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Checks and Balances on Political Budget Cycles

Checks and Balances on Political Budget Cycles
Author: Jorge M. Streb
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2009
Genre:
ISBN:

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Previous empirical work on political budget cycles (PBCs) implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy. Instead, we ask what happens when legislative checks and balances limit executive discretion. We find that legislative checks and balances moderate PBCs in countries with high compliance with the law. More effective checks and balances help to explain why cycles are weaker in developed countries and in established democracies. When the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies.


Separation of Powers and Political Budget Cycles

Separation of Powers and Political Budget Cycles
Author: Jorge M. Streb
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2007
Genre:
ISBN:

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From a theoretical viewpoint, political budget cycles (PBC) arise in equilibrium when rational voters are imperfectly informed about the incumbent's competency and the incumbent enjoys discretionary power over the budget. This paper focuses on the second condition, examining how executive discretion is affected by the budgetary process under separation of powers. We specifically model PBC in the composition of government spending. The main result is that effective checks and balances in the budgetary process curb PBC. The institutional features of the executive-legislature bargaining game, namely, the actual agenda-setting authority, the status quo location and the degree of legislative oversight and control of the implementation of the budgetary law, play critical roles for the existence and the size of PBC. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings, which show that PBC are more pronounced in developing countries, where there are also less effective checks and balances.


Discretional Political Budget Cycles and Separation of Powers

Discretional Political Budget Cycles and Separation of Powers
Author: Jorge M. Streb
Publisher:
Total Pages: 33
Release: 2007
Genre:
ISBN:

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In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger effective checks and balances explain why cycles are weaker in developed and established democracies. Once the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies. Whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, or the electoral rules are majoritarian or proportional, does not change the basic results.


Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies

Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies
Author: Adi Brender
Publisher:
Total Pages: 64
Release: 2004
Genre: Business cycles
ISBN:

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"Like other recent studies, we find the existence of a political deficit cycle in a large cross-section of countries. However, we find that this result is driven by the experience of new democracies'. The strong budget cycle in those countries accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger samples that include these countries; when these countries are removed from the larger sample, so that only established' democracies remain, the political budget cycle disappears. The political deficit cycle in new democracies accounts for findings in both developed and less developed economies, for the finding that the cycle is stronger in weaker democracies, and for differences in the political cycle across governmental and electoral systems. Our findings may reconcile two contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation, one arguing it is a useful instrument to gain voter support and a widespread empirical phenomenon, the other arguing that voters punish rather than reward fiscal manipulation"--NBER website


Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa

Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa
Author: Wilson Prichard
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 309
Release: 2015-09-11
Genre: Political Science
ISBN: 1316453731

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It is increasingly argued that bargaining between citizens and governments over tax collection can provide a foundation for the development of responsive and accountable governance in developing countries. However, while intuitively attractive, surprisingly little research has captured the reality and complexity of this relationship in practice. This book provides the most complete treatment of the connections between taxation and accountability in developing countries, providing both new evidence and an invaluable starting point for future research. Drawing on cross-country econometric evidence and detailed case studies from Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia, Wilson Prichard shows that reliance on taxation has, in fact, increased responsiveness and accountability by expanding the political power wielded by taxpayers. Critically, however, processes of tax bargaining have been highly varied, frequently long term and contextually contingent. Capturing this diversity provides novel insight into politics in developing countries and how tax reform can be designed to encourage broader governance gains.


Passing a Budget

Passing a Budget
Author: Ashley M. Ehman
Publisher: Cavendish Square Publishing, LLC
Total Pages: 66
Release: 2018-12-15
Genre: Juvenile Nonfiction
ISBN: 1502641372

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Every year, Congress is supposed to pass a budget, balancing military spending with domestic needs like infrastructure, Social Security, and education. This book meets objectives in the C3 Framework for Social Studies State Standards and describes the steps of the budgeting process in reader-friendly terms. It considers the groups behind passing a budget, including the Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office, and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The book also explores the reconciliation process, the national debt, and how the different branches of the government intersect while setting economic policy. This volume also considers up-to-date instances of budget items and the consequences of budgets failing to pass, particularly the government shutdowns of 2013 and 2018.


Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle

Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle
Author: Lorenzo Forni
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Total Pages: 20
Release: 2017-01-20
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 147556998X

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The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds.


Political Cycles in a Developing Economy

Political Cycles in a Developing Economy
Author: Stuti Khemani
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Total Pages: 58
Release: 2000
Genre: Business cycles
ISBN:

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Empirical results from India suggest that politicians exert greater effort in managing public works during election years. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a populist spending spree to sway voters just before elections.