Balance And Limitation Of Intellectual Property Protection In China PDF Download

"Many studies on development argue that, with industrial growth and increasing local innovation, companies in developing countries will seek protection of their intellectual properties (IPs) under local laws, and this will lead them to push for the improvement of legal protections for IPs. The present research suggests a more complicated process in China. Many Chinese companies have accumulated a large number of IPs but have not always shown the need to protect them; they are reluctant to enforce their IPRs through judicial procedure, and lack the incentive to lobby for better formal IP protection. With a focus on the use of IPs and relevant protection mechanisms in China, this study suggests explanations both for companies' acquisition of IPRs even when they do not enforce them and for their failure or reluctance to enforce their IPRs through formal legal procedures. Concerning the first question, many companies acquire IPRs for purposes other than the enforcement of property rights, such as attracting investment and media attention. Concerning the second question, although the Chinese IPR legal system is still under development, many companies have ways of protecting their IPs without resorting to court enforcement. Informed by the literature on the sociologies of law, development, and organization, and based on 88 interviews and various secondary data, this study shows how the broader institutional context of different industries shapes approaches to IP.This study analysed the following nine industries in three sectors in China: (1) the medical sector, including the chemical drug industry, the biomedicine industry, the traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) industry, and the medical device industry; (2) the telecommunications equipment sector, including the capital goods industry and the consumer product industry; (3) the film & TV sector, including the film industry, the traditional scripted series industry, and the online series industry. This study found that companies use IPRs for different functions, aside from profit appropriation based on potential or actual IPR litigation. The alternative functions include: (1) gaining government support (tax benefits, government subsidies, or policy privileges); (2) gaining publicity and attracting customers; and (3) attracting outside capital. The study also found that companies use various alternative methods of IPR protection in these industries, aside from legal enforcement (including both enforcement through the courts and administrative enforcement based on IPR law). These alternative enforcement methods include: (1) technological or technical barriers; (2) administrative market-entry control; (3) first-mover advantages enabled by market characteristics (including a market taste for novelty, the importance of marketing experience or channel cultivation, and sales or service bundles); and (4) reputation concerns inside a close-knit network. Both the alternative functions and the alternative enforcement mechanisms are shaped by industrial characteristics, especially in four aspects: (1) Technological and product characteristics, (2) administrative regulation, (3) market characteristics, and (4) network structure.With regard to theoretical contributions, this study mainly contributes to three literatures. It contributes to the development literature by explaining how a developing society interacts with a formal IPR institution that originated in the West; it contributes to the sociology of law literature by expanding the scope of alternatives to law; it also contributes to the organization-environment literature by elaborating the dynamic interaction between companies and legal institutions. Although the study focuses on IPRs, it also can be instructive for general implementation problems of law; despite some unique characteristics, the Chinese case is generalizable because China is also similar to many developing and post-socialist countries." --