Evolutionary stability in asymmetric population games
| Author | : Dieter Balkenborg |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 24 |
| Release | : 1995 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
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Evolutionary Stability In Asymmetric Population Games PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Evolutionary Stability In Asymmetric Population Games PDF full book. Access full book title Evolutionary Stability In Asymmetric Population Games.
Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability
| Author | : Immanuel M. Bomze |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 152 |
| Release | : 2013-12-19 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 364245660X |
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These Lecture Notes arose from discussions we had over a working paper written by the first author in fall 1987. We decided then to write a short paper about the basic structure of evolutionary stability and found ourselves ending up with a book manuscript. Parts of the material contained herein were presented in a seminar at the Department of Mathematics at the University of Vienna, as well as at a workshop on evolutionary game theory in Bielefeld. The final version of the manuscript has certainly benefitted from critical comments and suggestions by the participants of both the seminar and the workshop. Thanks are also due to S. Bomze-de Barba, R. Burger, G. Danninger, J. Hofbauer, R. Selten, K. Sigmund, G. Stiastny and F. Weising. The co-operation of W. Muller from Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, is gratefully acknowledged. Vienna, November 1988 Immanuel M. Bomze Benedikt M. Potscher III Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Strategies and payoffs 5 2. 1. A general setting for evolutionary game theory 6 2. 2. Mixed strategies and population games 8 2. 3. Finite number of strategies . . . . . 13 2. 4. Infinitely many (pure) strategies 15 2. 5. Structured populations: asymmetric contests and multitype games 17 2. 6. Additional remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. Evolutionary stability 25 3. 1. Definition of evolutionary stability 25 3. 2. Evolutionary stability and solution concepts in classical game theory 30 3. 3. Conditions for evolutionary stability based on the normal cone 31 3. 4.
Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games
| Author | : Larry Samuelson |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 1989 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
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Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games
| Author | : Larry Samuelson |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 50 |
| Release | : 1990 |
| Genre | : Game theory |
| ISBN | : |
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Game Theory, Two-player Animal Contests, Evolutionary Stable Strategies, and Evolution
| Author | : John Calhoun Zajac |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 596 |
| Release | : 1984 |
| Genre | : Behavior evolution |
| ISBN | : |
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Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
| Author | : Josef Hofbauer |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 356 |
| Release | : 1998-05-28 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 9780521625708 |
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Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Evolution and the Theory of Games
| Author | : John Maynard Smith |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 244 |
| Release | : 1982-10-21 |
| Genre | : Science |
| ISBN | : 9780521288842 |
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This 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.
Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory
| Author | : Tamer Basar |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 19?? |
| Genre | : Differential games |
| ISBN | : 9783319273358 |
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Résumé : "This will be a two-part handbook on Dynamic Game Theory and part of the Springer Reference program. Part I will be on the fundamentals and theory of dynamic games. It will serve as a quick reference and a source of detailed exposure to topics in dynamic games for a broad community of researchers, educators, practitioners, and students. Each topic will be covered in 2-3 chapters with one introducing basic theory and the other one or two covering recent advances and/or special topics. Part II will be on applications in fields such as economics, management science, engineering, biology, and the social sciences."
Evolutionary Game Dynamics
| Author | : American Mathematical Society. Short Course |
| Publisher | : American Mathematical Soc. |
| Total Pages | : 186 |
| Release | : 2011-10-27 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 0821853260 |
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This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games
| Author | : Ross Cressman |
| Publisher | : MIT Press |
| Total Pages | : 346 |
| Release | : 2003 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780262033053 |
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Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.
