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| Author | : S. M. Ravi Kanbur |
| Publisher | : World Bank Publications |
| Total Pages | : 43 |
| Release | : 1991 |
| Genre | : Impuestos |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Ravi Kanbur |
| Publisher | : Kingston, Ont. : Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University |
| Total Pages | : 35 |
| Release | : 1991 |
| Genre | : Commerce |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Queen's university. Institute for Economic Research |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 1991 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Mario Mansour |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 41 |
| Release | : 2013-07-09 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1484338774 |
We review the current state of the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s tax coordination framework, against the main objectives of the WAEMU Treaty of 1994: reduce distortions to intra-community trade, and mobilize domestic tax revenue. The process of tax coordination in WAEMU is one of the most advanced in the world—de jure at least—, but remains in many areas ineffective de facto. Nevertheless, the framework has, to some extent, succeeded in converging tax systems, particularly statutory tax rates, and may have contributed to improving revenue mobilisation. Important lessons can be drawn from the WAEMU experience, particularly in terms of whether coordination should take the form of harmonization through a top-down approach, or a softer approach of sharing best practice and limiting certain types of tax competition.
| Author | : Yutao Han |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 29 |
| Release | : 2013 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
In our paper, we demonstrate that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions differ in institutional quality. If tax revenues are used to gauge the desirability of coordination, our model demonstrates that imposing a uniform tax rate is Pareto-inferior to the non-cooperative equilibrium when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure. This result is completely reversed under pure tax competition if the countries are sufficiently similar in size. If a minimum tax rate is set within the range of those resulting from the non-cooperative equilibrium, the low tax country will never be better off. Finally, the paper demonstrates that the potential social welfare gains from tax harmonization crucially depend on the degree of heterogeneity among the competing countries.
| Author | : Marine Achelashvili |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 68 |
| Release | : 2011-11 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : 9783846550458 |
| Author | : Ben Lockwood |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 76 |
| Release | : 2000 |
| Genre | : Customs unions |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Vito Tanzi |
| Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
| Total Pages | : 28 |
| Release | : 1996-12 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : |
This paper discusses the implications for tax systems of globalization of capital markets and of economies. It shows the extent to which particular taxes are affected by the globalization process. It speculates on future developments in this area and on tax competition.
| Author | : Rajiv Biswas |
| Publisher | : Commonwealth Secretariat |
| Total Pages | : 332 |
| Release | : 2002 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780850926880 |
Many Commonwealth developing countries are potentially affected by the EU and OECD initiatives to regulate international tax competition. These articles by experts from Commonwealth countries discuss the concerns of affected nations, covering globalisation, fiscal sovereignty, WTO issues and more.
| Author | : Assaf Razin |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 11 |
| Release | : 2011 |
| Genre | : Economics |
| ISBN | : |
Abstract: The literature on tax competition with free capital mobility cites several reasons for the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis in the sense that tax competition may yield significantly lower tax rates than tax coordination. With a fixed (exogenously given) population that can move from one fiscal jurisdiction to another, the Tiebout paradigm suggests that tax competition among these jurisdictions yields an efficient outcome, so that there are no gains from tax coordination. The Tiebout paradigm considers the allocation of a given population among competing localities. Our model of international tax-transfer and migration competition among host countries deviates from the Tiebout paradigm in that the total population in the host countries and its skill distribution are endogenously determined through migration of various skills. As a result, competition needs not be efficient. This paper suggests that when a group of host countries faces an upward supply of immigrants, tax competition does not indeed lead to a race to the bottom; competition may lead to higher taxes than coordination
