Sovereign-debt renegotiations revisited
Author | : Raquel Fernández |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : Raquel Fernández |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Raquel Fernandez (Ph.D.) |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 44 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : Debt relief |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Boon-Chye Lee |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 156 |
Release | : 2019-09-06 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 1000316211 |
The author considers the risks that the failure of Third World economies pose for highly exposed banks, whose collapse would threaten domestic as well as international financial systems.
Author | : Kenneth Kletzer |
Publisher | : World Bank Publications |
Total Pages | : 64 |
Release | : 1990 |
Genre | : Debt relief |
ISBN | : |
Private renegotiation of debt repayments and new loans is inefficient because of the creditors' seniority privileges and lack of commitment and the inadequate information creditors have about debtors' policy choices.
Author | : Raquel Fernandez |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 32 |
Release | : 1988 |
Genre | : Debt relief |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Raquel Fernández |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 20 |
Release | : 1988 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 1988 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Jonathan Paul Thomas |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 25 |
Release | : 1996 |
Genre | : Debts, External |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Kenneth Kletzer |
Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
Total Pages | : 32 |
Release | : 2003-06 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : |
This paper compares the restructuring of sovereign bonds with and without collective action clauses. One conclusion is that collective action clauses can allow efficient debt renegotiation in a formal model of sovereign debt renegotiation while unanimity rules offer incentives for opportunistic behavior by bondholders that leads to inefficient outcomes. With collective action clauses, the mutual gains from renegotiation can be internalized by bondholders so that the holders of each bond issue have incentives to participate in a collective debt restructuring. The analysis abstracts from transactions costs, and the last conclusion might well be sensitive to renegotiation and coordination costs.