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| Author | : Adrian Haddock |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
| Total Pages | : 369 |
| Release | : 2009-09-03 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0199231184 |
Epistemic Value is a collection of new essays by leading epistemologists, focusing on questions regarding the value of knowledge, such as: Is knowledge more valuable than true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal, or do other values enter the picture?
| Author | : Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
| Total Pages | : 381 |
| Release | : 2020-10-15 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0197529178 |
"This book collects 20 papers in epistemology by Linda Zagzebski, covering her entire career of more than 25 years. She is one of the founders of contemporary epistemology and is well-known for broadening the field and re-focusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. The subject areas of most of epistemology are included in these papers: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem"--
| Author | : Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 294 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0190278269 |
Gives an extended argument for epistemic authority from the implications of reflective self-consciousness. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. The book argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modelled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains. The book investigates the way the problem of disagreement between communities or between the self and others is a conflict within self-trust, and argue against communal self-reliance on the same grounds as the book uses in arguing against individual self-reliance. The book explains how any change in belief is justified--by the conscientious judgment that the change will survive future conscientious self-reflection. The book concludes with an account of autonomy. -- Información de la editorial.
| Author | : Adrian Haddock |
| Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
| Total Pages | : 368 |
| Release | : 2009-09-03 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191571121 |
Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.
| Author | : Michael Raymond DePaul |
| Publisher | : Clarendon Press |
| Total Pages | : 308 |
| Release | : 2003 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0199219125 |
"Virtue ethics has attracted a lot of attention and there has been considerable interest in virtue epistemology as an alternative to traditional approaches in that field. This book fills a gap in the literature for a text that brings virtue epistemologists and virtue ethicists together."-- Back cover.
| Author | : Ana-Maria Crețu |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 164 |
| Release | : 2019-11-29 |
| Genre | : Science |
| ISBN | : 3030270416 |
This open access book – as the title suggests – explores some of the historical roots and epistemological ramifications of perspectivism. Perspectivism has recently emerged in philosophy of science as an interesting new position in the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. But there is a lot more to perspectivism than discussions in philosophy of science so far have suggested. Perspectivism is a much broader view that emphasizes how our knowledge (in particular our scientific knowledge of nature) is situated; it is always from a human vantage point (as opposed to some Nagelian "view from nowhere"). This edited collection brings together a diverse team of established and early career scholars across a variety of fields (from the history of philosophy to epistemology and philosophy of science). The resulting nine essays trace some of the seminal ideas of perspectivism back to Kant, Nietzsche, the American Pragmatists, and Putnam, while the second part of the book tackles issues concerning the relation between perspectivism, relativism, and standpoint theories, and the implications of perspectivism for epistemological debates about veritism, epistemic normativity and the foundations of human knowledge.
| Author | : Heather E. Douglas |
| Publisher | : University of Pittsburgh Pre |
| Total Pages | : 227 |
| Release | : 2009-07-15 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 082297357X |
The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the United States, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process. Some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious. Since World War II, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be "value-free." In Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal, Heather E. Douglas argues that such an ideal is neither adequate nor desirable for science. She contends that the moral responsibilities of scientists require the consideration of values even at the heart of science. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, thus protecting the integrity and objectivity of science. In this vein, Douglas outlines a system for the application of values to guide scientists through points of uncertainty fraught with moral valence.Following a philosophical analysis of the historical background of science advising and the value-free ideal, Douglas defines how values should-and should not-function in science. She discusses the distinctive direct and indirect roles for values in reasoning, and outlines seven senses of objectivity, showing how each can be employed to determine the reliability of scientific claims. Douglas then uses these philosophical insights to clarify the distinction between junk science and sound science to be used in policymaking. In conclusion, she calls for greater openness on the values utilized in policymaking, and more public participation in the policymaking process, by suggesting various models for effective use of both the public and experts in key risk assessments.
| Author | : Jonathan L. Kvanvig |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 234 |
| Release | : 2003-08-21 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 1139442287 |
Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.
| Author | : Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 289 |
| Release | : 2017 |
| Genre | : Language Arts & Disciplines |
| ISBN | : 0190655844 |
In Exemplarist Moral Theory of Linda Zagzebski presents an original moral theory based on direct reference to exemplars of goodness, whom we identify through the emotion of admiration. Using examples of heroes, saints, and sages, she shows how narratives of exemplars and empirical work on the most admirable persons can be incorporated into the theory to serve both theoretical and practical purposes.
| Author | : Allan Hazlett |
| Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
| Total Pages | : 317 |
| Release | : 2013-10-03 |
| Genre | : Philosophy |
| ISBN | : 0191662461 |
The value of true belief has played a central role in history of philosophy—consider Socrates' slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living, and Aristotle's claim that everyone naturally wants knowledge—as well as in contemporary epistemology, where questions about the value of knowledge have recently taken center stage. It has usually been assumed that accurate representation—true belief—is valuable, either instrumentally or for its own sake. In A Luxury of the Understanding, Allan Hazlett offers a critical study of that assumption, and of the main ways in which it can be defended. Hazlett defends the conclusion that true belief is at most sometimes valuable. In the first part of the book, he targets the view that true belief is normally better for us than false belief, and argues that false beliefs about ourselves—for example, unrealistic optimism about our futures and about other people, such as overly positive views of our friends—are often valuable vis-à-vis our wellbeing. In the second part, he targets the view that truth is "the aim of belief," and argues for anti-realism about the epistemic value of true belief. Together, these arguments comprise a challenge to the philosophical assumption of the value of true belief, and suggest an alternative picture, on which the fact that some people love truth is all there is to "the value of true belief".
