The Effect Of Accounting Conservatism On Firm Valuation PDF Download

Accounting conservatism is often described as an equilibrium reaction used to moderate a decrease in value resulting from information asymmetry, uncertainty, or private information that occurs between investors and managers (LaFond and Watts, 2008). Although a qualitative characteristic of the FASB conceptual framework, standard setters have addressed concerns that accounting conservatism may lack neutrality and can lead to biased firm reporting that misrepresents economic conditions. Based on the theoretical framework of litigation proposed by Watts (2003), I address whether firms with higher thresholds of litigation risk are inclined to use higher levels of asymmetric timeliness as a choice in reducing information asymmetry. The motivation for this study is to extend the concept of accounting conservatism to a setting that investigates firms with egregious levels of litigation risk to determine if they exhibit higher levels of accounting conservatism. In terms of regulation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted to increase transparency and disclosure in financial reporting and represents a more transparent shift in the information environment. I examine whether the asymmetric timeliness of earnings and firm-specific measures of accounting conservatism are more pronounced for alleged fraud firms in the post-SOX period, when litigation risk is expected to increase. In terms of standard setting, I examine if goodwill impairment is higher for firms accused of alleged fraudulent activity and whether these firms utilizing goodwill impairment maintain a higher degree of accounting conservatism. I investigate whether accounting conservatism, as a disclosure mechanism, can mitigate an increase in the cost of equity capital, even under the auspices of alleged fraud. Additionally, this study addresses the issue of whether there are contagion effects of asymmetric timeliness for firms in similar industries as the alleged fraud firms. The results suggest that the threat of litigation for alleged fraud firms invokes a higher degree of asymmetric timeliness surrounding the alleged fraud manipulation date in the financial statements vis-á-vis a control sample and is driven by the accrual component of earnings. The degree of asymmetric timeliness of earnings remains higher in the post-SOX period for alleged fraud firms. However, the relation between firm-specific measures of accounting conservatism and the post-SOX period vary depending on the measure used. Goodwill impairment is higher for firms accused of alleged fraudulent activity and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is greater for alleged fraud firms that utilize goodwill impairment. The relation between accounting conservatism and the cost of equity capital varies as to the measure used to construct the cost of equity capital. This suggests that firms are not able to influence the cost of equity capital through a more conservative disclosure policy. Also, there do not appear to be industry contagion effects. The findings lend support as to the role of accounting conservatism and why the FASB should continue to monitor its increasing effects. The results can provide support to investors, analysts, and academicians in adjusting for the effects of conservatism and to auditors in understanding how accounting conservatism could be used by firms and the multiple ways that it can be measured.