Operational Maneuver from the Sea
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 24 |
Release | : 1997 |
Genre | : Maneuver warfare |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 24 |
Release | : 1997 |
Genre | : Maneuver warfare |
ISBN | : |
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 23 |
Release | : 2001 |
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In December 1995, the United States Marine Corps introduced Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) as its future warfighting concept. The cornerstone of OMFTS is Ship to Objective Maneuver, which maintains that future naval expeditionary forces will project combat power from over the horizon to inland operational objectives without establishing a traditional beachhead to serve as a base of operation. Long lines of operation will pose unique and difficult security problems for the OMFTS force. General Winfield Scott, during his Vera Cruz campaign, operated successfully over long lines of operation. Conversely, Field Marshal Montgomery, during Operation Market Garden, failed to adequately mitigate the risks associated with long lines of operation with disastrous results. The lessons learned from comparing and contrasting these two operations are profound yet critical for those who will both shape and employ the future OMFTS force.
Author | : Mark W. Beddoes |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 33 |
Release | : 1997 |
Genre | : Amphibious warfare |
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The U.S. Marine Corps concept for the projection of naval power ashore is Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS calls for movement of Marines from ships at sea directly to objectives deep inland without requiring a pause to build up combat power on the beach. Support for ground forces is expected to come from the sea, and be delivered primarily by air. This demands that sea based logistics assets remain sufficiently close to shore to allow air assets to conduct resupply operations directly to the battlefield. The implication of this is that Navy ships may sacrifice operational and perhaps tactical mobility while sustaining the Marine operation. This thesis determines the distance from the coastline sea based Combat Service Support (CSS) assets will be able to maintain and still support operations of a given magnitude, and how tactically constrained Navy ships will be in order to support this concept of expeditionary warfare. It focuses on the time distance weight/volume relationships involved, and takes into account characteristics of the resupply assets, such as aircraft availability, capacity, method of employment, and the effects of combat attrition. Three methods of employing a Marine Expeditionary Unit are studied, ranging from a traditional force mix to the use of small infestation teams. The analysis shows that the available CSS assets will not support a traditional ground force mix at the distances envisioned, but will Support the use of small teams. To fully realize OMFTS and still allow ships to maintain the desired standoff from shore will require a shift to more lethal Marine forces with much smaller logistical demands. Until such a force is feasible, the Navy should plan on providing support to Marines from close to shore. s and mission requirements.
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Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 1999 |
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The Navy and Marine Corps are developing doctrine that will enable them to execute maneuver warfare from sea based platforms as part of a concept called "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" (OMFTS). A key part of the effort to develop this innovative doctrine involves establishing effective Command and Control (C2) organizations that will foster success on tomorrow's battlefield. Vying for consideration in future OMFTS doctrine are three different proposals for Command and Control architecture. They include use of the current doctrine as delineated in Joint Pub 3-02 (CATF/CLF); placing amphibious components under a fleet Composite Warfare Commander as a Naval Expeditionary Task Force; or establishment of "supported" and "supported" units by the Commander Joint Task Force. Each of these concepts trace their ancestry to recent periods in military history-World War II, the Cold War era, or the Post Cold War period. To some degree each one mirrors the organization, equipment, and military philosophy in use during their development. When examined and validated against the philosophical approach embodied in OMFTS, only the "supported/supporting" concept has the flexibility to work in the high tempo environment predicated by OMFTS.
Author | : |
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Total Pages | : 18 |
Release | : 1995 |
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As the naval service approaches the 21st century with a revised philosophy about warfighting, it will be the combatant commander who is ultimately responsible for shaping the battlespace in this new strategic landscape. Creating the conditions necessary to achieve the military objective will be a driving factor in shaping operations. The principles of war will serve the combatant commander in the planning process of establishing those conditions. Operational Maneuver From The Sea(OMFTS) is clearly a new concept for employing the Navy and Marine Corps team. However, the basic fundamentals of warfighting are not new; embedded in the tabloids of history are their success in combat. As the naval service embraces the concepts behind OMFTS, combatant commanders should not cast away the principles that have lasted thousands of years. It is the principles of war that provide the architecture for building OMFTS. When applied to the traditional principles, OMFTS will serve to dissipate the fog of war. (AN).
