Cross Domain Deterrence and Hybrid Conflict
Author | : Tim Sweijs |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2022 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : Tim Sweijs |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2022 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Erik Gartzke |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 384 |
Release | : 2019-02-01 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 019090867X |
The complexity of the twenty-first century threat landscape contrasts markedly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside anti-satellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, and other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence (CDD) emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers and commanders confronted emerging threats to vital military systems in space and cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), and CDD poses serious problems in practice. In Cross-Domain Deterrence, Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay assess the theoretical relevance of CDD for the field of International Relations. As a general concept, CDD posits that how actors choose to deter affects the quality of the deterrence they achieve. Contributors to this volume include senior and junior scholars and national security practitioners. Their chapters probe the analytical utility of CDD by examining how differences across, and combinations of, different military and non-military instruments can affect choices and outcomes in coercive policy in historical and contemporary cases.
Author | : King Mallory |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 34 |
Release | : 2018 |
Genre | : Access denial (Military science) |
ISBN | : |
"This Perspective places deterrence within the broader spectrum of influence strategies available to international actors. It focuses on the domains of space and cyberspace and on two subareas of the land domain of warfare: hybrid warfare and terrorism. Potential in-domain and cross-domain strategies of deterrence by denial or by threat of punishment are suggested for each focus area. The author concludes that establishing effective deterrence against attacks in space and against the use of hybrid warfare tactics are the two most urgent priorities. Legislative action, demonstrative exercises, collective security agreements, retaliatory strikes against opponent systems, and creating a visible ability to hold adversary systems of political control at risk are recommended as remedial steps in the space domain. Enhanced abilities to interdict "troll armies," conduct information operations, identify the national origin of combatants, respond collectively, and deploy military quick reaction forces to neighboring states by prior agreement with them are suggested as remedial steps for hybrid warfare. The Perspective outlines criteria by which to prioritize between strategies of deterrence: denial over punishment, nonescalatory strategies over escalatory ones, and reversible strategies over irreversible ones. Even when limited to deterring terrorism and war with China and Russia, implementing a doctrine of cross-domain deterrence would be complex and would have significant resource implications. Political capital would need to be spent to achieve allied consensus and international political support for the strategy, and agencies stood down at the end of the Cold War might need to be reestablished."--Publisher's description.
Author | : Frans Osinga |
Publisher | : Springer Nature |
Total Pages | : 538 |
Release | : 2020-12-03 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 9462654190 |
This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.
Author | : Vincent A. Manzo |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 8 |
Release | : 2011 |
Genre | : Computer networks |
ISBN | : |
Key Points: Many weapons systems and most military operations require access to multiple domains. These linkages create vulnerabilities that actors can exploit by launching cross-domain attacks; the United States may seek to deter such attacks by threatening cross-domain responses. However, both the U.S. Government and potential adversaries lack a shared framework for analyzing how counterspace and cyber attacks fit into an accepted escalation ladder. The real-world effects of attacks that strike targets in space and cyberspace and affect capabilities and events in other domains should be the basis for assessing their implications and determining whether responses in different domains are proportionate or escalatory. Development of a shared framework that integrates actions in the emerging strategic domains of space and cyberspace with actions in traditional domains would give decisionmakers a better sense of which actions and responses are expected and accepted in real-world scenarios and which responses would be escalatory. This would support more coherent cross-domain contingency planning within the U.S. government and deterrence threats that potential adversaries perceive as clearer and more credible.
Author | : Lawrence Rubin |
Publisher | : Georgetown University Press |
Total Pages | : 323 |
Release | : 2018-09-03 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 162616603X |
During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today’s international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.
