Tailored Deterrence
Author | : Barry R. Schneider |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 466 |
Release | : 2012 |
Genre | : Arms control |
ISBN | : 9780974740386 |
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Author | : Barry R. Schneider |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 466 |
Release | : 2012 |
Genre | : Arms control |
ISBN | : 9780974740386 |
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 9 |
Release | : 2007 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : |
Deterrence, the hallmark of Cold War era security, needs to be adapted to fit the more volatile security environment of the 21st century. The Bush administration has outlined a concept for tailored deterrence to address the distinctive challenges posed by advanced military competitors, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and nonstate terrorist networks while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors. The goal of deterrence is to prevent aggressive action or WMD use by ensuring that, in the mind of a potential adversary, the risks of the action outweigh the benefits, while taking into account the consequences of inaction. Deterrence requires detailed knowledge of the society and leadership that we seek to influence. U.S. decision makers will need a continuing set of comprehensive country or group deterrence assessments, drawing on expertise in and out of government, in order to tailor deterrence to specific actors and specific situations. The capabilities needed for tailored deterrence go beyond nuclear weapons and the strategic capabilities of the so-called New Triad, to the full range of military capabilities, presence, and cooperation, as well as diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments. The clarity and credibility of American messages in the mind of the deterree are critical to tailoring deterrence threats. U.S. policy makers need mechanisms to assess how their words and actions are perceived, how they affect each adversary's deterrence calculations, and how they might mitigate misperceptions that undermine deterrence.
Author | : M. Elaine Bunn |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 8 |
Release | : 2007 |
Genre | : Deterrence (Strategy) |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Naval Studies Board |
Publisher | : National Academies Press |
Total Pages | : 244 |
Release | : 1997-04-16 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 0309553237 |
Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
Author | : Keith B. Payne |
Publisher | : Routledge |
Total Pages | : 171 |
Release | : 2014-06-11 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 1317980298 |
For decades, the rational actor model served as the preferred guide for U.S. deterrence policy. It has been a convenient and comforting guide because it requires little detailed knowledge of an opponent’s unique decision-making process and yet typically provides confident generalizations about how deterrence works. The model tends to postulate common decision-making parameters across the globe to reach generalizations about how deterrence will function and the types of forces that will be "stabilizing" or "destabilizing." Yet a broad spectrum of unique factors can influence an opponent’s perceptions and his calculations, and these are not easily captured by the rational actor model. The absence of uniformity means there can be very few deterrence generalizations generated by the use of the rational actor model that are applicable to the entire range of opponents. Understanding Deterrence considers how factors such as psychology, history, religion, ideology, geography, political structure, culture, proliferation and geopolitics can shape a leadership’s decision-making process, in ways that are specific and unique to each opponent. Understanding Deterrence demonstrates how using a multidisciplinary approach to deterrence analysis can better identify and assess factors that influence an opponent’s decision-making process. This identification and assessment process can facilitate the tailoring of deterrence strategies to specific purposes and result in a higher likelihood of success than strategies guided by the generalizations about opponent decision-making typically contained in the rational actor model. This book was published as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.
Author | : Air Univeristy Press |
Publisher | : Military Bookshop |
Total Pages | : 344 |
Release | : 2014-09-01 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 9781782667100 |
With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.
Author | : Sean P. Larkin |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 31 |
Release | : 2011 |
Genre | : Deterrence (Strategy) |
ISBN | : |
The U.S. embraced "tailored deterrence" in its 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategies. Tailored deterrence seeks to customize whole-of-government deterrence strategies to specific actors and scenarios through a deterministic approach that combines rational deterrence theory with effects-based operations concepts. Consequently, tailored deterrence neglects some of the most important elements of contemporary deterrence theory, including the uncertainty and cognitive biases inherent to both intelligence assessments and international relations. While deterrence remains relevant, the U.S. objective to "decisively influence the adversary's decision-making calculus" overstates tailored deterrence's potential and does not adequately acknowledge its shortfalls. The U.S. approach to tailored deterrence is flawed because of its reliance on two erroneous assumptions: that the U.S. can reliably assess adversaries' decision calculus; and that the U.S. can decisively influence adversaries' choices. The U.S. should recognize that deterrence is a blunt instrument, not a scalpel, and modify its deterrence strategies accordingly.
Author | : Krista Langeland |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 70 |
Release | : 2022-04-30 |
Genre | : History |
ISBN | : 9781977407030 |
The authors examine the application of classical deterrence theory to the space domain and argue that to build a tailored deterrence strategy for China in space, China's own objectives should be considered.
Author | : John J. Mearsheimer |
Publisher | : Cornell University Press |
Total Pages | : 298 |
Release | : 1985-08-21 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 1501713256 |
Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.
Author | : Lawrence Rubin |
Publisher | : Georgetown University Press |
Total Pages | : 323 |
Release | : 2018-09-03 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 162616603X |
During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today’s international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.