Executive Compensation and Research and Development
Author | : Ronald Martin Singer |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 306 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : Ronald Martin Singer |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 306 |
Release | : 1989 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : United States. General Accounting Office. National Security and International Affairs Division |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 17 |
Release | : 1995 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Research and development.
Author | : John S. Beasley |
Publisher | : Edward Elgar Publishing |
Total Pages | : 553 |
Release | : 2012-01-01 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1781005109 |
Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.
Author | : Hampson, Tony |
Publisher | : [London, Ont.] : National Centre for Management Research and Development, University of Western Ontario |
Total Pages | : 8 |
Release | : 1991 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Andrea L. Gouldman |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 61 |
Release | : 2013 |
Genre | : Executives |
ISBN | : |
This study examines the effects of research and development (R&D) reporting method and managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation on R&D project continuation decisions. The current study employs an experiment with a 2x3 between-participants design, manipulating both R&D reporting method (expense vs. capitalize) and knowledge of supervisor compensation (control group with no knowledge vs. knowledge of non-restricted stock compensation vs. knowledge of restricted stock compensation). Using salient short-term incentives to motivate real earnings management, this study demonstrates that capitalization may result in managers foregoing economically efficient R&D investment opportunities. The results indicate that managerial knowledge of supervisor compensation structure has little influence on managers' R&D project continuation choices. However, when managers capitalizing R&D expenditures had knowledge that their supervisors received non-restricted (short-term) stock compensation their perceived personal responsibility for the decision significantly decreased. Participants who capitalized R&D expenditures and had knowledge that their supervisor received restricted (long-term) stock compensation rated the importance of making a decision to please their supervisor significantly higher than all other participants. Additionally, participants with knowledge that their supervisors restricted stock compensation were significantly more concerned about the likelihood of negative personal repercussions regardless of R&D reporting method. These findings contribute to the management accounting literature by providing new insights on the influence of knowledge of supervisor compensation on managerial decision making as well as additional insights into the factors that contribute to and limit real earnings management. This study also extends the literature on R&D by providing evidence of the potential for real earnings management when R&D expenditures are capitalized in the absence of personal responsibility.
Author | : Ralph Landau |
Publisher | : Stanford University Press |
Total Pages | : 484 |
Release | : 1996 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 9780804726047 |
A collection presenting the views of some of the world's most distinguished economists on long-term economic growth
Author | : Benjamin Hermalin |
Publisher | : Elsevier |
Total Pages | : 762 |
Release | : 2017-09-18 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0444635408 |
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Author | : Robert Gibbons |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 56 |
Release | : 1992 |
Genre | : Chief executive officers |
ISBN | : |
Investment decisions require trading off current expenditures against future revenues. If revenues extend far enough into the future, the executives responsible for designing long-run investment policy may no longer be in office by the time all the revenues are realized. We present evidence that: (1) on average, executives are close to leaving office (relative to the payout period of many investments); (2) bonuses based on accounting earnings constitute an important part of compensation for the typical executive; and (3) executives respond in predictable ways to compensation plans based on accounting measures of earnings. Based on these facts, we hypothesize that existing compensation policy induces executives to reduce investments during their last years in office. In our empirical work, however, we find that investment expenditures on research and development and on advertising tend to be largest in the final years of a CEO's time in office. We offer several possible explanations for this surprising finding.
Author | : United States Accounting Office (GAO) |
Publisher | : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform |
Total Pages | : 38 |
Release | : 2018-05-25 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781719598507 |
Federally Funded R&D Centers: Executive Compensation at The Aerospace Corporation
Author | : Rajiv D. Banker |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2016 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
We examine the relation between R&D intensity and the weights on ability indicators and financial performance measures in CEO compensation. The CEO's technology-related ability is likely more important in R&D intensive firms. Therefore, we predict that these firms place higher weights on indicators of technology-related ability, using the compensation contract as a screening device to mitigate the adverse selection problem. Both accounting and market performance measures are likely noisier in R&D intensive firms. Therefore, we predict that these firms rely less on short-term incentives tied to concurrent earnings and stock returns and rely more on long-term equity incentives. We test these predictions using hand-collected data on the education and professional background of the CEOs in Execucomp during 1992-2006. The results support our predictions and are robust. While prior research examined performance compensation in the context of moral hazard, our findings suggest that compensation based on ability indicators plays a screening role in the context of adverse selection.