Empirical Realism PDF Download

In this thesis, I address the question of how realist is Kant's empirical realism.1 By 'Kant's empirical realism', I mean Kant's idea that the world of human experience is a public and knowame w*rld 'of ontologically mind-independent and causally interrelated empirical objects. In other words, I take 'empirical realism' to refer to the understanding of the empirical world as cashed out by the Analogies of Experience.2 In Chapter I, I discuss Kant's views on the form of experience, one of the main aspects of transcendental idealism. I argue that Kant was committed to anti-realism about the empirical world, because he claims that the form (structure) of empirical reality is mind-dependent, but that the existence of empirical objects is mind-independent. In Chapter II, I discuss Kant's views on the matter of experience. I argue that empirical realism has robust realist credentials, because Kant's theory of perceptual experience should be understood as a species of direct realism. The realist credentials of empirical realism, moreover, are further boosted when we interpret Kant as advocating semantic realism. I conclude, however, that when we check the claims of empirical realism against Kant's position on the form of experience, which is something that I believe we need to do, we find that the realist credentials of empirical realism are ultimately not so robust: I argue that because Kant regards empirical realism as depending on his views on a priori form and the existence of empirical reality, empirical realism is ultimately not very realist. In the Appendix chapter, I ask whether it is correct to call Kant an internal realist (i.e. a Putnamian anti-realist). I argue that there are many important differences between Putnam and Kant, and that therefore it is not correct to call Kant an internal realist.