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| Author | : Naval War College (U.S.) |
| Publisher | : Naval War College Press |
| Total Pages | : 592 |
| Release | : 2002 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : François Delerue |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 545 |
| Release | : 2020-03-19 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 1108490271 |
This book offers a comprehensive overview of the international law applicable to cyber operations. It is grounded in international law, but is also of interest for non-legal researchers, notably in political science and computer science. Outside academia, it will appeal to legal advisors, policymakers, and military organisations.
| Author | : Marco Roscini |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press, USA |
| Total Pages | : 337 |
| Release | : 2014-03 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 0199655014 |
Recent years have seen a significant increase in the scale and sophistication of cyber attacks employed by, or against, states and non-state actors. This book investigates the international legal regime that applies to such attacks, and investigates how far the traditional rules of international humanitarian law can be used in these situations.
| Author | : |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 546 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
With their unique characteristics computer network attacks challenge the current legal framework which is based on a state-centred concept of armed force involving the clements of blast, heat and fragmentation. This challenge has resulted in calls for the negotiation of a dedicated regulatory framework to govern the use of computer network attacks. An evaluation of such calls lies at the core of this thesis. It seeks to identify the challenges computer network attacks pose to international law on the use of force and international humanitarian law, and to ascertain whether these challenges warrant a new legal framework. To that end, the thesis evaluates the technological features of computer network attacks and the conceptual limits of key international law provisions imposed by techniques of legal interpretation. This allows for the identification of the legal challenges posed by computer network attacks, namely ambiguity, uncertainty, insufficiency, and ineffectiveness. Whereas these challenges provide a measure for the adequacy of current legal frameworks, the thesis argues that the need for a new legal framework is ultimately determined by how states view and respond to these challenges. Thus, an examination of the positions of key states in international political processes, chiefly in cyber security debates at the United Nations, significantly informs the potential need for dedicated legal regimes to govern computer network attacks. Analysis of relevant UN debates and the individual positions of the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States shows that whereas efforts at an international treaty have not materialised, the emerging interpretative approaches of the four states reveal the potential need for additional norms in some areas, while limiting it in others.
| Author | : Yaroslav Radziwill |
| Publisher | : BRILL |
| Total Pages | : 429 |
| Release | : 2015-07-28 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 9004298304 |
At its current rate, technological development has outpaced corresponding changes in international law. Proposals to remedy this deficiency have been made, in part, by members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (led by the Russian Federation), but the United States and select allies have rejected these proposals, arguing that existing international law already provides a suitable comprehensive framework necessary to tackle cyber-warfare. Cyber-Attacks and the Exploitable Imperfections of International Law does not contest (and, in fact, supports) the idea that contemporary jus ad bellum and jus in bello, in general, can accommodate cyber-warfare. However, this analysis argues that existing international law contains significant imperfections that can be exploited; gaps, not yet filled, that fail to address future risks posed by cyber-attacks.
| Author | : Michael N. Schmitt |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 641 |
| Release | : 2017-02-02 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 1316828646 |
Tallinn Manual 2.0 expands on the highly influential first edition by extending its coverage of the international law governing cyber operations to peacetime legal regimes. The product of a three-year follow-on project by a new group of twenty renowned international law experts, it addresses such topics as sovereignty, state responsibility, human rights, and the law of air, space, and the sea. Tallinn Manual 2.0 identifies 154 'black letter' rules governing cyber operations and provides extensive commentary on each rule. Although Tallinn Manual 2.0 represents the views of the experts in their personal capacity, the project benefitted from the unofficial input of many states and over fifty peer reviewers.
| Author | : Heather Harrison Dinniss |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 359 |
| Release | : 2012-07-19 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 1107011086 |
An analysis of the status of computer network attacks in international law.
| Author | : Georg Kerschischnig |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : Cyberspace |
| ISBN | : 9789490947644 |
This book revolves around the public international law aspects of the destructive use of cyberspace by state actors and non-state actors, encompassing cyberwar, cyberterrorism, and hacktivism, but excluding cybercrime. For the purpose of delimitation, the book also addresses cyberespionage and political activism in cyberspace. Starting with an overview of the technical background, the book explains the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. Then, it outlines notable cyberincidents that have occurred so far and analyzes pertinent state practices and policies. Turning to the legal analysis, the book primarily focuses on the contemporary jus ad bellum and jus in bello, exploring whether concepts like the use of force or self-defense are applicable to cyberattacks, despite their lack of physicality; or whether state responsibility and the principles of international humanitarian law are applicable to cyberspace, in particular in the light of an evident civilianization of battlespace in this area. Furthermore, the book encompasses destructive cyberterrorism and puts this into context with human rights aspects of political activism in cyberspace. The book also looks into jurisdictional pitfalls borne in cyberspace. After a brief summary of the research results, the final chapter is dedicated to providing recommendations to the international community, in order to address cyberthreats in a political process.
| Author | : Johann-Christoph Woltag |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 313 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| Genre | : Information warfare (International law) |
| ISBN | : 9781780684802 |
In the last five years the topic of cyber warfare has received much attention due to several so-called "cyber incidents" which have been qualified by many as State-sponsored cyber attacks. This book identifies rules and limits of cross-border computer network operations for which States bear the international responsibility during both peace and war. It consequently addresses questions on jus ad bellum and jus in bello in addition to State responsibility. By reference to treaty and customary international law, actual case studies (Estonia, Georgia, Stuxnet) and the Tallinn Manual, the author illustrates the applicability of current international law and argues for an obligation on the State to prevent malicious operations emanating from networks within their jurisdiction.This book is written for academics in public international law and practitioners from the military and other public security sectors
| Author | : National Research Council |
| Publisher | : National Academies Press |
| Total Pages | : 400 |
| Release | : 2010-10-30 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 0309160359 |
In a world of increasing dependence on information technology, the prevention of cyberattacks on a nation's important computer and communications systems and networks is a problem that looms large. Given the demonstrated limitations of passive cybersecurity defense measures, it is natural to consider the possibility that deterrence might play a useful role in preventing cyberattacks against the United States and its vital interests. At the request of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Research Council undertook a two-phase project aimed to foster a broad, multidisciplinary examination of strategies for deterring cyberattacks on the United States and of the possible utility of these strategies for the U.S. government. The first phase produced a letter report providing basic information needed to understand the nature of the problem and to articulate important questions that can drive research regarding ways of more effectively preventing, discouraging, and inhibiting hostile activity against important U.S. information systems and networks. The second phase of the project entailed selecting appropriate experts to write papers on questions raised in the letter report. A number of experts, identified by the committee, were commissioned to write these papers under contract with the National Academy of Sciences. Commissioned papers were discussed at a public workshop held June 10-11, 2010, in Washington, D.C., and authors revised their papers after the workshop. Although the authors were selected and the papers reviewed and discussed by the committee, the individually authored papers do not reflect consensus views of the committee, and the reader should view these papers as offering points of departure that can stimulate further work on the topics discussed. The papers presented in this volume are published essentially as received from the authors, with some proofreading corrections made as limited time allowed.
