Imperfect Contract Enforcement PDF Download
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Author | : James E. Anderson |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 64 |
Release | : 2002 |
Genre | : Contracts (International law). |
ISBN | : |
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We model imperfect contract enforcement when repudiators and their victims default to spot trading. The interaction between the contract and spot markets under improved enforcement can exacerbate repudiation and reduce contract execution, harming all traders. Improved contract execution benefits traders on the excess side of the spot market by attracting potential counter-parties, but harms them by impeding their exit from contracts found to be unfavorable. Multiple equilibria and multiple optima are possible, with anarchy a local optimum, perfect enforcement a local minimum and imperfect enforcement a global optimum. LDCs exhibit parameter combinations such that imperfect enforcement is optimal from their side of international markets. The model thus rationalizes the internationally varying patterns of imperfect enforceability observable in survey data.
Author | : Nicola Gennaioli |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 55 |
Release | : 2015 |
Genre | : Contracts |
ISBN | : |
Download Legal Evolution and Contract Evolution Under Imperfect Enforcement Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
We model optimal contracts and the evolution of precedents by introducing imperfect enforcement into a standard incomplete contracts setup. We assume that biased trial courts can refuse to verify novel evidence but are bound to respect precedents, namely to verify evidence that other judges verified in past cases. Despite judicial biases, optimal contracts are innovative (contingent on both precedents and novel evidence). Noisy evidence and judicial biases, however, introduce enforcement risk and cause incentives to be low-powered. The use of innovative contracts is key. Their litigation refines the law and makes it more informative, so enforcement improves. As a result, parties can in turn write more complete contracts, which enable higher- powered incentives and improve welfare. This beneficial mechanism is hampered by judicial bias, which slows down legal evolution and causes enforcement risk to persist for a long time.
Author | : Evelina Méngova |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 412 |
Release | : 2005 |
Genre | : Contracting out |
ISBN | : |
Download Essays on Outsourcing with Imperfect Contract Enforcement and International Trade Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Author | : Richard Gilbert |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 37 |
Release | : 2017 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Download Licensing and Innovation with Imperfect Contract Enforcement Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We model contract enforcement as a game with perfect information but probabilistic enforcement and explore the implications of weak enforcement on the design of licensing contracts, the conduct of firms and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per-unit royalty. Strictly positive per-unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. With imperfect enforcement, the licensor lowers variable royalties to reduce cheating. Although imperfect contract enforcement reduces the profits of the licensor, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.
Author | : Edward Yorio |
Publisher | : Wolters Kluwer |
Total Pages | : 832 |
Release | : 2011-01-01 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 145480114X |
Download Contract Enforcement Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Rev. ed. of: Contract enforcement / Edward Yorio. c1989.
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 2005 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Download Optimal Contracts Under Imperfect Enforcement Revisited Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Author | : Steven Y. Wu |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2020 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Download Contract Enforcement, Social Efficiency, and Distribution Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
We use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the distribution of surplus in a vertically coordinated market with buyer concentration. We find that if a third party (e.g., government) perfectly enforces contracts, social efficiency is enhanced. We also find that when third-party enforcement is imperfect, social efficiency will not necessarily decrease because trading partners find ways to self enforce contracts. However, opportunistic behavior by some traders leaves some sellers (growers) with ex post profits below reservation levels. Finally, partial or one-sided third-party enforcement causes significant efficiency losses by constraining subjects' ability to use informal enforcement instruments.
Author | : Steven J. Burton |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 504 |
Release | : 1995 |
Genre | : Contracts |
ISBN | : |
Download Contractual Good Faith Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Author | : Steven Y. Wu |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2010 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Download Contract Enforcement, Social Efficiency, and Distribution Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
We use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the distribution of surplus in a vertically coordinated market with buyer concentration. We find that if a third party (e.g., government) perfectly enforces contracts, social efficiency is enhanced. We also find that when third-party enforcement is imperfect, social efficiency will not necessarily decrease because trading partners find ways to self enforce contracts. However, opportunistic behavior by some traders leaves some sellers (growers) with ex post profits below reservation levels. Finally, partial or one-sided third-party enforcement causes significant efficiency losses by constraining subjects' ability to use informal enforcement instruments.
Author | : Albert E. Yorio |
Publisher | : Aspen Publishers |
Total Pages | : 256 |
Release | : 2001 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : |
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