Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design PDF Download
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| Author | : Tim Roughgarden |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2020 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Download Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
The field of optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, as well as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major search engines auction off online advertising. There are, however, some basic problems for which the traditional optimal mechanism design approach is ill suited--either because it makes overly strong assumptions or because it advocates overly complex designs. This article reviews several common issues with optimal mechanisms, including exorbitant communication, computation, and informational requirements; it also presents several examples demonstrating that relaxing the goal to designing an approximately optimal mechanism allows us to reason about fundamental questions that seem out of reach of the traditional theory.
| Author | : Kobbi Nissim |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Download Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design Via Differential Privacy Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
We study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an arbitrary objective function. We design a mechanism that allows for approximate optimal implementation of insensitive objective functions in ex-post Nash equilibrium. If, furthermore, values are private then the same mechanism is strategy proof. We cast our results onto two specific models: pricing and facility location. The mechanism we design is optimal up to an additive factor of the order of magnitude of one over the square root of the number of agents and involves no utility transfers. Underlying our mechanism is a lottery between two auxiliary mechanisms -- with high probability we actuate a mechanism that reduces players influence on the choice of the social alternative, while choosing the optimal outcome with high probability. This is where differential privacy is employed. With the complementary probability we actuate a mechanism that may be typically far from optimal but is incentive compatible. The joint mechanism inherits the desired properties from both.
| Author | : Hedyeh Beyhaghi |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 179 |
| Release | : 2019 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Download Approximately-optimal Mechanisms in Auction Design, Search Theory, and Matching Markets Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Algorithmic mechanism design is an interdisciplinary field, concerned with the design of algorithms that are used by strategic agents. This field has applications in many real-world settings, such as auction design, search problems, and matching markets. In this thesis we study the mechanisms in these areas through lenses of simplicity and practicality. We pursue two main directions: study the strength of simple mechanisms, and improve the efficiency of practical mechanisms. In auction design, we consider a setting where a seller wants to sell many items to many buyers, and establish a tight gap between the efficiency of a simple and commonly-used auction with the complicated revenue-optimal auction. In search theory context, we introduce Pandora's problem with alternative inspections and provide the first approximately-optimal mechanism for this problem. In Pandora's problem with alternative inspections, a searcher wants to select one out of n elements whose values are unknown ahead of time. The searcher evaluates the elements one by one and can choose among different costly ways to evaluate each element, the order to evaluate the elements, and how long to continue the search, in order to maximize her utility. In matching markets, we propose theoretical models that closely capture the participant behaviors in the real world, and provide methods to optimize the already implemented mechanisms.
| Author | : Dirk Bergemann |
| Publisher | : World Scientific |
| Total Pages | : 471 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 981437458X |
Download Robust Mechanism Design Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
| Author | : Hu Fu |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 216 |
| Release | : 2013 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
Download Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanisms Design Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Mechanism design studies optimization problems with inputs from selfishly behaving agents. To a class of relatively simple questions, classical auction theory gives optimal solution which are often too complicated for practical use. This dissertation presents techniques and results on the design and analysis of simple and practical auctions that have provably approximately optimal performances. For single-parameter revenue optimization, we present the k-lookahead auction, which works for coorelated valuation distributions, and we discuss its consequences, which encompass a family of reserveprice-based auctions with approximately optimal revenue. For more general settings, we present the marginal revenue mechanisms as a framework for designing simple mechanisms in very general settings. Both frameworks are motivated with clear economic intuitions. For social welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions, we present an equilibrium analysis for simultaneous item auctions. In particular, we show that when valuations exhibit no complements, the welfare loss in these auctions at Bayesian Nash equilibria is bounded by small constants.
| Author | : Tim Roughgarden |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 356 |
| Release | : 2016-08-30 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 1316781178 |
Download Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
| Author | : Tilman Borgers |
| Publisher | : Oxford University Press |
| Total Pages | : 263 |
| Release | : 2015-05-01 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 019987588X |
Download An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
| Author | : Paul Milgrom |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 378 |
| Release | : 2004-01-12 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1139449168 |
Download Putting Auction Theory to Work Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
| Author | : Rakesh V. Vohra |
| Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
| Total Pages | : 185 |
| Release | : 2011-05-09 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1139499173 |
Download Mechanism Design Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
| Author | : Petter Ogland |
| Publisher | : Lulu.com |
| Total Pages | : 336 |
| Release | : 2017-11-27 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 1387360027 |
Download Mechanism Design for Total Quality Management: Using the Bootstrap Algorithm for Changing the Control Game Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle
This PhD thesis contributes to the theory of information infrastructures by explaining how to use game theory and genetic algorithms for turning the pseudo-code of the bootstrap algorithm into proper code. The study is the first known study to analyse the bootstrap algorithm from an action research perspective, and it has become an important reference for further research on how to bootstrap information infrastructures.
