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Algorithmic Tacit Collusion

Algorithmic Tacit Collusion
Author: Valeria Caforio
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2022
Genre:
ISBN:

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In light of the ongoing debate on algorithmic collusion, this paper intends to answer the following question: should algorithmic tacit collusion be prohibited under EU competition law? By algorithmic tacit collusion it is meant the capability of algorithmic pricing agents to unilaterally engage into tacitly collusive strategies without human intervention (we also call it 'machine-to-machine cooperation' or 'algorithmic interdependent pricing'). Essentially, this practice raises the very same issues as the well-known oligopoly problem. Therefore, to make it prohibited one could envisage the traditional proposed solution of disentangling the categories of article 101 TFEU from the notions of an 'act of reciprocal communication between firms' or 'meeting of minds'. The paper sets out to discuss this option and its implications. It argues that, from a competition law standpoint, although algorithmic tacit collusion remains undesirable, the notions of agreement and concerted practices should not be changed to encompass it. Rather, it embraces a regulatory perspective referred to as 'algorithms by design' which relies on introducing a legal obligation for firms to program algorithms in such a way as to prevent them from setting oligopolistic prices. In particular, while exploring this regulatory proposal, the paper discusses the peculiar case of algorithms that, though designed not to violate antitrust law, end up charging collusive prices. In this regard, the paper develops a second proposal: it introduces the idea of 'outcome visibility' to nail firms to their responsibility. This concept implies the idea that even if firms are not aware that their pricing algorithms are implementing a collusive strategy, they cannot ignore their visible market outcome.


What Do We Know About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion?

What Do We Know About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion?
Author: Ai Deng
Publisher:
Total Pages: 17
Release: 2019
Genre:
ISBN:

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The past few years have seen many legal scholars and antitrust agencies expressing interest in and concerns with algorithmic collusion. In this paper, I survey and draw lessons from the literature on Artificial Intelligence and on the economics of algorithmic tacit collusion. I show that a good understanding of this literature is a crucial first step to better understand the antitrust risks of algorithmic pricing and devise antitrust policies to combat such risks.


Algorithms, Collusion and Competition Law

Algorithms, Collusion and Competition Law
Author: Steven Van Uytsel
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Total Pages: 281
Release: 2023-01-20
Genre: Law
ISBN: 1802203044

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What is algorithmic collusion? This evaluative book provides an insight into tackling this important question for competition law, with contrasting critical perspectives, including theoretical, empirical, and doctrinal – the latter frequently from a comparative perspective. Bringing together scholarly discussion on algorithmic collusion, the book questions whether competition law is adeptly equipped to deal with its various facets.


Virtual Competition

Virtual Competition
Author: Ariel Ezrachi
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Total Pages: 365
Release: 2016-11-14
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0674545478

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“A fascinating book about how platform internet companies (Amazon, Facebook, and so on) are changing the norms of economic competition.” —Fast Company Shoppers with a bargain-hunting impulse and internet access can find a universe of products at their fingertips. But is there a dark side to internet commerce? This thought-provoking exposé invites us to explore how sophisticated algorithms and data-crunching are changing the nature of market competition, and not always for the better. Introducing into the policy lexicon terms such as algorithmic collusion, behavioral discrimination, and super-platforms, Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke explore the resulting impact on competition, our democratic ideals, our wallets, and our well-being. “We owe the authors our deep gratitude for anticipating and explaining the consequences of living in a world in which black boxes collude and leave no trails behind. They make it clear that in a world of big data and algorithmic pricing, consumers are outgunned and antitrust laws are outdated, especially in the United States.” —Science “A convincing argument that there can be a darker side to the growth of digital commerce. The replacement of the invisible hand of competition by the digitized hand of internet commerce can give rise to anticompetitive behavior that the competition authorities are ill equipped to deal with.” —Burton G. Malkiel, Wall Street Journal “A convincing case for the need to rethink competition law to cope with algorithmic capitalism’s potential for malfeasance.” —John Naughton, The Observer


Algorithmic Collusion & Its Implications for Competition Law and Policy

Algorithmic Collusion & Its Implications for Competition Law and Policy
Author: Kenji Lee
Publisher:
Total Pages: 48
Release: 2019
Genre:
ISBN:

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Algorithms are increasingly employed by businesses as an integral part of their business models given the availability of big data and breakthroughs in artificial intelligence technology and application. While the competition landscape has shifted to a digital environment, questions have been raised as to whether the traditional competition policy tools, formulated in the analogue era, may nevertheless remain relevant in addressing algorithmic anti-competitive practices. In particular, the unilateral use of algorithms and algorithmic tacit collusion raises enforcement challenges for the competition authorities because of the inability of existing ex-post measures to adequately address these algorithmic anti-competitive conducts. This paper discusses these issues through a critical analysis of the relevant law, economics and computer science literatures.


What Do We Know About Algorithmic Collusion Now? New Insights from the Latest Academic Research

What Do We Know About Algorithmic Collusion Now? New Insights from the Latest Academic Research
Author: Ai Deng
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2023
Genre:
ISBN:

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Algorithmic collusion has captured the attention of the global antitrust community for the past several years. Deng (2020) provided a comprehensive survey of the pertinent literature in economics and computer science and a critical discussion. Over the past three years, new insights have emerged from academic research. These new insights have not only deepened our understanding of the intricate relationship between algorithms and competition but also begun challenging some previous findings once considered compelling evidence supporting the plausibility of autonomous algorithmic tacit collusion. In this article, I discuss these new insights, with a focus on four topics: (1) the nuanced ways algorithms affect prices, (2) the crucial role of algorithmic design, (3) the consequences of third-party pricing algorithms, and (4) some considerations when assessing algorithmic impact in litigation.


Algorithmic Pricing & Collusion; The Limits of Antitrust Enforcement

Algorithmic Pricing & Collusion; The Limits of Antitrust Enforcement
Author: Sumit Bhadauria
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2020
Genre:
ISBN:

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The combination of big data, large storage capacity and computational power has strengthened the emergence of algorithms in making myriads of business decision. It allows business to gain a competitive advantage by making automatic and optimize decision making. In particular, the use of pricing algorithms allows business to match the demand and supply equilibrium by monitoring & setting dynamic pricing. It benefits consumer alike to see and act on fast changing prices. However, on the downside, the widespread use of algorithm in an industry has the effect of altering the structural characteristic of market such as price transparency, high speed trading which increases the likelihood of collusion. The ability of pricing algorithm to solve the cartel incentive problem by quickly detecting and punishing the deviant further strengthen the enforcement of price fixing agreement. In addition, the use of more advance forms of algorithm such as self-learning algorithm allows business to achieve a tacitly collusive outcome in limited market characteristic even without communication between humans. This raises the fundamental challenge for anti-cartel enforcement as the current law in most jurisdictions is ill-equipped to deal with algorithmic facilitated tacit collusion. The legality of tacit collusion is questionable primarily because the pricing algorithm has the ability to alter the market characteristics where the tacitly collusive outcome is difficult to achieve; thus widening the scope of the so-called 'oligopoly problem'. This paper studies the usages of pricing algorithms by business in online markets. In particular, the paper identify the conditions under which the algorithm prices causes the harm to consumers. It seeks to analyze how algorithms might facilitate or even causes the collusive outcome without human interventions. Further, it looks at the legal challenges faced by the competition authorities around the globe to deal with the algorithmic let collusion and examine the various approaches suggested to counter act it.


Research Handbook on the Law of Artificial Intelligence

Research Handbook on the Law of Artificial Intelligence
Author: Woodrow Barfield
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Total Pages: 736
Release: 2018-12-28
Genre: Computers
ISBN: 1786439050

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The field of artificial intelligence (AI) has made tremendous advances in the last two decades, but as smart as AI is now, it is getting smarter and becoming more autonomous. This raises a host of challenges to current legal doctrine, including whether AI/algorithms should count as ‘speech’, whether AI should be regulated under antitrust and criminal law statutes, and whether AI should be considered as an agent under agency law or be held responsible for injuries under tort law. This book contains chapters from US and international law scholars on the role of law in an age of increasingly smart AI, addressing these and other issues that are critical to the evolution of the field.


Controlling Algorithmic Collusion

Controlling Algorithmic Collusion
Author: Joao E. Gata
Publisher:
Total Pages: 20
Release: 2019
Genre:
ISBN:

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Algorithms have played an increasingly important role in economic activity, as they becoming faster and smarter. Together with the increasing use of ever larger data sets, they may lead to significant changes in the way markets work. These developments have been raising concerns not only over the rights to privacy and consumers' autonomy, but also on competition. Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. However, current concerns are of a different nature as they relate to the role algorithms can play as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated games, and the role increasingly sophisticated algorithms can play as autonomous implementers of pricing strategies, learning to collude without any explicit instructions provided by human agents. In particular, it is recognized that the use of 'learning algorithms' can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion. Several authors who have addressed the possibilities for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously, have also considered some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type of algorithms used by firms. By using well-known results in the theory of computation, I show that such option faces serious challenges to its effectiveness due to undecidability results. Ex-post assessment may be constrained as well. Notwithstanding several challenges face by current software testing methodologies, competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an interdisciplinary collaboration with computer science and mathematics.