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Essays on Sovereign Debt and Monetary Economics

Essays on Sovereign Debt and Monetary Economics
Author: Diego J. Perez
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2015
Genre:
ISBN:

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This dissertation contains three essays on Sovereign Debt and Monetary Economics. The first chapter, entitled 'Sovereign Debt, Domestic Banks and the Provision of Public Liquidity' studies the effect of a sovereign default in the domestic economy and its implications for the government's incentives to repay its debt. I explore two mechanisms through which a sovereign default can disrupt the domestic economy via its banking system. First, a sovereign default creates a negative balance-sheet effect on banks, which reduces their ability to raise funds and prevents the flow of resources to productive investments. Second, default undermines internal liquidity as banks replace government securities with less productive investments. I quantify the model using Argentinean data and find that these two mechanisms can generate a deep and persistent fall in output post-default, which accounts for the government's commitment necessary to explain observed levels of external public debt. The balance-sheet effect is more important because it generates a larger output cost of default and a stronger ex-ante commitment for the government. Post-default bailouts of the banking system, although desirable ex-post, are welfare reducing ex-ante since they weaken government's commitment. Imposing a minimum public debt requirement on banks is welfare improving as it enhances commitment by increasing the output cost of default. The second chapter, entitled 'Sovereign Debt Maturity Structure Under Asymmetric Information' studies the optimal choice of sovereign debt maturity when investors are unaware of the government's willingness to repay. Under a pooling equilibrium there is a wedge between the borrower's true default risk and the default risk priced in debt, and the size of this wedge differs with the maturity of debt. Long-term debt becomes less attractive for safe borrowers since it pools more default risk that is not inherent to them. In response, safe borrowers issue low levels of debt with a shorter maturity profile -relative to the optimal choice under perfect information- and risky borrowers mimic the behavior of safe borrowers to preclude the market from identifying their type. In times of financial distress, the default risk wedge of long-term debt relative to short-term debt increases which makes borrowers reduce the amount of debt issuance and shorten its maturity profile. I present empirical evidence on sovereign debt maturity choices and sovereign spreads for a panel of emerging economies that is consistent with the model's implications. The third chapter, entitled 'Price Setting Under Uncertainty About Inflation', is based on a working paper coauthored with Andres Drenik. This chapter provides an empirical assessment of the effects of the availability of public information about inflation on price setting. We exploit an event in which economic agents lost access to information about the inflation rate: starting in 2007 the Argentinean government began to misreport the national inflation rate. Our difference-in-difference analysis reveals that this policy led to an increase in the coefficient of variation of prices of 18% with respect to its mean. This effect is analyzed in the context of a general equilibrium model in which agents make use of publicly available information about the inflation rate to set prices. We quantify the model and use it to further explore the effects of higher uncertainty about inflation on the effectiveness of monetary policy and aggregate welfare. We find that monetary policy becomes more effective in a context of higher uncertainty about inflation and that not reporting accurate measures of the CPI entails significant welfare losses.


Essays on Sovereign Debt and Default

Essays on Sovereign Debt and Default
Author: Jarrod E. Hunt
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2014
Genre: Economics
ISBN:

