Item Veto And Expanded Impoundment Proposals PDF Download

Conflicting budget priorities of the President and Congress accentuate the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. Impoundment, whereby a President withholds or delays the spending of funds appropriated by Congress, provides an important mechanism for budgetary control during budget implementation in the executive branch; but Congress retains oversight responsibilities at this stage as well. Many Presidents have called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide them with greater control over federal spending. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Title X of P.L. 93-344), established two categories of impoundments: deferrals, or temporary delays in funding availability; and rescissions, or permanent cancellation of budget authority. With a rescission, the funds must be made available for obligation unless both houses of Congress take action to approve the President's rescission request within 45 days of "continuous session." Consideration of impoundment reform increasingly became joined with that of an item veto for the President. While Constitutional amendment proposals have not disappeared (see H.J.Res. 15 and S.J.Res. 22 ), many who originally favored an item veto constitutional amendment turned to expanded rescission authority for the President as a functionally similar mechanism achievable more easily ...