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| Author | : Esmaeil Zarei |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 537 |
| Release | : 2024 |
| Genre | : Electronic books |
| ISBN | : 303162470X |
| Author | : Paul M. Salmon |
| Publisher | : CRC Press |
| Total Pages | : 368 |
| Release | : 2017-09-18 |
| Genre | : Technology & Engineering |
| ISBN | : 1317120124 |
This book provides an overview of, and practical guidance on, the range of human factors (HF) methods that can be used for the purposes of accident analysis and investigation in complex sociotechnical systems. Human Factors Methods and Accident Analysis begins with an overview of different accident causation models and an introduction to the concepts of accident analysis and investigation. It then presents a discussion focussing on the importance of, and difficulties associated with, collecting appropriate data for accident analysis purposes. Following this, a range of HF-based accident analysis methods are described, as well as step-by-step guidance on how to apply them. To demonstrate how the different methods are applied, and what the outputs are, the book presents a series of case study applications across a range of safety critical domains. It concludes with a chapter focussing on the data challenges faced when collecting, coding and analysing accident data, along with future directions in the area. Human Factors Methods and Accident Analysis is the first book to offer a practical guide for investigators, practitioners and researchers wishing to apply accident analysis methods. It is also unique in presenting a series of novel applications of accident analysis methods, including HF methods not previously used for these purposes (e.g. EAST, critical path analysis), as well as applications of methods in new domains.
| Author | : Nancy G. Leveson |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 555 |
| Release | : 2012-01-13 |
| Genre | : Science |
| ISBN | : 0262297302 |
A new approach to safety, based on systems thinking, that is more effective, less costly, and easier to use than current techniques. Engineering has experienced a technological revolution, but the basic engineering techniques applied in safety and reliability engineering, created in a simpler, analog world, have changed very little over the years. In this groundbreaking book, Nancy Leveson proposes a new approach to safety—more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world—based on modern systems thinking and systems theory. Revisiting and updating ideas pioneered by 1950s aerospace engineers in their System Safety concept, and testing her new model extensively on real-world examples, Leveson has created a new approach to safety that is more effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques. Arguing that traditional models of causality are inadequate, Leveson presents a new, extended model of causation (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, or STAMP), then shows how the new model can be used to create techniques for system safety engineering, including accident analysis, hazard analysis, system design, safety in operations, and management of safety-critical systems. She applies the new techniques to real-world events including the friendly-fire loss of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in the first Gulf War; the Vioxx recall; the U.S. Navy SUBSAFE program; and the bacterial contamination of a public water supply in a Canadian town. Leveson's approach is relevant even beyond safety engineering, offering techniques for “reengineering” any large sociotechnical system to improve safety and manage risk.
| Author | : |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 72 |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
The increasing complexity in highly technological systems such as aviation, maritime, air traffic control, telecommunications, nuclear power plants, defence and aerospace, chemical and petroleum industry, and healthcare and patient safety is leading to potentially disastrous failure modes and new kinds of safety issues. Traditional accident modelling approaches are not adequate to analyse accidents that occur in modern sociotechnical systems, where accident causation is not the result of an individual component failure or human error. This report provides a review of key traditional accident modelling approaches and their limitations, and describes new system-theoretic approaches to the modelling and analysis of accidents in safety-critical systems. It also discusses current research on the application of formal (mathematically-based) methods to accident modelling and organisational theories on safety and accident causation. This report recommends new approaches to the modelling and analysis of complex systems that are based on systems theory and interdisciplinary research, in order to capture the complexity of modern sociotechnical systems from a broad systemic view for understanding the multidimensional aspects of safety and accident causation.
| Author | : Kip Edward Johnson |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 290 |
| Release | : 2017 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
When interdependent conditions exist among decision units, safety results in part from coordination. Safety analysis methods should correspondingly address coordination. However, state-of-the-art safety analysis methods have limited guidance for analytical inquiry into coordination between interdependent decision systems. This thesis presents theoretical and applied research to address the knowledge gap by extending STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes)-based analysis methods STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) and CAST (Causal Analysis based on STAMP). This thesis contributes to knowledge by introducing: 1) a coordination framework for use in analysis, 2) STPA-Coordination and CAST-Coordination, which extend STPA and CAST to analyze coordination, and 3) flawed coordination analysis guidance for use in the extensions. The coordination framework provides explanatory power for observation of and analysis of coordination in sociotechnical systems. The coordination framework includes perspectives for use in the evaluation of coordination, which are used to operationalize the framework for analysis. STPA-Coordination extends STPA with additional steps for analysis of how coordination can lead to unsafe controls (i.e. hazards). In part, STPA-Coordination uses analysis guidance introduced in this thesis that consists of four unique flawed coordination cases and nine coordination elements. CAST-Coordination extends CAST with additional steps to investigate accident causation influences from flawed coordination. Two case studies evaluate the utility of extensions, flawed coordination guidance, and the framework. One case study investigates the application of STPA-Coordination to a current and significant sociotechnical system challenge-unmanned aircraft systems integration into military and civil flight operations. Results are compared to official functional hazard analysis and requirements results. The comparison shows that STPA-Coordination provides additional insights into identifying hazardous coordination scenarios and recommendations. Another case study applies CAST-Coordination to investigate a Patriot missile friendly fire (2003) during Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is a relevant concern today. CAST-Coordination is successfully applied to the friendly-fire coordination problem. When compared to official government accident investigation reports, CAST-Coordination shows benefits in identifying accident influences and generating recommendations to address the coordination and safety problem. Both case study quantitative and qualitative results are promising and suggest STPA- and CAST-Coordination and the coordination framework are useful.
| Author | : Nancy G. Leveson |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 555 |
| Release | : 2016-12-16 |
| Genre | : Science |
| ISBN | : 0262533693 |
A new approach to safety, based on systems thinking, that is more effective, less costly, and easier to use than current techniques. Engineering has experienced a technological revolution, but the basic engineering techniques applied in safety and reliability engineering, created in a simpler, analog world, have changed very little over the years. In this groundbreaking book, Nancy Leveson proposes a new approach to safety—more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world—based on modern systems thinking and systems theory. Revisiting and updating ideas pioneered by 1950s aerospace engineers in their System Safety concept, and testing her new model extensively on real-world examples, Leveson has created a new approach to safety that is more effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques. Arguing that traditional models of causality are inadequate, Leveson presents a new, extended model of causation (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, or STAMP), then shows how the new model can be used to create techniques for system safety engineering, including accident analysis, hazard analysis, system design, safety in operations, and management of safety-critical systems. She applies the new techniques to real-world events including the friendly-fire loss of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in the first Gulf War; the Vioxx recall; the U.S. Navy SUBSAFE program; and the bacterial contamination of a public water supply in a Canadian town. Leveson's approach is relevant even beyond safety engineering, offering techniques for “reengineering” any large sociotechnical system to improve safety and manage risk.
| Author | : Clifton A. Ericson, II |
| Publisher | : John Wiley & Sons |
| Total Pages | : 643 |
| Release | : 2015-06-12 |
| Genre | : Technology & Engineering |
| ISBN | : 1119101727 |
Explains in detail how to perform the most commonly used hazard analysis techniques with numerous examples of practical applications Includes new chapters on Concepts of Hazard Recognition, Environmental Hazard Analysis, Process Hazard Analysis, Test Hazard Analysis, and Job Hazard Analysis Updated text covers introduction, theory, and detailed description of many different hazard analysis techniques and explains in detail how to perform them as well as when and why to use each technique Describes the components of a hazard and how to recognize them during an analysis Contains detailed examples that apply the methodology to everyday problems
| Author | : Nathaniel Arthur Peper |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 109 |
| Release | : 2017 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This thesis presents the results of a study to compare Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), a hazard analysis methodology based on a new model of accident causation called Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), with the traditional assessments recommended by industry standards for analyzing safety risks in modern manufacturing workplaces that are increasingly incorporating automated systems. These increasingly complex, modern socio-technical systems are introducing new problems in the manufacturing environment that traditional methods of analysis were not designed to analyze. While these traditional methods have previously proven effective at analyzing hazards, the increasing levels of complexity and technological advancement in the factories are surpassing the limits of traditional assessment capabilities. Today's continuous search for opportunities to automate manufacturing process makes this a critical time to ensure that the hazard analysis methodologies in use are capable of providing an effective and efficient analysis. STAMP and STPA were developed specifically to understand and analyze modern, complex socio-technical systems that are introducing new types of accidents with causes beyond traditional component failures. This thesis provides background and discussion of traditional models and methods, of the current industry standard method, and of the proposed method. The current and proposed methods are then used on an actual semi-automated manufacturing process being implemented in an aerospace manufacturing company and analyzed with a set of criteria to determine their effectiveness and efficiency. The results of this analysis determine that STPA is better equipped for the modern manufacturing environment.
| Author | : Erik Hollnagel |
| Publisher | : Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. |
| Total Pages | : 161 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : Technology & Engineering |
| ISBN | : 1409445518 |
There has not yet been a comprehensive method that goes behind 'human error' and beyond the failure concept, and various complicated accidents have accentuated the need for it. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) fulfils that need. This book presents a detailed and tested method that can be used to model how complex and dynamic socio-technical systems work, and understand both why things sometimes go wrong but also why they normally succeed.
| Author | : Erik Hollnagel |
| Publisher | : CRC Press |
| Total Pages | : 158 |
| Release | : 2018-04-17 |
| Genre | : Technology & Engineering |
| ISBN | : 1317059794 |
Safety has traditionally been defined as a condition where the number of adverse outcomes was as low as possible (Safety-I). From a Safety-I perspective, the purpose of safety management is to make sure that the number of accidents and incidents is kept as low as possible, or as low as is reasonably practicable. This means that safety management must start from the manifestations of the absence of safety and that - paradoxically - safety is measured by counting the number of cases where it fails rather than by the number of cases where it succeeds. This unavoidably leads to a reactive approach based on responding to what goes wrong or what is identified as a risk - as something that could go wrong. Focusing on what goes right, rather than on what goes wrong, changes the definition of safety from ’avoiding that something goes wrong’ to ’ensuring that everything goes right’. More precisely, Safety-II is the ability to succeed under varying conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes is as high as possible. From a Safety-II perspective, the purpose of safety management is to ensure that as much as possible goes right, in the sense that everyday work achieves its objectives. This means that safety is managed by what it achieves (successes, things that go right), and that likewise it is measured by counting the number of cases where things go right. In order to do this, safety management cannot only be reactive, it must also be proactive. But it must be proactive with regard to how actions succeed, to everyday acceptable performance, rather than with regard to how they can fail, as traditional risk analysis does. This book analyses and explains the principles behind both approaches and uses this to consider the past and future of safety management practices. The analysis makes use of common examples and cases from domains such as aviation, nuclear power production, process management and health care. The final chapters explain the theoret