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This dissertation is comprised of two essays focused on the central theme of sovereign default. In the first essay, I detail a method to improve forecasting models of sovereign default by evaluating the impact of a country's composition of debt. For my second essay, I assess the long-horizon impact of a sovereign default episode on a country's economic volatility. A country's external debt relative to gross domestic product is positively associated with the probability of being in default. Aggregate measures of external debt are commonly used for this type of risk analysis. However, based on the details of each loan, there are numerous subsets of external debt. Using a dataset of 32 developing countries from 1971-2010, I find that short-term debt, commercial bank loans, and concessional debt owed to other countries are the categories responsible for the positive relationship between the aggregate and the probability of being in default. In addition to isolating the categories driving the relationship between total external debt and sovereign default, I distinguish between the associated impact of each debt category on the probability of entering default and the probability of prolonging default. This is an important distinction as some subsets, such as bonds and multilateral concessional debt, are only related to the probability of entering default, while others, such as the use of IMF credit, are only significant when a country is already in default. Additionally, I find that short-term debt, commercial bank loans, and concessional bilateral debt positively affect both the probability of entering default as well as the probability of remaining in default. Focusing on the composition of external debt provides a more complete picture of the effect of debt on the probability of default, allowing for more precise forecasts of default probabilities. In my second chapter, I evaluate the impact of sovereign default on the volatility of gross domestic product, a relationship related to two strands of literature: one focused on the impact of sovereign default on output and another that evaluates the impact of economic volatility on growth in output. In addition to bridging the gap between the existing strands of literature, the dataset and techniques employed in this analysis offer advantages over those currently in use. First, the use of the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition addresses issues encountered by other, common trend-cycle decomposition methods. Second, this dataset, which spans 1870-2008, includes more sovereign default episodes per country, allowing for a richer region-specific evaluation. Using a dataset of 7 South American countries, I find that the volatility of output decreases following a sovereign default episode. Taking advantage of the considerable longitudinal dimension, I am also able to assess the impact of volatility on economic growth by looking at different sub-periods. I show evidence that from 1870-1959, economic volatility is positively related to growth while from 1960-2008, a commonly used time period in the literature, there is no effect. These findings suggest that volatility's influence on economic growth may change over time.


Essays on Sovereign Default and the Link with the Domestic Economy

Essays on Sovereign Default and the Link with the Domestic Economy
Author: Eugenia Andreasen
Publisher:
Total Pages: 61
Release: 2012
Genre: Debts, Public
ISBN:

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This thesis studies the causes and consequences of sovereign defaults focusing on non traditional links between sovereign default and the domestic economy: the impact of sovereign defaults on the external financial conditions for the private sector; and the ex-ante implications of the redistributive effects of default and repayment on the political support that the government requires to implement either of these decisions. In the first chapter of my thesis I analyze the worsening of the external financial conditions for the private sector that follows sovereign defaults. To explore the issue I develop a signaling model in which sovereign defaults reveal negative information to foreign lenders regarding the institutional quality in the country. Foreign lenders care about institutional quality because it affects the expected repayment of loans. Therefore, if foreign lenders receive negative information on the institutional quality from the sovereign default they worsen the financial conditions they offer to local firms triggering a sharp reduction in credit and investment (updating effect). The model can rationalize the worsened financial conditions in international capital markets for the private sector observed after default episodes. In the second chapter, a joint work with Guido Sandleris and Alejandro Van der Ghote, we analyze how the presence of political constraints affects sovereign governmentsborrowing and default decisions. We do so in a standard DSGE model with endogenous default risk where we introduce two novel features: heterogeneous agents in the domestic private sector and a requirement that the government obtains some of their support to implement the fiscal program needed to repay the debt. In this framework, we demonstrate that sovereign default can also arise due to insufficient political support and we explore the implications of different income distribution, political systems and tax systems over the repayment decision.


Essays in Sovereign Debt and Default

Essays in Sovereign Debt and Default
Author: Ming Qiu
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2019
Genre:
ISBN:

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This thesis consists of three papers on sovereign debt and default. Chapter 1 studies public provision of liquidity in a model of public and private linkages that allows partial sovereign default. Entrepreneurs use their holdings of domestic bonds as liquidity stock to carry out investment and the bond default risk arises from the government's trade-off between private consumption and public expenditure. The model features a feedback loop between aggregate investment and debt sustainability. An adverse productivity shock reduces the government's tax base and hence its ability to repay. The initial decrease in bond price shrinks the economy's liquidity stock and leads to more projects being liquidated. Lower tax base, in turn, reduces bond price further. Chapter 2 analyses the impact of disaster risk on risk premium of debt issued by emerging economies. I distinguish between "natural" and "economic" disasters based on the output dynamics prior to disaster occurrence. My empirical estimation results show that a sample of thirteen emerging countries are subject to economic disasters and the probabilities of disaster occurrence in those economies are positively correlated with their interest spreads. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction of a model constructed to compare economies with natural and economic disaster risks. Chapter 3 relaxes an assumption made in previous works on optimal policy that the government has perfect knowledge of states in the economy and considers a model of optimal provision of liquidity when the government only has partial information. I present solutions to the full information and partial information cases.


