An Econometric And Game Theoretic Model Of Common Pool Resource Management PDF Download

The dissertation is composed of three chapters that contribute to the areas of game theory and resource economics. Chapter one, ``Waves as a Common-Pool Resource: Why Do Surfers Share Waves?", presents a game theoretic model of ocean waves, used recreationally by surfers, as a common-pool resource. In games with a finite time horizon, the surfers will compete for waves such that they deplete the value of their shared resource, leading to a tragedy of the commons. On the other hand, when the game is played with an indefinite time horizon, surfers are able to maximize the value of their resource in equilibrium assuming they are patient enough. This application of the Folk Theorem establishes that ocean waves are a common-pool resource that can be efficiently maintained in equilibrium despite a lack of clearly defined property rights. Chapter two, ``Cooperation and the `Surfers' Dilemma': An Experimental Study", provides experimental evidence on the relationship between group size and the probability of future interactions on cooperation in common-pool resource systems. Experimental evidence suggests that increasing group size significantly reduces the level of cooperation and leads to a decreased resource value. Additional experimental evidence suggests that cooperation is positively related to the probability of future interactions. Chapter three, ``Dangerous Water: Urban Runoff and Public Health", Utilizes a natural experiment to test the effects of coastal water pollution on public health outcomes in the South Bay Region of San Diego, California. Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that urban runoff from the Tijuana River significantly increases the number of reported cases of cellulitis, staph infection, and hepatitis A, in South Bay hospitals for white males age 18-35.