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Implementation of the United States-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement

Implementation of the United States-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement
Author: G. Armantrout
Publisher:
Total Pages: 9
Release: 2004
Genre:
ISBN:

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The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) monitors and provides assurance that Russian weapons-grade HEU is processed into low enriched uranium (LEU) under the transparency provisions of the 1993 United States (U.S.)-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement. Meeting the Agreement's transparency provisions is not just a program requirement; it is a legal requirement. The HEU Purchase Agreement requires transparency measures to be established to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are met. The Transparency concept has evolved into a viable program that consists of complimentary elements that provide necessary assurances. The key elements include: (1) monitoring by technical experts; (2) independent measurements of enrichment and flow; (3) nuclear material accountability documents from Russian plants; and (4) comparison of transparency data with declared processing data. In the interest of protecting sensitive information, the monitoring is neither full time nor invasive. Thus, an element of trust is required regarding declared operations that are not observed. U.S. transparency monitoring data and independent instrument measurements are compared with plant accountability records and other declared processing data to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the 1993 Agreement are being met. Similarly, Russian monitoring of U.S. storage and fuel fabrication operations provides assurance to the Russians that the derived LEU is being used in accordance with the Agreement. The successful implementation of the Transparency program enables the receipt of Russian origin LEU into the United States. Implementation of the 1993 Agreement is proceeding on schedule, with the permanent elimination of over 8,700 warhead equivalents of HEU. The successful implementation of the Transparency program has taken place over the last 10 years and has provided the necessary nonproliferation assurances to the U.S. while developing an increasing level of trust and cooperation between the U.S. and Russian government agencies.


Implementation of the United States/Russian HEU Agreement

Implementation of the United States/Russian HEU Agreement
Author: E. Rutkowski
Publisher:
Total Pages: 8
Release: 2003
Genre:
ISBN:

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During Calendar Year (CY) 2002, the Russian Federation (R.F.) delivered low enriched uranium (LEU) from the conversion and processing of 30 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade (90% {sup 235}U assay) uranium. Through July 2003, the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) will have monitored the conversion of over 190 MT HEU into LEU. This total represents about 38 percent of the projected 500 MT HEU scheduled to be blended down through the year 2013 and is equivalent to the destruction of 7,600 nuclear devices. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) HEU-TIP monitors the processing of this HEU at four Russian uranium-processing plants. During CY 2002, United States (U.S.) personnel monitored this process for a total of 194 monitor-weeks by staffing a Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) located in Novouralsk, and through a series of five-day Special Monitoring Visits (SMV) to the four plants. U.S. monitor observations include the inventory of in-process containers, the observation of operations and non-destructive assay measurements (NDA) to determine {sup 235}U enrichment, as well as the examination and validation of Russian Material Control and Accountability (MC & A) documents. In addition, the U.S. designed Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) installed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) in January 1999 monitored all HEU blended at that facility, which is about 50 percent of the HEU blended into LEU during CY 2002. Recently we installed a BDMS at the Electrochemical Plant (ECP) in Zelenogorsk and plans are underway to install a BDMS at the Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE) in Seversk in late 2004. On a very positive note, interpersonal interactions between U.S. and Russian technical experts continues to expand and have proven to be an important element of the transparency regime. On the tenth anniversary of the HEU Purchase Agreement, the Ministry of the R.F. for Atomic Energy (Minatom) also saluted the successful implementation of the government-to-government program as ''an example of the effective realization of bilateral cooperation in real disarmament''. This paper describes the Program's monitoring efforts and achievements at the four Russian uranium processing plants, and will touch upon the issues of transparency and the natural uranium component activities.


Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nuclear Nonproliferation
Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release:
Genre: Nuclear nonproliferation
ISBN:

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This report discusses: 1. The status of the February 1993 HEU agreement's implementation, 2. USEC's performance as executive agent for the United States, 3. The impact of USEC's privatization and the HEU agreement on the United States' capability to produce fuel for nuclear power plants domestically, and 4. Federal oversight of the HEU agreement's implementation.


Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2000
Genre:
ISBN:

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This report discusses: 1. The status of the February 1993 HEU agreement's implementation, 2. USEC's performance as executive agent for the United States, 3. The impact of USEC's privatization and the HEU agreement on the United States' capability to produce fuel for nuclear power plants domestically, and 4. Federal oversight of the HEU agreement's implementation.


Russian Suspension Agreement

Russian Suspension Agreement
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Publisher:
Total Pages: 68
Release: 2008
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN:

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Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 41
Release: 2000
Genre:
ISBN:

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This report discusses: 1. The status of the February 1993 HEU agreement's implementation, 2. USEC's performance as executive agent for the United States, 3. The impact of USEC's privatization and the HEU agreement on the United States' capability to produce fuel for nuclear power plants domestically, and 4. Federal oversight of the HEU agreement's implementation.


HEU Transparency Implementation Program and Its Radiation Safety Program

HEU Transparency Implementation Program and Its Radiation Safety Program
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 8
Release: 2002
Genre:
ISBN:

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In February 1993, the Governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) signed a bilateral Agreement for the U.S. purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from 500 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons. The HEU Purchase Agreement serves important national security and nonproliferation policy imperatives for both countries since its implementation reduces the quantity of surplus Russian HEU that could be stolen and diverted for weapons use. In return, Russia receives much needed U.S. dollars over a 20-year delivery period. In 2001, Russia received over half a billion US dollars from the purchase of the LEU blended from 30 MT HEU. As part of this Agreement, transparency rights were agreed upon that provide confidence to both governments that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are being fulfilled. While the U.S. Department of State, in concert with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible negotiating transparency rights associated with this nuclear material, the NNSA is responsible for implementing those rights. These rights allow U.S. and R.F., personnel (called ''monitors'') to visit the processing facilities and observe the steps for processing the HEU into fuel for nuclear reactors. In this fashion, the processing of HEU to LEU is made ''transparent.'' For DOE, there are three transparency objectives: (1) that the HEU is extracted from nuclear weapons, (2) that this same HEU is oxidized, and (3) that the HEU is blended into LEU. For MINATOM, the transparency objective is: (1) that the LEU is fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors: The transparency is based on visits by designated transparency monitors (100 preapproved U.S. and Russian monitors) with specific rights to monitor and to access storage and processing areas to provide confidence that the nonproliferation goals of the agreement are met. The Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP), within NNSA implements the transparency provisions of the bilateral agreement. It is constantly making progress towards meeting its objectives and gathering the information necessary to confirm that Russian weapons-usable HEU is being blended into LEU. Since the first shipment in 1995 through December 2001, a total of 141 MT of weapons-grade HEU, about 28% of the agreed total and equivalent to 5,650 nuclear weapons, was converted to LEU, further reducing the threat of this material returning back into nuclear weapons. In the year 2001, the LEU sold to electric utility customers for fuel was sufficient to supply the annual fuel needs for about 50 percent of the U.S. installed nuclear electrical power generation capacity. There are four primary uranium processing activities involved in converting HEU metal components extracted from dismantled nuclear weapons into fuel for power reactors: (1) Converting HEU metal to purified HEU oxide; (2) Converting purified HEU oxide to HEU hexafluoride; (3) Downblending HEU hexafluoride to LEU hexafluoride; and (4) Converting LEU hexafluoride into reactor fuel. The first three processes are currently being performed at four Russian nuclear processing facilities: Mayak Production Association (MPA), Electrochemical Plant (ECP), Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE), and Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP). Following the blending down of HEU, the LEU hexafluoride is loaded into industry, standard 30B cylinders at the downblending facilities and transported to St. Petersburg, Russia. From there the LEU is shipped by sea to the United States where it is converted into fuel to be used in nuclear power plants. There are six U.S. facilities processing LEU subject to the HEU purchase agreement: the Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant, Global Nuclear Fuel -America, Framatome-Lynchburg, Framatome-Richland, Westinghouse-Hematite, and Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility.


Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security

Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security
Author: Russian Academy of Sciences
Publisher: National Academies Press
Total Pages: 118
Release: 2006-03-22
Genre: Political Science
ISBN: 0309097053

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In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.