Essays on Sovereign Default

Essays on Sovereign Default
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 78
Release: 2013
Genre:
ISBN:

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This dissertation consists of three independent essays on sovereign default. In the first chapter, I develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of sovereign default to account for spillover of default risk across countries. When the collateral constraint for investors binds due to a decrease in the value of collateral, triggered by a high default risk for one country, credit constrained investors ask for liquidity premiums even to countries with normal fundamentals. This increase in the cost of borrowing increases incentives to default for the other countries with normal fundamentals, further constraining investors in obtaining credit through a decrease in the value of collateral. The quantitative results show that this model can generate spillover of default risk across countries. The essay in the second chapter introduces endogenous capital accumulation to a quantitative model of sovereign default based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). With a production technology in the model, output and interest rates are jointly determined by the interaction between a sovereign government who can optimally default and foreign creditors taking into account default risk. Adding investment enables the model to generate unique economic dynamics similar to those observed around emerging economies' default crises: (1) Emerging economies' debt crises display a boom-bust pattern. (2) A non-negligible fraction of sovereign defaults occur in good times. The essay in the third chapter explains why emerging economies borrow abroad in foreign currency. We present a two-period model in which foreign lenders offer a small open economy an optimal self-enforcing contract in which borrowing is denominated in borrowers' currency. Taking into account the government's incentive to inflate away the debt, the optimal lending contract provides consumption insurance for the economy in that the contract allows the economy for inflation in bad times but asks for deflation in good times. As the variance of income shocks for the economy increases, it gets more difficult for the contract to satisfy the incentive compatible constraints at the good income state. The numerical results are consistent with the fact that emerging economies with high income volatility suffer from "Original Sin".


Essays on Sovereign Debt in the Euro Area

Essays on Sovereign Debt in the Euro Area
Author: Niccolo Battistini
Publisher:
Total Pages: 176
Release: 2017
Genre: Debts, Public
ISBN:

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This dissertation explores the interaction between sovereign debt and investor preferences in the euro area during the recent crisis from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. From an empirical perspective, in Chapter 2 (written with Marco Pagano and Saverio Simonelli), we investigate the relationship between the divergence of sovereign yields and CDS premia and the rise in banks' home bias, as well as its rationale. Our approach is based on (i) the decomposition of yield differentials and CDS spreads in a country-specific and a common risk component via a dynamic factor model and (ii) the estimation of a vector error-correction model on 2008-12 monthly data. We find that (i) in euro area periphery countries, banks increase their domestic exposure in response to increases in country risk and (ii) in most euro area countries, banks respond to an increase in the common risk factor by raising their domestic exposures. Finding (i) suggests distorted incentives in periphery banks' response to changes in their own sovereign's risk. Finding (ii) indicates that, when systemic risk increases, all banks tend to increase the home bias of their portfolios, making the euro area sovereign market more segmented. Policy implications are finally drawn from these findings. From a theoretical perspective, Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the interactions between macroeconomic fundamentals and debtor and creditor incentives through the lenses of dynamic general equilibrium models with strategic sovereign default. In Chapter 3, I provide a theoretical framework to understand three phenomena occurred at the onset of the recent sovereign debt crisis: (1) the increase in investor risk aversion, (2) the reversal in the process of union-wide financial integration and (3) the rise in the perceived imperfect substitutability of government bonds. Advancing a novel approach to modelling optimal portfolio strategy, the model assumes investors to exhibit preferences with a constant elasticity of substitution between bonds, which is inversely related to the degree of risk aversion, perceived financial segmentation and imperfect asset substitutability. Consistently with empirical evidence, a low elasticity, representing adverse market sentiments, implies a high sensitivity of yields to macroeconomic fundamentals. In an empirical assessment, the model captures several features of Greek sovereign yields, debt and default before and during the crisis. Finally, Chapter 4 proposes a comprehensive analytical framework for the assessment of fiscal sustainability in the euro area. The standard Eaton-Gersovitz model is enriched with two novel features to reflect salient features of euro area economies. First, the presence of domestically held debt implies that a sovereign default, through lower repayments on sovereign debt, determines both benefits for the public sector and costs for private domestic investors. As the sovereign seeks to maximize domestic welfare, a higher domestic share of debt increases the government's incentives to honor its obligations and, thus, expands its borrowing opportunities. Second, the introduction of credible supranational fiscal rules creates the possibility for self-fulfilling debt crises and, accordingly, increases the borrowing costs for the government. In this way, fiscal rules reduce the sovereign's optimal level of debt and foster market-based fiscal discipline. In an empirical application, the calibrated average euro area country faces a low risk of default, but it can reap both welfare and sustainability gains through fiscal consolidation.


