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This paper reviews changes in role of European Parliament (EP) in EU’s trade policy since the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty brought about important changes in EU governance, and in particular, strengthening of the role of the EP. EP’s competences in trade policy were also strengthened. All trade agreements with third countries require a consent from the EP in the ratification procedure and all trade-related legislations must be jointly decided by the Council and the EP. This paper examines the determinants of voting patterns for EU’s trade legislations including EU’s Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Korea and Colombia/Peru. The results confirm that Members of European Parliaments (MEP) still tend to vote with others in their political groups in trade legislations and their voting pattern is not very different from the previous pattern. This trend is confirmed by both the comparison of intra-voting cohesion index and the empirical test based on the probit model. Country-specific variables do not explain well the voting behavior of MEPs. However, it is noteworthy that some MEPs voted in line with their national interests in case of Korea-EU FTA. It is expected that influences of the EP on EU’s trade policy would increase over time, as MEPs realize their new powers and learn how to use it to reflect their opinion on EU’s trade agenda. As the EU expands its FTAs to the United States and Japan, much larger trade partner than the EU ever negotiated, more active involvements from the EP are expected. This means that various interest groups, such as trade associations and NGOs will attempt to exert greater influence on the European Parliament as well as the European Commission. I. Introduction II. Role of European Parliament in the EU’s Trade Policy 1. EU’s Trade Policy and the EP’s Involvement 2. Changes in EP’s Competences after the Lisbon Treaty III. Literature Review of Voting Patterns of European Parliament 1. The Voting Patterns of European Parliament 2. US Congressional Voting on Trade Policy IV. Econometric Analyses 1. Trade Legislations Examined 2. Votes by Political Groups and Countries 3. Empirical Test of Votes (Probit Model) V. Conclusion