Anglo French Relations And Strategy On The Western Front 1914 18 PDF Download

The subject of this thesis is the operation of the Anglo-French coalition during the phase of movement on the western front from August to November, 1914. Although Anglo-French relations during the Battle of the Marne have been treated in several studies, no study exists of the entire period of manoeuvre of mass armies in the open field prior to the advent of trench warfare in mid-November. That whole period nonetheless offers a special interest because of the interaction of policy, strategy and tactics on a front of more -vital interest to the French than the British. A central theme of the study is that Joffre, the French Commanden- in-Chief, sought to obtain a maximum contribution from the British on the battlefield in 1914 as a means of defending the vital interests of France. Although the British entered the war with a limited commitment to continental defence. Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, acceded to Joffre*s ever-increasing demands in the belief that British interest, even survival, depended on Anglo-French victory over Germany on the continent. Thus, while preparing mass armies for ulti mate British triumph, he intervened when necessary to force coopera tion; in particular by. his trip to Paris on September 1, when the Al liance threatened to dissolve; and as crisis followed crisis, he extended Britain*s continental commitment. Thus, on November 1, in response to the crisis during the Battle of Tpres, he promised the French a million men on the western front for the summer of 1915. As former enemies, the French and British were to prove uneasy Allies in 191U- Conflict in particular arose in early October when Kitchener*s plan for an expedition for the relief of Antwerp clashed with Joffre*s strategy of a flanking manoeuvre in northern France against the German Army. Even after the victory of the Marne, much mistrust and suspicion prevailed between the two commands, serving as the chief impediment between them to effective cooperation. A pro longed command crisis thus developed in late October when the Commander- in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Sir John French, rede ployed his Force in Flanders from the Aisne, despite French misgivings, and then failed to march on Lille. Indeed, Sir John, whose command was independent of the French, was not always agreeable to the French form ula of maximum British participation under French direction. The de gree of success on the battlefield, which depended on French strategic planning, nevertheless* affected the functioning of the coalition most of all, for cooperation could be built only on confidence. In the final analysis, the French and British were only partially compatible as Allies, and their cooperation during the ,f War of Movement" must be qualified as a limited success. At the end of the period, the pattern of Allied cooperation had been established for the long period of stalemate which followed on the western front. The thesis is based mainly on research in archival sources and the private papers and diaries of the main participants in France and Great Britain.