Author | : Ashley Townshend |
Publisher | : United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and Pacific Forum |
Total Pages | : 28 |
Release | : 2020-04-02 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 1742104924 |
In an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, the United States, Australia and their regional allies and partners face a myriad of strategic challenges that cut across every level of the competitive space. Driven by China’s use of multidimensional coercion in pursuit of its aim to displace the United States as the region’s dominant power, a new era of strategic competition is unfolding. At stake is the stability and character of the Indo-Pacific order, hitherto founded on American power and longstanding rules and norms, all of which are increasingly uncertain. The challenges that Beijing poses the region operate over multiple domains and are prosecuted by the Chinese Communist Party through a whole-of-nation strategy. In the grey zone between peace and war, tactics like economic coercion, foreign interference, the use of civil militias and other forms of political warfare have become Beijing’s tools of choice for pursuing incremental shifts to the geostrategic status quo. These efforts are compounded by China’s rapidly growing conventional military power and expanding footprint in the Western Pacific, which is raising the spectre of a limited war that America would find it difficult to deter or win. All of this is taking place under the lengthening shadow of Beijing’s nuclear modernisation and its bid for new competitive advantages in emerging strategic technologies. Strengthening regional deterrence and counter-coercion in light of these challenges will require the United States and Australia — working independently, together and with their likeminded partners — to develop more integrated strategies for the Indo-Pacific region and novel ways to operationalise the alliance in support of deterrence objectives. There is widespread support for this agenda in both Washington and Canberra. As the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy makes clear, allies provide an “asymmetric advantage” for helping the United States deter aggression and uphold favourable balances of power around the world. Australia’s Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds mirrored this sentiment in a major speech in Washington last November, observing that “deterrence is a joint responsibility for a shared purpose — one that no country, not even the United States, can undertake alone.” Forging greater coordination on deterrence strategy within the US-Australia alliance, however, is no easy task, particularly when this undertaking is focussed on China’s coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific. Although Canberra and Washington have overlapping strategic objectives, their interests and threat perceptions regarding China are by no means symmetrical. Each has very different capabilities, policy priorities and tolerance for accepting costs and risks. Efforts to operationalise deterrence must therefore proceed incrementally and on the basis of robust alliance dialogue. To advance this process of bilateral strategic policy debate, the United States Studies Centre and Pacific Forum hosted the second round of the Annual Track 1.5 US-Australia Deterrence Dialogue in Washington in November 2019, bringing together US and Australian experts from government and non-government organisations. The theme for this meeting was “Operationalising Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” with a focus on exploring tangible obstacles and opportunities for improving the alliance’s collective capacity to deter coercive changes to the regional order. Both institutions would like to thank the Australian Department of Defence Strategic Policy Grants Program and the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency for their generous support of this engagement. The following analytical summary reflects the authors’ accounts of the dialogue’s proceedings and does not necessarily represent their own views. It endeavours to capture, examine and contextualise a wide range of perspectives and debates from the discussion; but does not purport to offer a comprehensive record. Nothing in the following pages represents the views of the Australian Department of Defence, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency or any of the other officials or organisations that took part in the dialogue.
Author | : Mitchell A. Orenstein |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 240 |
Release | : 2019-04-02 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 0190936150 |
Russia's stealth invasion of Ukraine and its assault on the US elections in 2016 forced a reluctant West to grapple with the effects of hybrid war. While most citizens in the West are new to the problems of election hacking, state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, influence operations by foreign security services, and frozen conflicts, citizens of the frontline states between Russia and the European Union have been dealing with these issues for years. The Lands in Between: Russia vs. the West and the New Politics of Russia's Hybrid War contends that these "lands in between" hold powerful lessons for Western countries. For Western politics is becoming increasingly similar to the lands in between, where hybrid warfare has polarized parties and voters into two camps: those who support a Western vision of liberal democracy and those who support a Russian vision of nationalist authoritarianism. Paradoxically, while politics increasingly boils down to a zero sum "civilizational choice" between Russia and the West, those who rise to the pinnacle of the political system in the lands in between are often non-ideological power brokers who have found a way to profit from both sides, taking rewards from both Russia and the West. Increasingly, the political pathologies of these small, vulnerable, and backwards states in Europe are our problems too. In this deepening conflict, we are all lands in between.
Author | : Mattia Bertolini |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2023 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Rival states increasingly use hybrid tactics to influence democratic processes and exploit the vulnerabilities of their opponents. As a response, Western governments have progressively enhanced their situational awareness and developed capabilities to minimise damages from hybrid threats. In addition, they have also started to respond proactively to hybrid threats by implementing a range of policies to not just increase resilience and bolster defence but also to shape the adversary’s behaviour through deterrence measures. However, deterring hybrid aggressors remains a difficult task. A set of non-technical policy guidelines for a counter-hybrid posture for small and middle powers (SMPs) that explains how core good practices of cross-domain deterrence can be developed, applied and embedded into policies and practice. The report focuses specifically on active measures associated with deterrence by punishment to provide policymakers with useful insights to craft proportional and effective strategies to deal with actors operating in the grey zone. It also describes the steps needed to manage escalation and anticipate potential second- and third-order effects. Importantly, in conjunction with a counter-hybrid deterrence posture, positive reassurances and incentives should be communicated to the adversary to encourage good behaviour.
Author | : Ofer Fridman |
Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | : 237 |
Release | : 2018-08-01 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 0190934735 |
During the last decade, 'Hybrid Warfare' has become a novel yet controversial term in academic, political and professional military lexicons, intended to suggest some sort of mix between different military and non-military means and methods of confrontation. Enthusiastic discussion of the notion has been undermined by conceptual vagueness and political manipulation, particularly since the onset of the Ukrainian Crisis in early 2014, as ideas about Hybrid Warfare engulf Russia and the West, especially in the media. Western defense and political specialists analyzing Russian responses to the crisis have been quick to confirm that Hybrid Warfare is the Kremlin's main strategy in the twenty-first century. But many respected Russian strategists and political observers contend that it is the West that has been waging Hybrid War, Gibridnaya Voyna, since the end of the Cold War. In this highly topical book, Ofer Fridman offers a clear delineation of the conceptual debates about Hybrid Warfare. What leads Russian experts to say that the West is conducting a Gibridnaya Voyna against Russia, and what do they mean by it? Why do Western observers claim that the Kremlin engages in Hybrid Warfare? And, beyond terminology, is this something genuinely new?