Antitrust Penalty Reform
Author | : William Breit |
Publisher | : A E I Press |
Total Pages | : 104 |
Release | : 1986 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : |
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Author | : William Breit |
Publisher | : A E I Press |
Total Pages | : 104 |
Release | : 1986 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : |
Author | : United States |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 3 |
Release | : 2010 |
Genre | : Antitrust law |
ISBN | : |
Author | : United States |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 2 |
Release | : 2009 |
Genre | : Antitrust law |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Eileen R. Larence |
Publisher | : DIANE Publishing |
Total Pages | : 76 |
Release | : 2011 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 1437989306 |
Criminal cartel activity, such as competitors conspiring to set prices, can harm consumers and the U.S. economy through lack of competition and overcharges. The Dept. of Justice (DoJ) leniency program offers the possibility that the first individual or co. that self-reports cartel activity will avoid criminal conviction and penalties. The Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) encourages such reporting. This report addresses: (1) the extent that ACPERA affected DoJ¿s criminal cartel enforcement; (2) the ways ACPERA has affected private civil actions; and (3) key stakeholder perspectives on rewards and anti-retaliatory protection for whistleblowers reporting antitrust violations. Illus. This is a print on demand report.
Author | : United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 238 |
Release | : 1962 |
Genre | : Antitrust law |
ISBN | : |
Considers. S. 996, to amend the Sherman Act to limit the employment of antitrust violators by any company convicted of the same violation. S. 2252, to amend the Sherman Act to increase the maximum fine assessable and to require prison sentences for repeat offenders of antitrust violations. S. 2253, to amend the Sherman Act to provide for heavier corporate fines for price fixing and market allocation violations. S. 2254, to amend the Clayton Act to impose sanctions on corporate officers who engage in anticompetitive activities leading to antitrust violations. S. 2255, to require an affidavit of noncollusion from Government contract bidders who in the previous two years have bid prices identical to their competitors.
Author | : Alan J. Devlin |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 300 |
Release | : 2021-08-31 |
Genre | : Law |
ISBN | : 9781108999908 |
Industrial consolidation, digital platforms, and changing political views have spurred debate about the interplay between public and private power in the United States and have created a bipartisan appetite for potential antitrust reform that would mark the most profound shift in US competition policy in the past half-century. While neo-Brandeisians call for a reawakening of antitrust in the form of a return to structuralism and a concomitant rejection of economic analysis founded on competitive effects, proponents of the status quo look on this state of affairs with alarm. Scrutinizing the latest evidence, Alan J. Devlin finds a middle ground. US antitrust laws warrant revision, he argues, but with far more nuance than current debates suggest. He offers a new vision of antitrust reform, achieved by refining our enforcement policies and jettisoning an unwarranted obsession with minimizing errors of economic analysis.
Author | : Texas |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 1968 |
Genre | : Commercial law |
ISBN | : |
Author | : |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 0 |
Release | : 2005 |
Genre | : Antitrust law |
ISBN | : |
Author | : U.s. Government Accountability Office |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 76 |
Release | : 2017-08-17 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781974643592 |
"Criminal cartel activity, such as competitors conspiring to set prices, can harm consumers and the U.S. economy through lack of competition and overcharges. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division's leniency program offers the possibility that the first individual or company that self-reports cartel activity will avoid criminal conviction and penalties. In 2004, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) was enacted to encourage such reporting. The 2010 reauthorization mandated that GAO study ACPERA's effect. This report addresses (1) the extent that ACPERA affected DOJ's criminal cartel enforcement, (2) the ways ACPERA has reportedly affected private civil actions, and (3) key stakeholder perspectives on rewards and antiretaliatory protection for whistleblowers reporting criminal antitrust violations. GAO analyzed DOJ data on criminal cartel cases (1993-2010) and interviewed DOJ officials. GAO also interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of plaintiffs' and defense attorneys from 17 civil cases and key stakeholders including other antitrust attorneys selected using a snowball sampling technique whereby GAO identified contacts through referrals."
Author | : U. S. Government Accountability Office ( |
Publisher | : BiblioGov |
Total Pages | : 80 |
Release | : 2013-06 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9781289119102 |
Criminal cartel activity, such as competitors conspiring to set prices, can harm consumers and the U.S. economy through lack of competition and overcharges. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division's leniency program offers the possibility that the first individual or company that self-reports cartel activity will avoid criminal conviction and penalties. In 2004, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) was enacted to encourage such reporting. The 2010 reauthorization mandated that GAO study ACPERA's effect. This report addresses (1) the extent that ACPERA affected DOJ's criminal cartel enforcement, (2) the ways ACPERA has reportedly affected private civil actions, and (3) key stakeholder perspectives on rewards and antiretaliatory protection for whistleblowers reporting criminal antitrust violations. GAO analyzed DOJ data on criminal cartel cases (1993-2010) and interviewed DOJ officials. GAO also interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of plaintiffs' and defense attorneys from 17 civil cases and key stakeholders including other antitrust attorneys selected using a snowball sampling technique whereby GAO identified contacts through referrals.