Governance Crises And The Andean Region PDF Download

This monograph is an invaluable contribution to the ongoing study of Plan Colombia begun in February 2001 by the U.S. Army War College and the Dante B. Fascell North South Center of the University of Miami. In her presentation, Dr. Judith A. Gentleman of the U.S. Air War College demonstrates the widening impact of the "spillover effect" into each of Colombia's neighbors and into Brazil and Panama. She then proposes sensible ideas worthy of policymakers' consideration. For some time it has been apparent that the crisis of Colombia is no longer confined to that country. In fact, under no imaginable scenario can Colombia's problems be contained within it. The activities of drug traffickers and guerrillas are on the rise in the entire region, coming from Colombia. Given such compelling evidence of spillover, why has a regional, cooperative response been so slow in taking shape? Dr. Gentleman goes right to the heart of the matter: a pattern of competing objectives and inherent tensions. To begin, Plan Colombia was seen in the region as a U.S.-inspired initiative by Colombia, about which the neighboring countries were not consulted in advance. Its objectives, while broad, were supported only in their military component (and by the United States alone). Moreover, the United States and Colombia were not really in harmony as to the true objective, which, for the United States was suppression of the drug trade; and for Colombia, pacification of the guerrilla insurgency. The Andean countries have also come around slowly and grudgingly to the concept, as the author points out, that only extensive international cooperation will work in an age of globalization. To do so, however, requires at least partial renunciation of the cherished principles of "nonintervenv tion, national self determination, and sovereignty." Meeting in Cartagena in April 2001 before the Quebec City Summit of the Americas, Andean leaders agreed on a regional counternarcotics strategy. They also called on the United States to renew the Andean Trade Preference Act and to include Venezuela in it. Such agreement is a great step forward. Much depends on the support of the United States for such a comprehensive regional approach. The Bush administration has responded positively with its new Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) of over $800 million, announced in May 2001. It will expand assistance into seven countries in the areas of alternative economic development, infrastructure development, human rights activities, and initiatives other than fighting narcotics trafficking. The new U.S. approach may well draw the promised (but not delivered) European assistance to the developmental aspects of Plan Colombia. Dr. Gentleman recommends, however, that the new U.S. regional approach avoid simply responding to "political constraints rather than strategic analysis," by which she means "the political predilections" of Colombia's neighbors. She makes the case that a better level of analysis be applied to design a "defensible and feasible" policy and that a "special envoy" be appointed for the Andean region to oversee and coordinate the program.