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Analyst Forecasts, Earnings Management, and Insider Trading Patterns

Analyst Forecasts, Earnings Management, and Insider Trading Patterns
Author: Garen Markarian
Publisher: VDM Publishing
Total Pages: 164
Release: 2008
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9783836473958

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For at least two decades, it was believed that making managers into owners could ameliorate many agency conflicts existing in capital markets settings. In fact, it now appears that managerial ownership of stock itself may encourage earnings manipulations. In this study, we show that CEO insider trading, earnings manipulations, and the ability to meet and exceed market benchmarks are all interrelated. Managers manipulate earnings to exceed analyst earnings forecasts. Additionally, managerial insider selling increases with performance relative to analyst forecasts, and is magnified by stock option holdings. Insider selling is more intense among managers who have used earnings manipulations to exceed forecasts. Additionally, managers who sell following the announcement of an earnings surprise are able to earn abnormal profits. Firms having both positive earnings surprises and insider selling exhibit lower subsequent accounting performance. This study is of interest to academics, practitioners who are interested in the finer mechanisms of markets, and advanced finance students, alike.


The Walk-Down to Beatable Forecasts

The Walk-Down to Beatable Forecasts
Author: Hongping Tan
Publisher:
Total Pages: 53
Release: 2017
Genre:
ISBN:

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We use the framework developed in Richardson et al. (2004) to identify country, firm and analyst characteristics that we expect to be associated with the prevalence of the analyst walk-down forecast pattern. Based on a large sample of 50,649 analysts covering 33,645 firms from 46 countries during 1992-2014, we find that the walk-down pattern positively correlates with country characteristics related to insider trading restrictions and equity sales. It also positively relates to the stock market reward for beating analyst forecasts, firm-level characteristics underlying management concerns with share prices after earnings announcements, and analysts' incentives to cooperate with management. The effects of these factors on the walk-down pattern are more pronounced in countries with better media-coverage institutions. Overall, these findings suggest that capital market incentives affecting the communication between managers and analysts and the resulting analyst forecast bias involves various forces including a country's institutional infrastructure, and firm and analyst characteristics.


Earnings Management to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises in Periods Following Insider Sales

Earnings Management to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises in Periods Following Insider Sales
Author: Peggy Weber
Publisher:
Total Pages: 28
Release: 2008
Genre:
ISBN:

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This paper investigates whether insiders manage earnings in the quarters following their stock sales in order to mitigate earnings shocks. An insider trade followed closely by potentially value-relevant earnings disclosures gives the appearance that the trade was based on foreknowledge of the soon-to-be disclosed information. Because securities laws prohibit such trade insiders have incentives to avoid the appearance that their stock transactions are based on private information. I examine a sample of 18,349 firm quarters that correspond to insider sale or post-sale periods over the period January 1989 through July 2001. I compare properties of earnings for these sample observations to non-sale controls matched on industry, time, size and performance. I find increased levels of abnormal accruals in the periods subsequent to insider sales, and that these positive accruals are associated with analyst forecast errors whose values are indistinguishable from those of matched control firms but whose magnitudes are significantly smaller. This pattern suggests insiders manage earnings in order to distance their sales from negative earnings news consistent with avoidance of the appearance of illegal insider trade.


The Walk-Down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts

The Walk-Down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts
Author: Scott A. Richardson
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2005
Genre:
ISBN:

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It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an earnings guidance game where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk-down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (via new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk-down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.


Management Earnings Forecasts, Insider Trading, and Information Asymmetry

Management Earnings Forecasts, Insider Trading, and Information Asymmetry
Author: Anastasia Kraft
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

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We investigate whether senior officers use accrual-based earnings management to meet voluntary earnings disclosure (i.e., management earnings forecasts) before selling or buying their own shares when they have private information. This study is the first to use the differences in timing of trades by senior officers and other insiders (e.g., directors or large shareholders) to infer information asymmetry. We hypothesize that the timing of senior officers' trades with no other insiders' trades at the same time indicates opportunistic trades and asymmetric information between senior officers and other insiders. Our results show that senior officers' exclusive sales are negatively associated with future returns, indicating that they tend to use insider information. Moreover, senior officers are more likely to meet their earnings forecasts when they plan to sell stocks.


Unreported Insider Trades

Unreported Insider Trades
Author: Millicent Chang
Publisher:
Total Pages: 33
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

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We provide evidence of unreported trading by corporate insiders in their own firm's shares and link this activity to future firm earnings and analyst forecast error. Unreported trading represent discrepancies between insider shareholdings from trades they report to the Exchange and their shareholdings as disclosed in the firm's annual report. Over the five year period from 2007 to 2011, the rate of unreported trading is 7.73%, being at its lowest in 2008 of 4.86% and peaking at 9.59% in 2011. Such activity is influenced by the firm's growth opportunities and individual factors such as equity related compensation and insider ownership. We separate unreported purchases from unreported sales due to the different motivations for buying and selling. Unreported purchases do not appear to lead earnings increases though they are able to predict forecast error. On the other hand, unreported sales predict future decreases in earnings for up to two years and are also related to forecast error. These findings suggest that insiders have foresight of decreases in earnings and conceal their sales to profit from such information, at the expense of other shareholders. They also trade opportunistically on analyst forecast error.


Financial Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Recommendations

Financial Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Recommendations
Author: Sundaresh Ramnath
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
Total Pages: 125
Release: 2008
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1601981627

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Financial Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Recommendations reviews research related to the role of financial analysts in the allocation of resources in capital markets. The authors provide an organized look at the literature, with particular attention to important questions that remain open for further research. They focus research related to analysts' decision processes and the usefulness of their forecasts and stock recommendations. Some of the major surveys were published in the early 1990's and since then no less than 250 papers related to financial analysts have appeared in the nine major research journals that we used to launch our review of the literature. The research has evolved from descriptions of the statistical properties of analysts' forecasts to investigations of the incentives and decision processes that give rise to those properties. However, in spite of this broader focus, much of analysts' decision processes and the market's mechanism of drawing a useful consensus from the combination of individual analysts' decisions remain hidden in a black box. What do we know about the relevant valuation metrics and the mechanism by which analysts and investors translate forecasts into present equity values? What do we know about the heuristics relied upon by analysts and the market and the appropriateness of their use? Financial Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Recommendations examines these and other questions and concludes by highlighting area for future research.


The Walkdown to Beatable Analyst Forecasts

The Walkdown to Beatable Analyst Forecasts
Author: Scott A. Richardson
Publisher:
Total Pages: 44
Release: 2011
Genre:
ISBN:

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Security regulators and the business press have alleged that firms play an 'earnings-guidance game' where analysts make optimistic forecasts at the start of the year and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level the firm can beat by the end of the year. In a comprehensive sample of I/B/E/S individual analysts' forecasts of annual earnings from 1983-1998, we find strong support for the claim in the post-1992 period. We examine whether the 'walk down' to beatable targets is associated with managers' incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (via new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (insider trades). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the 'walk down' to beatable targets is most pronounced in firms that are either net issuers of equity or in firms where managers are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on how capital market incentives affect communications between managers and analysts.