The Economic Consequences Of Increased Disclosure PDF Download

Seminar paper from the year 2020 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: 1.0, Mannheim University of Applied Sciences, language: English, abstract: A series of financial crises and corporate scandals gave rise to increasing concerns about prevailing models of corporate governance and disclosure and stimulated financial disclosure and reporting regulation. As a result, there has been considerably more interest in documenting the benefits of increased disclosure than its costs. Accordingly, numerous papers purport to provide evidence of capital market benefits through incremental disclosure. At the same time, firms refrain from voluntarily committing to increased disclosure, implying that there must be a trade-off between associated benefits and costs. Consequently, critics contend that the capital market benefits are inconclusive. Instead, increased disclosure may result in adverse capital market effects through increasing information asymmetry. Moreover, critics predict that increased disclosure imposes further costs on the firm. The purpose of this seminar thesis is to review existing literature on these expected costs of increased disclosure. Thereby, I focus on controversies regarding the heavily debated capital market effects as well as on specific forces that determine proprietary and litigation costs associated with increased disclosure. While a firm’s disclosure choices likely are a joint outcome of market forces and incentives provided by regulation, the seminar thesis is limited to voluntary disclosure choices as a starting point for possible disclosure regulation. The remainder of the seminar thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the capital market effects of voluntary disclosure through its impact on information asymmetry. Section 3 discusses the ambiguous impact of voluntary disclosure on litigation and proprietary costs. Section 4 concludes the seminar thesis.