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Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining

Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining
Author: Daniel Keniston
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2021
Genre:
ISBN:

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This paper uses detailed data on sequential offers from seven vastly different real-world bargaining settings to document a robust pattern: agents favor offers that split the difference between the two most recent offers on the table. Our settings include negotiations for used cars, insurance injury claims, a TV game show, auto rickshaw rides, housing, international trade tariffs, and online retail. We demonstrate that this pattern can arise in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an alternating-offer game with two-sided incomplete information, but this equilibrium is far from unique. We then provide a robust-inference argument to explain why agents may view the two most recent offers as corresponding to the potential surplus. Split-the-difference offers under this weaker, robust inference can then be viewed as fair. We present a number of other patterns in each data setting that point to split-the-difference offers as a strong social norm, whether in high-stakes or low-stakes negotiations.


Advances in Negotiation Theory

Advances in Negotiation Theory
Author: Carlo Carraro
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Total Pages: 55
Release: 2005
Genre: Bargaining
ISBN: 5061610121

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Abstract: Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determine the outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.


Fairness in Bargaining and Markets

Fairness in Bargaining and Markets
Author: Christian Korth
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 175
Release: 2009-07-25
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 3642022537

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This book focuses on economic bargaining theory. Economic bargaining theory seeks to predict the outcomes of bargaining situations. In such situations, govern ments, ?rms, or individuals share a mutual interest in cooperation; however, they also have con?icting interests regarding the terms of an agreement. A classic ex ample of such a situation is wage bargaining between unions and employers. More commonplace examples also exist. For instance, a discussion between partners on how to spend an evening can be understood as a bargaining situation. Economic bargaining theory explores the relationship between bargaining situ ations and the outcomes of the bargaining. Economists have two primary reasons to show interest in this relationship. The ?rst reason is that many important human interactions, including economic interactions, are bargaining situations. The second reason is that the understanding of these situations may inform the economic theory of markets. The tool utilized in this study is the mathematical theory of games. Predictions for bargaining outcomes are developed by modeling the bargaining situation as a strategic game and using game theoretic equilibrium concepts in order to solve the game. In this approach, the speci?c identi?ed bargaining outcome depends on the assumptions underlying the model. The neoclassical and fundamental assumption is that of rational agents—called economic men—who strive to maximize their utility based on stable preferences.


Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Author: Peter B. Linhart
Publisher:
Total Pages: 576
Release: 1992
Genre: Negotiation
ISBN:

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These 22 contributions to the economic theory of non co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy and delay in bargaining outcomes.


Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem

Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem
Author: Ferdinand von Siemens
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2011
Genre:
ISBN:

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In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.


Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-up Problem

Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-up Problem
Author: Ferdinand A. von Siemens
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2009
Genre:
ISBN:

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Abstract: "In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining." [author's abstract]


Bargaining Theory and Fairness

Bargaining Theory and Fairness
Author: Arwed Crüger
Publisher:
Total Pages: 173
Release: 2002
Genre: Crowding out (Economics)
ISBN: 9783428107414

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Two new bargaining games, called "Freedom to Punish (FTP)" and "Right and Choice to Punish (RAP)", are developed, analyzed and tested by means of an experimental implementation. Hypotheses about behavior are developed, discussed and tested. The central hypotheses are aimed at the importance of freedom of choice, on the difference between the FTP game and the RAP game, and on the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation. As might have been expected, fairness plays a role in both games, represented by the frequent appearances of equal splits as well as by the frequent rejections of unfair offers.In addition to that, fairness was crowded out by the new Institution of a veto power decision, confirming the importance of the institutional setting for behavior. Contrary to the few veto power sales in the RAP game, an amazingly high number of receivers refrained from veto power in the FTP game. This significant difference has clearly been attributed to the different information conditions and the existence of a bonus. This bonus can be interpreted in terms of freedom of choice, and exploits a value for the freedom to choose for the first time in experimental economics.


Two-person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information

Two-person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information
Author: Bettina Kuon
Publisher: Springer
Total Pages: 312
Release: 1994
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN:

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Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O.