSV and institutional ownership are complements of each other in terms of enhancing corporate governance.
