Sovereign Debt Renegotiations PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Sovereign Debt Renegotiations PDF full book. Access full book title Sovereign Debt Renegotiations.
Author | : Boon-Chye Lee |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 156 |
Release | : 2019-09-06 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 1000316211 |
Download The Economics Of International Debt Renegotiation Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
The author considers the risks that the failure of Third World economies pose for highly exposed banks, whose collapse would threaten domestic as well as international financial systems.
Author | : Kenneth Kletzer |
Publisher | : World Bank Publications |
Total Pages | : 64 |
Release | : 1990 |
Genre | : Debt relief |
ISBN | : |
Download Inefficient Private Renegotiation of Sovereign Debt Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Private renegotiation of debt repayments and new loans is inefficient because of the creditors' seniority privileges and lack of commitment and the inadequate information creditors have about debtors' policy choices.
Author | : Mr.Udaibir S. Das |
Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
Total Pages | : 128 |
Release | : 2012-08-01 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1475505531 |
Download Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010 Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.
Author | : Kenneth Kletzer |
Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
Total Pages | : 26 |
Release | : 2003-06-01 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1451855621 |
Download Sovereign Bond Restructuring Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
This paper compares the restructuring of sovereign bonds with and without collective action clauses. One conclusion is that collective action clauses can allow efficient debt renegotiation in a formal model of sovereign debt renegotiation while unanimity rules offer incentives for opportunistic behavior by bondholders that leads to inefficient outcomes. With collective action clauses, the mutual gains from renegotiation can be internalized by bondholders so that the holders of each bond issue have incentives to participate in a collective debt restructuring. The analysis abstracts from transactions costs, and the last conclusion might well be sensitive to renegotiation and coordination costs.
Author | : Raquel Fernandez |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 32 |
Release | : 1988 |
Genre | : Debt relief |
ISBN | : |
Download Sovereign-debt Renegotiations Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Author | : Raquel Fernández |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Download Sovereign-debt renegotiations revisited Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Author | : Raquel Fernandez (Ph.D.) |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 44 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : Debt relief |
ISBN | : |
Download Sovereign-debt Renegotiations Revisited Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Download Sovereign-debt Renegotiations Revisited Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Author | : Kenneth M. Kletzer |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 25 |
Release | : 2008 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Download Sovereign Bond Restructuring Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
This paper discusses the collective action problem in sovereign debt restructurings using a benchmark model of sovereign debt renegotiation. It considers the welfare comparison of outcomes sustainable under collective action clauses and under governing law that requires the unanimous agreement of bondholders to repayment revisions. One conclusion is that collective action clauses allow the implementation of an efficient renegotiation equilibrium for the model economy while unanimity rules provide incentives for opportunistic behavior by individual bondholders that leads to inefficient outcomes. The potential role for a multilateral sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is also discussed. It is argued that the establishment of an official international bankruptcy tribunal that collectively restructures all of a country's debt may not improve upon the universal adoption of collective action clauses for sovereign bond issues. With collective action clauses, mutual gains from collective renegotiation are internalized so that sufficient incentives exist for the private formation of bondholder councils to restructure various debt issues together. The approach abstracts from transactions costs, and the last conclusion might well be sensitive to renegotiation and coordination costs.
Author | : Ran Bi |
Publisher | : International Monetary Fund |
Total Pages | : 29 |
Release | : 2011-11-01 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 146392464X |
Download The Problem that Wasn't Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use.