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Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Complementary Products

Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Complementary Products
Author: Hui Li
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2018
Genre:
ISBN:

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This paper studies intertemporal price discrimination (IPD) with complementary products in the context of e-readers and e-books. Using individual-level data (2008-2012), I estimate a dynamic demand model for e-reader adoption and subsequent book quantity, reading format, and retailer choices in several book genres. I use the estimates to simulate a monopolist's optimal dynamic pricing strategies when facing forward-looking consumers. The results illustrate how skimming/penetration pricing incentives for e-readers and harvesting/investing incentives for e-books interact in this novel setting. The optimal joint IPD strategy is skimming for e-readers and investing for e-books. Counterfactual results suggest that combining IPD with complementary product pricing improves firm profitability because it attenuates the limitations of each pricing approach. In a single-product IPD setting, firms' pricing power is limited when consumers anticipate future price changes and delay purchases. Adding complementary products offers firms two pricing instruments; opposite price trajectories provide conflicting incentives for consumers, limiting intertemporal arbitrage. In a static complementary product setting, firms' pricing power is limited when the relative elasticity between the two products is heterogeneous and conflicting among consumers. Adding IPD sorts heterogeneous consumers into different periods and reduces the need to balance across consumer types.


Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Storable Goods Markets

Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Storable Goods Markets
Author: Igal Hendel
Publisher:
Total Pages: 36
Release: 2011
Genre: Economics
ISBN:

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Abstract: We study intertemporal price discrimination when consumers can store for future consumption needs. To make the problem tractable we offer a simple model of demand dynamics, which we estimate using market level data. Optimal pricing involves temporary price reductions that enable sellers to discriminate between price sensitive consumers, who anticipate future needs, and less price-sensitive consumers. We empirically quantify the impact of intertemporal price discrimination on profits and welfare. We find that sales: (1) capture 25-30% of the profit gap between non-discriminatory and third degree price discrimination profits, and (2) increase total welfare


Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Multiple Products

Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Multiple Products
Author: Jean-Charles Rochet
Publisher:
Total Pages: 52
Release: 2017
Genre: Monopolies
ISBN:

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We study the multiproduct monopoly profit maximisation problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly-ordered then optimality for the seller requires intertemporal price discrimination and it can be implemented by dynamic pricing on the cross-sell to the bundle. If consumers are perfectly negatively correlated, reducing the cross-sell price at a single point in time is optimal. For general valuations we show that if the cross-partial derivative of the profit function is negative then dynamic pricing on the cross-sell is more profitable than fixing prices. So we show that the celebrated Stokey (1979) no-discrimination-across-time result does not extend to multiple good sellers when consumers' valuations are drawn from the tilted uniform, the shifted uniform, the exponential, or the normal distribution. We extend our results to welfare, to complementarities in demand, and to the determination of optimal discount schedules.


Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Consumer Packaged Goods

Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Consumer Packaged Goods
Author: Ryan Mansley
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2022
Genre:
ISBN:

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Temporary price promotions, or sales, are common in many markets. Using retail scanner data, I find that manufacturers, not retailers, control the timing of sales, while retailers exercise some control over the magnitude of the price decrease. I also find that observed sale policy is more consistent with intertemporal price discrimination than with other explanations. I develop an empirically tractable model that is consistent with these facts and use it to show that sales generally improve consumer surplus and total welfare relative to static pricing. I also find that the effects of market concentration on sales are ambiguous; firms must have some degree of market power for sales to occur, but there are also scenarios when an increase in market power can decrease the occurrence of sales or eliminate them entirely.


Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Time-Varying Valuations

Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Time-Varying Valuations
Author: Victor F. Araman
Publisher:
Total Pages: 41
Release: 2020
Genre:
ISBN:

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A firm that sells a non perishable product considers intertemporal price discrimination in the objective of maximizing the long-run average revenue. Each period, a number of interested customers approach the firm and can either purchase on arrival, or remain in the system for a period of time. During this time, each customer's valuation changes following a discrete and homogenous Markov chain. Customers leave the system if they either purchase at some point, or their valuations reach an absorbing state v0. We show that, in this context, cyclic strategies are optimal, or nearly optimal. When the pace of intertemporal pricing is constrained to be comparable to customers patience level, we have a good control on the cycle length and on the structure of the optimizing cyclic policies. We also obtain an algorithm that yields the optimal (or near optimal) cyclic solutions in polynomial time in the number of prices. We cast part of our results in a general framework of optimizing the long-run average revenues for a class of payoffs that we call weakly coupled, in which the revenue per period depends on a finite number of neighboring prices.


Dynamic Pricing

Dynamic Pricing
Author: Mark Stenius Roberts
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 1977
Genre:
ISBN:

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Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Competition

Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Competition
Author: Ralph C. Bayer
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2006
Genre: Competition
ISBN:

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In this study we investigate the impact of competition on markets for non-durable goods where intertemporal price discrimination is possible. We develop a simple model of different potential scenarios for intertemporal price discrimination and implement it in a laboratory experiment. We compare the outcomes in monopolies and duopolies. Surprisingly, we find that competition does not necessarily prevent intertemporal price discrimination, as our model predicts. However, competition generally reduces sales prices, but by far less than theory predicts. As expected, competition increases efficiency.