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| Author | : Alon Brav |
| Publisher | : Now Publishers Inc |
| Total Pages | : 76 |
| Release | : 2010 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1601983387 |
Hedge Fund Activism begins with a brief outline of the research literature and describes datasets on hedge fund activism.
| Author | : John Buchanan |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 389 |
| Release | : 2012-05-24 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1107379318 |
Hedge fund activism is an expression of shareholder primacy, an idea that has come to dominate discussion of corporate governance theory and practice worldwide over the past two decades. This book provides a thorough examination of public and often confrontational hedge fund activism in Japan in the period between 2001 and the full onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. In Japan this shareholder-centric conception of the company espoused by activist hedge funds clashed with the alternative Japanese conception of the company as an enduring organisation or a 'community'. By analysing this clash, the book derives a fresh view of the practices underpinning corporate governance in Japan and offers suggestions regarding the validity of the shareholder primacy ideas currently at the heart of US and UK beliefs about the purpose of the firm.
| Author | : John Buchanan |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 389 |
| Release | : 2012-05-24 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1107016835 |
Charts the rise and fall of confrontational hedge fund activism in Japan.
| Author | : Nicole M. Boyson |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 45 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Recently, the mainstream media have paid considerable attention to hedge funds behaving as agents of corporate change. We study this phenomenon using a unique dataset of hedge fund activism for the period 1994-2005, and find evidence that hedge fund activists improve both short-term stock performance and long-term operating performance of their targets. The most dramatic changes in performance accrue to targets where activists seek corporate governance changes and reductions in excess cash. Additionally, hedge funds themselves benefit from activism: the risk-adjusted annual performance of hedge funds seeking changes in corporate governance is about 7-11% higher than for non-activist hedge funds and hedge funds pursuing less aggressive activism. These results imply that hedge funds can facilitate long-lasting changes in corporate governance, cash flows, and operating performance that benefit target firm shareholders and hedge fund investors alike.
| Author | : PhD Goodwin (Shane) |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 288 |
| Release | : 2016 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost.
| Author | : John C. Coffee |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 108 |
| Release | : 2016-02-10 |
| Genre | : Corporate governance |
| ISBN | : 9781680830767 |
The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance has three basic aims: to understand and explain the factors that have caused an explosion in hedge fund activism; to examine the impact of this activism; and to survey and evaluate possible legal interventions with an emphasis on the least restrictive alternative.
| Author | : William Bratton |
| Publisher | : OUP Oxford |
| Total Pages | : 924 |
| Release | : 2015-08-20 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 0191039799 |
The past two decades has witnessed unprecedented changes in the corporate governance landscape in Europe, the US and Asia. Across many countries, activist investors have pursued engagements with management of target companies. More recently, the role of the hostile activist shareholder has been taken up by a set of hedge funds. Hedge fund activism is characterized by mergers and corporate restructuring, replacement of management and board members, proxy voting, and lobbying of management. These investors target and research companies, take large positions in `their stock, criticize their business plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action enhancing shareholder value. This book analyses the impact of activists on the companies that they invest, the effects on shareholders and on activists funds themselves. Chapters examine such topic as investors' strategic approaches, the financial returns they produce, and the regulatory frameworks within which they operate. The chapters also provide historical context, both of activist investment and institutional shareholder passivity. The volume facilitates a comparison between the US and the EU, juxtaposing not only regulatory patterns but investment styles.
| Author | : Iris H-Y Chiu |
| Publisher | : Bloomsbury Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 204 |
| Release | : 2010-10-12 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 1847316042 |
The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism examines the landscape of contemporary shareholder activism in the UK. The book focuses on minority shareholder activism in publicly listed companies. It argues that contemporary shareholder activism in the UK is dominated by two groups; one, the institutional shareholders whose shareholder activism is largely seen as a driving force for good corporate governance, and two, the hedge funds whose shareholder activism is based on value extraction and exit. The book provides a detailed examination of both types of shareholder activism, and discusses critically the nature of, motivations for and consequences following both types of shareholder activism. The book then locates both types of shareholder activism in the theory of the company and the fabric of company law, and argues that institutional shareholder activism based on exercising a voice at general meetings is well supported in theory and law. The call for institutions to engage in more informal forms of activism in the name of 'stewardship' may bring about challenges to the current patterns of activism that institutions engage in. The book argues, however, that a more cautious view of hedge fund activism and the pattern of value extraction and exit should be taken. More empirical evidence is likely to be necessary, however, to weigh up the long terms benefits and costs of hedge fund activism.
| Author | : Ekrem Solak |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 237 |
| Release | : 2020-05-04 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 1000069745 |
This book provides a complete framework for contemporary shareholder activism and its implications for US corporate governance, which is based on director primacy theory. Under director primacy theory, shareholders do not wish to be involved in the management of the company; in the rare event that they wish to be involved, it is considered a transfer of power from the board of directors to shareholders, which in turn reduces the efficiency of centralised decision-making in public companies. However, this book demonstrates that shareholders do not use their power to transfer corporate control from the board to themselves, and that some form of shareholder activism is even collaborative, which is a new paradigm for US corporate governance. This book shows that while monitoring remains a key contribution of shareholders, they also bring new informational inputs to corporate decision-making that could not be obtained under the traditional board model. Accordingly, contemporary shareholder activism enhances the board’s decision-making and monitoring capacity, without undermining the economic value of the board's authority. Therefore, this book argues that the complete approach of contemporary shareholder activism should be accommodated into US corporate governance. In doing so, this book considers not only legal and regulatory developments in the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, but also the governance developments through by-law amendments. Furthermore, the author makes several recommendations to soften the current director primacy model: establishing a level playing field for private ordering, adopting the proxy access default regime, the majority voting rule, the universal proxy rules, and enhancing the disclosure requirements of shareholders. The book will be of interest to academics and students of corporate governance, both in the US and internationally.
| Author | : Thomas W. Briggs |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 59 |
| Release | : 2017 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Hedge funds are not quot;normalquot; institutional investors. They launch proxy fights for corporate control. Their recent successes and quot;wolf packquot; tactics have garnered headlines, but leave us with a question: what does hedge fund activism mean for corporate governance in the United States? This Article undertakes a legal, empirical, and theoretical study in an effort to answer this question. The heart of the Article is an empirical study of obtainable instances of hedge fund activism during 2005 and the 2006 proxy season. The Article starts by showing that the SEC opened the door to hedge fund activism when it stopped censoring most proxy material in 1992 and started allowing proxy quot;free communicationquot; in 2000. The Article's empirical survey found over 50 instances of hedge fund activism, and also found the in terrorem effect of these examples to be considerable. The survey further found that the combination of quot;wolf packquot; tactics and the increasing influence of activist proxy advisory firms (the recommendations of which many institutional investors follow automatically) have made hedge fund activists a real power in corporate governance. Despite some claims that hedge funds often hold short positions or are otherwise dangerously conflicted, the survey found very limited evidence for this; the survey also found that hedge funds have, in fact, disclosed these conflicts, though the proxy and Williams Act rules in this respect should be clarified. The Article then subjects these results to theoretical analysis using current nexus of contracts, shareholder primacy, director primacy, team production, connected contracts, and other theories, and finds none completely satisfactory. The Article concludes that an almost unprincipled balance-of-power political model best explains the hedge fund activism phenomenon. In the end, if these activities cause managements to review and reassess their strategies, corporate governance is improved.