Essays on Sovereign Default

Essays on Sovereign Default
Author: JungJae Park
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2013
Genre:
ISBN:

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This dissertation consists of three independent essays on sovereign default. In the first chapter, I develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of sovereign default to account for spillover of default risk across countries. When the collateral constraint for investors binds due to a decrease in the value of collateral, triggered by a high default risk for one country, credit constrained investors ask for liquidity premiums even to countries with normal fundamentals. This increase in the cost of borrowing increases incentives to default for the other countries with normal fundamentals, further constraining investors in obtaining credit through a decrease in the value of collateral. The quantitative results show that this model can generate spillover of default risk across countries. The essay in the second chapter introduces endogenous capital accumulation to a quantitative model of sovereign default based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). With a production technology in the model, output and interest rates are jointly determined by the interaction between a sovereign government who can optimally default and foreign creditors taking into account default risk. Adding investment enables the model to generate unique economic dynamics similar to those observed around emerging economies' default crises: (1) Emerging economies' debt crises display a boom-bust pattern. (2) A non-negligible fraction of sovereign defaults occur in good times. The essay in the third chapter explains why emerging economies borrow abroad in foreign currency. We present a two-period model in which foreign lenders offer a small open economy an optimal self-enforcing contract in which borrowing is denominated in borrowers' currency. Taking into account the government's incentive to inflate away the debt, the optimal lending contract provides consumption insurance for the economy in that the contract allows the economy for inflation in bad times but asks for deflation in good times. As the variance of income shocks for the economy increases, it gets more difficult for the contract to satisfy the incentive compatible constraints at the good income state. The numerical results are consistent with the fact that emerging economies with high income volatility suffer from "Original Sin".


Three Essays on Sovereign Debt and Financial Markets

Three Essays on Sovereign Debt and Financial Markets
Author: Mauro Alessandro
Publisher:
Total Pages: 94
Release: 2011
Genre:
ISBN:

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This dissertation analyzes different aspects of the actions of borrowing and repaying debts by governments in both domestic and international financial markets. In Chapter 1, which is co-authored with Guido Sandleris and Alejandro Van der Ghote, we use a unique dataset on sovereign bond issuances and syndicated bank loans to study the duration and determinants of the periods of exclusion from international credit markets that usually follow governments' defaults. Among other results, we find that countries either reaccess the markets in the first years after a default or have to wait much longer to do it, and that political stability significantly increases the chances of reaccessing the market. We present a political economy model of endogenous sovereign borrowing and market reaccess that matches these two features of the data. In Chapter 2, 1 study the relation between the domestic financial system's market structure, the allocation of government debt and the cost of credit for the government. The fact that governments are less likely to repudiate their debts when there are more domestic agents among their creditors creates an externality: when domestic investors demand government bonds, they reduce the probability of default and improve the situation of every other bondholder. The concentration of investment decisions in fewer financial institutions increases the degree of internalization of this effect, expands the demand for government bonds by domestic agents and reduces the cost of credit for the government. In Chapter 3, I propose a mechanism that can explain the observed positive correlation between public and private spreads, taking into account that domestic banks tend to be heavily exposed to sovereign debt. Firms have private information about the results of their projects, information that can be obtained by domestic banks, as long as they pay a verification cost, but not by foreign creditors. A sovereign default has a negative impact on domestic banks, reduces their verification capacity and increases the incentives for firms to declare themselves insolvent. Consequently, risks of sovereign and private defaults are positively correlated.