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Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation
Author: Lin Liu
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2014
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ISBN:

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We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.


Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice
Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2010
Genre:
ISBN:

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An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.


Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game
Author: Yuanzhu Lu
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2009
Genre:
ISBN:

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We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.


Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality

Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality
Author: Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2017
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ISBN:

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We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.


A Model of Endogenous Payoff Motives and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly

A Model of Endogenous Payoff Motives and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly
Author: Kangsik Choi
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2009
Genre:
ISBN:

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A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.


Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Author:
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Total Pages:
Release: 1998
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ISBN:

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The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.


Downstream Mixed Duopoly, Vertical Bargaining Contract and Endogenous Choice of Competition Modes

Downstream Mixed Duopoly, Vertical Bargaining Contract and Endogenous Choice of Competition Modes
Author: Haitao Qu
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2022
Genre:
ISBN:

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In this paper, a vertical mixed oligopoly framework is used to select the endogenous competition modes with a two-part tariff input price bargaining. We get the following result: First, the public firm does not have the dominant strategy and the private firm's strictly dominant strategy is price competition; Second, due to that the upstream firm's profit maximization, the public firm choosing quantity competition while the private firm choosing price competition is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which is in sharp with Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) and Choi (2012, 2019).


Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly

Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly
Author: Rabah Amir
Publisher:
Total Pages: 34
Release: 2013
Genre:
ISBN:

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This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private - domestic or foreign - firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.