Misstated Quarterly Earnings Alternative Information And Financial Analyst Earnings Forecast Revisions PDF Download

Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Misstated Quarterly Earnings Alternative Information And Financial Analyst Earnings Forecast Revisions PDF full book. Access full book title Misstated Quarterly Earnings Alternative Information And Financial Analyst Earnings Forecast Revisions.

Earnings-Related Information Transfers and Revisions in Earnings Expectations

Earnings-Related Information Transfers and Revisions in Earnings Expectations
Author: Sundaresh Ramnath
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 1997
Genre:
ISBN:

Download Earnings-Related Information Transfers and Revisions in Earnings Expectations Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle

This paper examines the revisions in earnings expectations for non-announcing firms following the earnings announcements of related firms. Specifically, using quarterly earnings data I examine whether such revisions are predictable based on the information released by the announcing firm. Results of the study indicate that the correlation in forecast errors of announcing and non- announcing firms from previous quarters can be used to predict the revisions in earnings expectations of financial analysts and investors around the earnings announcement dates of related firms. Consistent with prior research documenting analyst under-reaction to publicly available information, I also find that analysts' forecast revisions that follow the early announcements do not seem to completely incorporate earnings-related information available from early-announcers in the group. An additional finding is that grouping firms based on patterns in analyst following yields more homogenous sets of firms than classifications based on four-digit SIC codes.


Earnings Announcement Disclosures and Changes in Analysts' Information

Earnings Announcement Disclosures and Changes in Analysts' Information
Author: Orie E. Barron
Publisher:
Total Pages: 45
Release: 2016
Genre:
ISBN:

Download Earnings Announcement Disclosures and Changes in Analysts' Information Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle

This study examines how financial disclosures made with earnings announcements affect analysts' information about future earnings, focusing on disclosures of financial statements and management earnings forecasts. We find that disclosures of balance sheets and segment data are associated with an increase in the degree to which analysts' forecasts of upcoming quarterly earnings are based on private information. Further analyses show that balance sheet disclosures are associated with an increase in the precision of both analysts' common and private information, segment disclosures are associated with an increase in analysts' private information, and management earnings forecast disclosures are associated with an increase in analysts' common information. These results are consistent with analysts processing balance sheet and segment disclosures into new private information regarding near-term earnings. Additional analysis of conference calls shows that balance sheet, segment, and management earnings forecast disclosures are all associated with more discussion related to these items in the questions-and-answers section of conference calls, consistent with analysts playing an information interpretation role with respect to these disclosures.


An Examination of Analysts' Target Price Forecasts After Accounting Misstatements

An Examination of Analysts' Target Price Forecasts After Accounting Misstatements
Author: Daniel Alan Street
Publisher:
Total Pages: 104
Release: 2020
Genre: Accounting
ISBN:

Download An Examination of Analysts' Target Price Forecasts After Accounting Misstatements Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle

I investigate the magnitude, accuracy, and informativeness of analysts' target price forecast revisions after material negative accounting misstatements. Although prior researchers find that analysts' earnings forecasts decline after misstatements, the effects of misstatements upon analysts' target price forecasts have not yet been investigated. Relative to analysts' target price forecasts for control firms, I find that analysts decrease their target price forecasts more sharply for misstating firms. Although analysts' target price forecast revisions are somewhat less accurate for misstating firms, I find that analysts' target price forecast revisions for misstating firms remain informative to the stock market. Several misstatement and target price forecast characteristics (misstated account, misstatement intention, SEC investigation, and CEO turnover after misstatement) affect the average magnitude, accuracy, and informativeness of analysts' target price forecast revisions. These findings inform investors regarding the extent to which they may effectively rely upon analysts' target price forecasts after material negative accounting misstatements and contribute to our knowledge of the value relevance of historical accounting and future earnings expectations for sell-side analysts.


Do Analysts Say Anything About Earnings Without Revising Their Earnings Forecasts?

Do Analysts Say Anything About Earnings Without Revising Their Earnings Forecasts?
Author: Philip G. Berger
Publisher:
Total Pages: 57
Release: 2016
Genre:
ISBN:

Download Do Analysts Say Anything About Earnings Without Revising Their Earnings Forecasts? Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle

We identify a novel bias in analyst forecasts, after revision bias, which we identify by examining an analyst's reports after his final earnings forecast of the quarter. We document that (i) qualitative predictions from the text of reports, (ii) share price target revisions, and (iii) revisions to next quarter's earnings forecast predict error in the current quarter's earnings forecast. Market returns are slow to impound the information in qualitative predictions and share price target revisions. Analysts are more likely to disseminate positive news after the current quarter's final earnings forecast, consistent with analysts acting to maintain a beatable benchmark for managers. We argue our findings are consistent either with analysts acting to tip clients or with frictions limiting the frequency of quarterly forecast revisions. Our results demonstrate that the value of the current quarter's earnings forecast to managers and investors distorts the flow of information into the forecast.