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The Efficacy of Regulation Fair Disclosure

The Efficacy of Regulation Fair Disclosure
Author: Christopher Gadarowski
Publisher:
Total Pages: 48
Release: 2009
Genre:
ISBN:

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An informational advantage enjoyed by select few around material announcements was the concern raised by SEC in passing Regulation Fair Disclosure. To date, no large study has examined this question. We document stock price movements in the direction of the news two days prior to the announcements in pre Reg. FD period. After Reg. FD, pre-announcement abnormal return as a percentage of total return has decreased by 26.1% (21.4%) for large firms with good (bad) news. These findings support both the premise and the intended purpose of the regulation for large firms. Our tests failed to detect any such support for small firms.


Effective Company Disclosure in the Digital Age

Effective Company Disclosure in the Digital Age
Author: Gill North
Publisher: Kluwer Law International B.V.
Total Pages: 386
Release: 2015-10-16
Genre: Law
ISBN: 9041168184

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Effective corporate reporting and disclosure are critical in financial markets to promote vigorous competition, optimal performance, and transparency. This book examines whether existing disclosure frameworks in eight countries with the world's most significant securities exchanges achieve these objectives, and then, drawing on extensive empirical findings, identifies the policies and practices that contribute most to improving the overall quality of listed company reporting and communication. Contending that public disclosure of listed company information is an essential precondition to the long-term efficient operation of financial markets, the book provides analysis of such issues and topics as the following: - arguments for and against mandatory disclosure regimes; - key principles of periodic and continuous disclosure regulation; - tensions between direct and indirect investment in financial markets; - assumptions concerning the need to maintain a privileged role for financial intermediaries; - intermediary, analyst, and research incentives; - protection of individual investors; - selective disclosure; - disclosure of bad news; - the role of accounting standards; - public access to company briefings; - long term performance reporting and analysis; and - company reporting developments. A significant portion of the book provides an overview of disclosure regulation and practice in the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, and Singapore. A highly informative survey looks at company reports, disclosures, and websites of large listed companies, including Microsoft, Citigroup, Teck Resources, Deutsche Bank, BP, Sony, PetroChina Company, BHP Billiton, and Singapore Telecommunications. The book discusses common disclosure issues that arise across jurisdictions, provides valuable insights on the efficacy of existing disclosure regulation and practice, and highlights the important principles, processes, and practices that underpin best practice company disclosure frameworks. It will be welcomed by company boards and executives and their counsel, as well as by policymakers and scholars in the areas of corporate, securities, banking and financial law, accounting, economics and finance.


The Effectiveness of Regulation Fd

The Effectiveness of Regulation Fd
Author: Andreas Gintschel
Publisher:
Total Pages: 47
Release: 2003
Genre:
ISBN:

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We examine whether Regulation FD has reduced the informativeness of analysts' information outputs. For a sample of financial analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations released between October 23, 1999 and October 23, 2001, we show that in the post-Regulation period the absolute price impact of information disseminated by financial analysts is lower by 32%. We also show that the drop in price impact varies systematically with brokerage house and stock characteristics related to the level of selective disclosure prior to Reg FD. Based on the time-series and cross-sectional evidence we conclude Regulation FD has been effective in curtailing selective disclosure.


Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection
Author: Baljit K. Sidhu
Publisher:
Total Pages: 40
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

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Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000, was designed to prohibit disclosure of material private information to selected market participants. The informational advantage such select participants gain is unclear. If multiple ldquo;insidersrdquo; receive identical information, private information is immediately incorporated in price and each insider has zero expected profit. If, on the other hand, Regulation FD has curtailed the flow of information from firms, private information becomes longer-lived and more valuable. Hence, market makers will demand increased compensation by widening the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. We identify the cost components of the bid-ask spread for a sample of NASDAQ stocks surrounding the implementation of Regulation FD. Controlling for other factors affecting the spread, we find that adverse selection costs increase approximately 36% after Regulation FD. We interpret our finding as Regulation FD failing to achieve one of its desired objectives.


The Effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Leakage

The Effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Leakage
Author: Chi T. Mac
Publisher:
Total Pages: 29
Release: 2002
Genre:
ISBN:

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Reg FD was motivated by a desire to eliminate the (legal) trading advantage some investors had through selective disclosure practices. If this had been pervasive practice prior to Reg FD, then there should have been information leakage through price run-up before official earnings announcements. I analyzed the average cumulative abnormal returns for three samples: the NYSE and the largest and smallest capitalization firms of the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq pool. The results suggest that Reg FD affected large firms more than small ones and negative information releases more than positive ones. There is also evidence that information leakage was already subsiding before Reg FD became effective, possibly because of voluntary compliance or the demands of the increasing number of individual investors.


The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure

The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure
Author: Kumar Venkataraman
Publisher:
Total Pages: 34
Release: 2002
Genre:
ISBN:

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Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed a new rule, known as Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD), that prohibits selective disclosure of material information to analysts and other investment professionals. Both proponents and critics, in emphasizing different aspects of the information environment, have offered logical support for their views. Our study is designed to clarify the empirical impact of this new regulation on trading costs and, by inference, on the degree of information asymmetry extant in the equity markets. In brief, we find no evidence to suggest that Reg. FD has caused asymmetry to increase. On the contrary, our measures of trading costs suggest that the risk of adverse selection during information events has reduced significantly after the introduction of Reg. FD. In addition, we find some evidence that the SEC appears to be successful in accomplishing its objective of preventing select investors from gaining preferential access to material information before information events. In a cross-section, our analysis suggests that the more illiquid firms obtain, relatively, a greater benefit from this reduction in trading costs.Finally, our analysis of market model residuals and announcement period return prediction errors provides no support for the contention that Reg. FD increases return volatility and exaggerates price reactions to announcements. If anything, the data suggest that information flow around mandatory announcements has decreased but overall information flow is unchanged.


Regulation Fair Disclosure and Information Asymmetry

Regulation Fair Disclosure and Information Asymmetry
Author: Vesna Straser
Publisher:
Total Pages: 62
Release: 2002
Genre:
ISBN:

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With the institution of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on October 23, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed higher transparency requirements on the voluntary disclosure practices of public companies. This paper investigates whether the regulation induced companies to commit to higher or lower levels of voluntary disclosures by studying the changes in information asymmetry. The analysis is based on the extant economic theory suggesting that increases in the quantity and/or quality of disclosures should reduce companies' levels of information asymmetry. We study two proxies of information asymmetry - the probability of informed trading and the adverse selection component of the spread. After the implementation of Regulation FD we find a significant increase in both proxies of information asymmetry and the probability of new information events that contain private information while the proportion of informed traders decreases. An analysis of the volume of disclosures shows that the regulation was successful in increasing the quantity of available public information. Combined with the previous results we are able to conclude that, at least initially, companies responded to the regulation by providing more public information of lower quality.


Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Private Information of Analysts

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Private Information of Analysts
Author: Eric Zitzewitz
Publisher:
Total Pages: 47
Release: 2002
Genre:
ISBN:

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This paper reports evidence that Regulation Fair Disclosure has had its desired effect of reducing selective disclosure of information about future earnings to individual analysts without reducing the total amount of information disclosed. In particular, it finds that multi-forecast days, which typically follow public announcements or events, now account for over 70 percent of the new information about earnings, up from 35 percent before Reg FD. This result is obtained by applying a new methodology from Zitzewitz (2001a) for measuring the information content of individual forecasts. These results are strongest for the fourth quarter of 2000, when the SEC Chairman who introduced Reg FD was still in office; since the change in administration, some of the initial effects of Reg FD appear to have been reversed.