Insider Trading And Earnings Management PDF Download

The empirical motivation of this dissertation is the increasing importance of financialmarket?s regulation pursuant of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). There is currentlyincomplete knowledge on the relationship between insider trading and earningsmanagement on the one hand and earnings management and firm performance on the otherin light of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX). Moreover, the relevance of politicalregulation of financial markets has not yet been thoroughly investigated. The research aims of the dissertation are: 1) To evaluate the effectiveness of financialmarket regulation (SOX) on Insider trading and Earnings management 2) To empiricallyexamine how the different techniques used to manage earnings influence firm performancein light of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX). Both tests suggest ways in whichinvestors can examine and unravel a comprehensive set of earnings management signalsand their impact on either insider trading or future firm performance. The thesis is divided into two main empirical chapters: The first main empirical chapter(chapter 4) discusses insider trading and earnings management in light of the recentregulatory intervention mandated by the SOX. The second main empirical chapter (Chapter5) discuss changes in earnings management and firm performance relationship in light ofthe recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by SOX. In an attempt to obtain acomprehensive understanding of several conceptual issues, the different techniques used tomanage earnings are employed including, discretionary accruals techniques, real earningsmanagement and the probability of financial statements distortion as measured by theBeneish M-Score. Overall, the focus is on managers of S & P 500 companies, holders ofprivate information about the firm?s prospects, preparers and senders of financial reportsand investors and analysts as receivers and users of these financial statements. Findings on the relationship between insider trading and earnings management in light ofthe recent regulatory intervention suggest that after the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002,managers are less likely to time their trade and boast earnings to benefit at the expense ofoutside investors. Furthermore, under stricter regulations, market participants detect andreact to insider trading and earnings management practices. Findings on the relationship between a comprehensive set of earnings management signalsand firm performance suggest that there have been greater monitoring of financialIIIstatements in the Post SOX era. When firms attempt to manage earnings during periods ofintense market regulation, investors discount this through disappointing stock returns. Overall, the results suggest that there should be broad based approach in analysingfinancial statements.