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| Author | : Abhinay Muthoo |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 378 |
| Release | : 1999-08-19 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780521576475 |
Graduate textbook presenting abstract models of bargaining in a unified framework with detailed applications involving economic, political and social situations.
| Author | : Abhinay Muthoo |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 357 |
| Release | : 1999 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9780521572255 |
Graduate textbook presenting abstract models of bargaining in a unified framework with detailed applications involving economic, political and social situations.
| Author | : Gideon Doron |
| Publisher | : SAGE |
| Total Pages | : 196 |
| Release | : 2001-03-28 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 9780761952510 |
This book brings an exciting and innovative new approach to the study of politics today. It introduces political bargaining, a process at the heart of all political and economic exchanges in contemporary society and the very essence of politics itself, to provide a new framework and fresh insights to modern political science. The authors trace the prevalence of bargaining processes in politics from the abstract level of individual human interaction and the `state of nature’ to the more concrete political or institutionalized level. They introduce students to theory -- the basic models of game theory, rational choice theory and positivist approaches; practice -- the practical manifestations of political b
| Author | : H.J. Peters |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 244 |
| Release | : 2013-04-17 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9401580227 |
Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a prescription assigning an alternative to each bargaining game is called a bargaining solution. In the cooperative game-theoretical approach, bargaining solutions are mathematically characterized by desirable properties, usually called axioms. In the noncooperative approach, solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an underlying bargaining procedure. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining, starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past four decades. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach. The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for coalitional bargaining games are included, as well as an auxiliary chapter on the relevant demands from utility theory.
| Author | : Carlo Carraro |
| Publisher | : World Bank Publications |
| Total Pages | : 55 |
| Release | : 2005 |
| Genre | : Bargaining |
| ISBN | : 5061610121 |
Abstract: Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determine the outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.
| Author | : Stefan Napel |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 193 |
| Release | : 2012-12-06 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3642561608 |
This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend, and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be considered: First of all, will two parties reach efficient agreements? Traditional economic theory gives a generally affirma tive answer for perfectly rational agents, who can carry out complex calcu lations instantaneously and without cost. The book uses innovative methods to analyse the implications of less demanding assumptions. A practical ques tion related to bargaining is: How much power does the design of institutions such as the U. N. Security Council give to each of its members? Formally, non permanent members' votes are necessary to pass resolutions, but theoretical investigation of pre-voting negotiation attributes all power to the five perma nent members. Or one may ask whether a society should rather finance the education in higher mathematics for a talented person than remedial training for a retarded person? Different concepts of justice yield different answers. Which particular concept is implemented in a given society is also a matter of bargaining, and it is of special philosophical interest to investigate which bargain will be struck in an ideal society in which individual talents and resources are not yet known. Very generally, a bilateral bargaining situation is characterized by two agents - individuals, firms, governments, etc.
| Author | : Alan Coddington |
| Publisher | : Routledge |
| Total Pages | : 153 |
| Release | : 2017-07-05 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1351472267 |
A tour de force of theoretical reasoning, this book presents the most advanced analytical model of the bargaining process so far conceived. Focused essentially on the dynamics of the bargaining process, Coddington's model employs elements of several conceptual constructs--individual decision-making, theories of expectations and their adjustment, and environment concepts--to explain the nature of consistency in a bargainer's system of expectations and intentions.The book begins with a description of the bargaining process in an economic context and establishes an analytical framework. There follows a critical survey of bargaining theory in which the author selects those concepts, which he finds most valid and most applicable to his decision-making/expectation/adjustment model. The internal consistency of a wide class of bargaining models is then examined in a chapter on the relationship between decision-making and expectations. Since the theory of games has been used as a basis for bargaining process theory, the author devotes a chapter to an examination of the game-theoretic approach and an assessment of its value relative to his own approach.The author concludes with a study of the specific capabilities of his own analytical model, with discussion of the possible combinations of assumptions with which the investigator may work. Although stemming from a problem in economic theory and of immediate intent to economists, the book's contribution to the general theory of conflict process and interdependent decision-making make it an important study for students of politics and international affairs as well as management and labor relations specialists.
| Author | : Nolan McCarty |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2014-10-30 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 9781107438637 |
Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.
| Author | : Arwed Crüger |
| Publisher | : Duncker & Humblot |
| Total Pages | : 180 |
| Release | : 2015 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9783428507412 |
Two new bargaining games, called "Freedom to Punish (FTP)" and "Right and Choice to Punish (RAP)", are developed, analyzed and tested by means of an experimental implementation. Hypotheses about behavior are developed, discussed and tested. The central hypotheses are aimed at the importance of freedom of choice, on the difference between the FTP game and the RAP game, and on the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation. As might have been expected, fairness plays a role in both games, represented by the frequent appearances of equal splits as well as by the frequent rejections of unfair offers.In addition to that, fairness was crowded out by the new Institution of a veto power decision, confirming the importance of the institutional setting for behavior. Contrary to the few veto power sales in the RAP game, an amazingly high number of receivers refrained from veto power in the FTP game. This significant difference has clearly been attributed to the different information conditions and the existence of a bonus. This bonus can be interpreted in terms of freedom of choice, and exploits a value for the freedom to choose for the first time in experimental economics.
| Author | : John Davidson |
| Publisher | : New York ; London : G.P. Putnam |
| Total Pages | : 346 |
| Release | : 1898 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : |
