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Labor Supply Under Disability Insurance

Labor Supply Under Disability Insurance
Author: Frederic P. Slade
Publisher:
Total Pages: 24
Release: 2007
Genre:
ISBN:

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There has been a significant recent growth in the Social Security Administration's Disability Insurance (DI) program, both in the number of covered workers under the program and in the amount of monthly benefits, One possible factor causing this growth has been labor supply disincentives under the pro- gram. The labor supply decision by an individual involves the effect of the disability benefit structure (potential benefits) on labor force participation. Probit estimates from the 1969 original sample of the Longitudinal Retirement History Study (LRHS) indicated an elasticity of participation with respect to benefits of -0031 for married men aged 58-63, and -.023 for all men of the same age group. The magnitude of these estimates are much less than those found by authors such as Parsons, and suggest relatively insignificant efficiency losses in terns of reduced work effort.


Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply

Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply
Author: Jonathan Gruber
Publisher:
Total Pages: 56
Release: 1996
Genre: Disability insurance
ISBN:

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Disability Insurance (DI) is a public program that provides income support to persons unable to continue work due to disability. The difficulty of defining disability, however, has raised the possibility that this program may be subsidizing the early retirement of workers who are not truly disabled. A critical input for assessing the optimal size of the DI program is therefore the elasticity of labor force participation with respect to benefits generosity. Unfortunately, this parameter has been difficult to estimate in the context of the U.S. DI program, since all workers face an identical benefits schedule. I surmount this problem by studying the experience of Canada, which operates two distinct DI programs, for Quebec and the rest of Canada. The latter program raised its benefits by 36% in January, 1987, while benefits were constant in Quebec, providing exogenous variation in benefits generosity across similar workers. I study this relative benefits increase using both simple `difference-in-difference' estimators and more parameterized estimators that exploit the differential impact of this policy change across workers. I find that there was a sizeable labor supply response to the policy change; my central estimates imply an elasticity of labor force non-participation with respect to DI benefits of 0.25 to 0.32. Despite this large labor supply response, simulations suggest that there were welfare gains from this policy change under plausible assumptions about preference parameters.


Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the Labor Supply of Older Workers

Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the Labor Supply of Older Workers
Author: Jonathan Gruber
Publisher:
Total Pages: 48
Release: 1994
Genre: Age and employment
ISBN:

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Disability Insurance (DI), which provides income support to disabled workers, has been criticized for inducing a large fall in the labor force participation rate of older workers. We study the effects of one policy response designed to address this moral hazard problem: raising the rate at which DI claims are denied. Initial DI applications are decided at the state level, and, in response to a funding crisis for the DI program in the late 1970s, the states raised their rejection rates for first time applicants by 30% on average. The extent of this rise, however, varied substantially across states. We use this variation to estimate a significant reduction in labor force non-participation among older workers in response to denial rate rises. A 10% increase in denial rates led to a 2.7% fall in non- participation among 45-64 year old males; between 1/2 and 2/3 of this effect is a true reduction in labor force leaving, with the remainder accounted for by the return to work of denied applicants. We find some support for the notion that increases in denial rates effectively target their incentive effects to more able individuals; the fall in labor force non-participation was much stronger among more able workers, according to an anthropometric measure of disability.


Temporary Disability Insurance and Labor Supply

Temporary Disability Insurance and Labor Supply
Author: Per Pettersson-Lidbom
Publisher:
Total Pages: 36
Release: 2007
Genre:
ISBN:

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All OECD countries but Korea have compulsory insurance programs for temporary disability,that is, cash benefits for non-work-connected sickness or injury. Despite the economic significance of these programs little is known about their effects on labor supply. This paper provides such evidence from a reform in Sweden which increased the replacement rate for some workers while the replacement rate for other workers were left unchanged. This allows us to use a differences-in-differences design to estimate the elasticity of lost work time with respect to benefits. We find a substantial labor supply effects of temporary disability benefits: the estimate that incorporates both the incidence and duration of claims is between 4 and 5, that is, a 10 percent increase in short term sickness benefits is associated with a 40-50 percent decline in work time.


Disability

Disability
Author: Virginia P. Reno
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
Total Pages: 213
Release: 2010-12-01
Genre: Social Science
ISBN: 0815713487

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A Brookings Institution Press and National Academy for Social Insurance publication This book presents a cross-cutting assessment of disability income policy in public and private programs in the United States and in European countries. It evaluates whether there is a crisis in disability benefit policy, drawing on an in-depth review of Social Security disability programs by a panel of national experts. In addition to highlighting the panel's findings and recommendations for reform, the authors debate issues in financing and delivering quality health care through Medicare and Medicaid for working-age persons with disabilities, and they examine new developments in how Workers' Compensation organizes and finances cash benefits and health care for workers injured on the job. These developments in benefits and health policy for disabled workers are examined in light of budget constraints and challenges posed by today's rapidly changing labor market. The book concludes with a provocative discussion of "where are the jobs?"--an assessment of growing wage inequality between less skilled and highly skilled workers and the implication of labor market trends for goals of promoting employment among persons with chronic health conditions or disabilities. The contributors include Monroe Berkowitz, Rutgers University; Richard V. Burkhauser, Syracuse University; John Burton, Rutgers University; Philip de Jong, Institute for Law and Public Policy, Leiden University, the Netherlands; Alan Krueger, Princeton University; Katherine Newman, Harvard University; Van Ooms, Committee on Economic Development; Dallas Salisbury, Employee Benefit Research Institute; Leslie Scallet, Mental Health Policy Resource Center; and the Honorable Bruce C. Vladek, Health Care Financing Administration.


Take-up and Labor Supply Responses to Disability Insurance Earnings Limits

Take-up and Labor Supply Responses to Disability Insurance Earnings Limits
Author: Judit Krekó
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2022
Genre:
ISBN:

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In most disability insurance programs beneficiaries lose some or all of their benefits if they earn above an earnings threshold. While intended to screen out applicants with high remaining working capacity, earnings limits can also distort the labor supply of beneficiaries. We develop a simple framework to evaluate this trade-off. We use a reduction in the earnings limit in Hungary to examine screening and labor supply responses. We find that the policy changed selection into the program modestly but reduced labor supply significantly. Viewed through the lens of our model, these findings suggest that the earnings threshold should be higher.


Disability Benefits, Consumption Insurance, and Household Labor Supply

Disability Benefits, Consumption Insurance, and Household Labor Supply
Author: David H. Autor
Publisher:
Total Pages: 68
Release: 2019
Genre:
ISBN:

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There is no evaluation of the consequences of Disability Insurance (DI) receipt that captures the effects on households' net income and consumption expenditure, family labor supply, or benefits from other programs. Combining detailed register data from Norway with an instrumental variables approach based on random assignment to appellant judges, we comprehensively assess how DI receipt affects these understudied outcomes. To consider the welfare implications of the findings from this instrumental variables approach, we estimate a dynamic model of household behavior that translates employment, reapplication and savings decisions into revealed preferences for leisure and consumption. The model-based results suggest that on average, the willingness to pay for DI receipt is positive and sizable. Because spousal labor supply strongly buffers the household income and consumption effects of DI allowances, the estimated willingness to pay for DI receipt is smaller for married than single applicants.