International Cross Listing Of Chinese Firms PDF Download

The thesis, empirically investigates issues pertinent to the partial privatization of Chinese initial public offerings at home and abroad, especially on issues relating to Chinese enterprises? seeking overseas listings. Based on the asymmetric information hypotheses on initial public offerings (IPOs) and cross-border flotation literature, the proposed research includes both short-run and long-run methods, and covers the entire offering process of Chinese firms? going public in overseas markets. The investigation begins with an overview of Hong Kong?s and China mainland?s financial markets in Chapter II. The limitation of development in the domestic capital market, the desire of bringing Chinese SOEs into the international market, and the appropriate conditions in Hong Kong encourage Chinese companies to issue new shares in Hong Kong. Chapter III provides a comparative analysis on underpricing of Chinese and non-Chinese firms in Hong Kong, in order to discover the influence of asymmetric information on overseas listing and the correspondent offering strategies of Chinese companies and their underwriters. They are normally underwritten by highly reputable bankers, and the overwhelming majority of Chinese firms went public via bookbuilding when the market is on an optimal evaluation base. The average price range seems to be relatively conservative for promoting subscription demands. The potential loss can be partially mitigated by a positive price revision and carefully market timing. Chapter IV focuses on information disclosure and earnings forecasting accuracy in IPO prospectuses with their subsequent effects on aftermarket performance, since the accuracy of information becomes important in influencing IPOs offerings and after-market performance. The IPO profit forecasts errors represent a pessimistic bias on average, but it can be a crucial information resource for their investment decisions. The magnitude of forecasting errors is higher for China-related companies than local shares, indicating a higher asymmetric information level. The forecasts are not rational in the sense that managers correctly incorporate all available information, especially historical profits, in their forecasting. Also, the magnitude of forecasting errors can systematically affect the one-year trading performance. Due to the initial overvaluation, firms with higher initial returns actually underperform in the long run. And Chapter V, in order to discover the ultimate meanings and motives of such overseas listing, directly questions why and how the Chinese government takes so many many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) public in the international market. It concludes Chinese SOEs? overseas primary listing takes on the formidable tasks of macroeconomic partial privatization, home market protection, and domestic infantile market development. Large and?healthy? state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the government?s supporting industries are more likely to issue their shares on foreign, open, and well-developed stock exchanges when the target market is in good time of pricing and offering, in order to raise more capital, to operate under international standards, to send a positive signal of Chinese economic reform, and to indirectly protect the development of domestic financial market. Consequently, the partial privatization through an overseas primary listing approach is indeed a feasible way to facilitate domestic financial market growth, particularly for countries with a large economy but lack of a well-developed home capital market and a mature trading platform.