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 106 |
Release | : 1999 |
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Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) provides the Marine Corps vision for conducting 21st-century naval expeditionary operations. This vision, which seeks to exploit the sea as maneuver space, involves projecting naval expeditionary forces and power directly from the sea onto operational objectives well inland, obviating the traditional need to first seize and secure a beachhead and build up a support base ashore before pushing out to accomplish inland operational objectives.
Author | : |
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Total Pages | : 29 |
Release | : 2004 |
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The Navy-Marine Corps team envisioned in Sea Power 21 has the potential to offer the future Joint Force Commander (JFC) a significant capability with the application of Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). In order to realize this potential however, the appropriate command and control structure must he available to the JFC. In a joint community that is becoming increasingly dependant on the use of functional component commanders in the execution of major operations, the need for a Joint Force Amphibious Component Commander (JFAMCC) is worthy of consideration as an organizational option. As amphibious command relationships continue to evolve, the need for a JFAMCC in addition to the Navy's Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) will he dependent on the size of the conflict, the geography of the theatre, and the capabilities of emergent weapons systems. The employment of an amphibious functional component commander offers significant benefits, however it also carries substantial costs. Considering those costs, the command relationships that are available for the planning and execution of amphibious operations are currently adequate. As the technology and procedures required for the execution of OMFTS mature, however, and amphibious forces are able to offer a truly operational capability to the JFC, a JFAMCC acting in concert with a JFMCC and the other standing functional component commanders will he an asset well worth the cost.
Author | : Norman J. Robison |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 18 |
Release | : 1995 |
Genre | : Amphibious warfare |
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Author | : Joaquin F. Malavet |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2000 |
Genre | : Dien Bien Phu, Battle of, Điện Biên Phủ, Vietnam, 1954 |
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The end of the Cold War and our current U.S. military dominance, combined with increased terrorists, despots, and rogue nation states with access to weapons of mass destruction, have significantly contributed to a more complex era and the exponential possibilities of world-wide asymmetrical threats for the 21st Century. The ability of the United States to protect its vital interests through the National Security Strategy (NSS) will thus be measured in part by the armed forces' ability to support the National Military Strategy (NMS) with capabilities against these threats. Both consistent with and supportive of the NSS and NMS, Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) is the conceptual template that provides a common direction for our services in developing a capabilities-based force within the joint framework of concepts, programs, and doctrine. The Marine Corps capstone operational warfighting concepts for maritime power projection, Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM), capitalize on the USMC maneuver warfare philosophy and support the NSS, NMS, and JV2010 guidance to Shape-Respond-Prepare Now. The principles and execution of these concepts offer warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINCs) options and solutions to asymmetrical threats in the 21st Century. However, those who choose to ignore the past are destined to repeat it. OMFTS/STOM vertical assault operations incur sustainment and fire support challenges similar to those encountered at Dien Bien Phu. This paper examines these sustainment and fire support challenges through a historical lens. These operational challenges represent a microcosm of challenges for the "Focused Logistics" and "Precision Engagement" tenets of Joint Vision 2010, and thus may influence our current and future strategy to defeat 21st Century asymmetrical threats.--Abstract.
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 29 |
Release | : 2000 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
The end of the Cold War and our current U.S. military dominance, combined with increased terrorists, despots, and rogue nation states with access to weapons of mass destruction, have significantly contributed to a more complex era and the exponential possibilities of world-wide asymmetrical threats for the 21st Century. The ability of the United States to protect its vital interests through the National Security Strategy (NSS) will thus be measured in part by the armed forces' ability to support the National Military Strategy (NMS) with capabilities against these threats. Both consistent with and supportive of the NSS and NMS, Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) is the conceptual template that provides a common direction for our services in developing a capabilities-based force within the joint framework of concepts, programs, and doctrine. The Marine Corps capstone operational warfighting concepts for maritime power projection, Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM), capitalize on the USMC maneuver warfare philosophy and support the NSS, NMS, and JV2010 guidance to Shape-Respond-Prepare Now. The principles and execution of these concepts offer warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINCs) options and solutions to asymmetrical threats in the 21st Century. However, those who choose to ignore the past are destined to repeat it. OMFTS/STOM vertical assault operations incur sustainment and fire support challenges similar to those encountered at Dien Bien Phu. This paper examines these sustainment and fire support challenges through a historical lens. These operational challenges represent a microcosm of challenges for the "Focused Logistics" and "Precision Engagement" tenets of Joint Vision 2010, and thus may influence our current and future strategy to defeat 21st Century asymmetrical threats.