The Guide To Monitorships PDF Download

Monitorships are a common part of the suite of sanctions for corporate misconduct. Prosecutors show an increasing interest in actively reforming corporate criminals and seem to favor using monitors for the job. Judges, too, can and do impose sentences that involve monitor-directed reform. The role of the corporate monitor, in light of its new-found prominence, has come under increasing scrutiny by academics. The general tenor of the resulting discourse has been one of concern, namely that monitors do too much or too little, the wrong thing or the right thing in the wrong way. Corporate lawyers and academics generally incline towards the efficiencies of private ordering, which is reflected in their preference for relatively hands-off sanctions, such as fines. Monitor-directed corporate reform is anything but hands-off. This chapter sounds a relatively rare note of enthusiasm for the criminal justice potential of the corporate monitor. When private ordering becomes corrupted by familiar pathologies of the organizational setting - agency costs, collective action barriers, or ineffective information channels - a more hands-on approach may be the most effective remedy. As instruments of criminal justice, monitors and the promise of reform they bring should be evaluated in light of the goals of corporate criminal law. Monitors may be uniquely situated as the most promising agents for achieving the goals of corporate criminal law. In fact, when corporate monitors are effectively used, they may obviate the need for any other form of corporate sanction.