Administered Protection PDF Download

Inspired by and drawing from the work of many who have addressed similar and related issues of trade protectionism (e.g., Taussig, Schattschnieder, Bhagwati, Pastor, Rugman, Anderson, Brovard, Finger, Hall, Nelson, Boltuck, Litan, Pattison, Clubb, Waller, just to name a few), this study analyzes the historical development and application of the United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty legislation from a political economy perspective. Political Economy is concerned with depicting relationships between political processes and economic processes. It is grounded on an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the human condition within an institutional framework. It is from this perspective that the following study proceeds and concludes. It is well settled that national wealth is the result of multi-dimensional causes including the external physical circumstances of the countries in question, the intelligence and moral character of their people, and their political and social institutions. The U.S. process of administered protection is among those institutions that impacts national wealth. To assess that impact, this study employs three political-economic perspectives: 1) economic theory, 2) public choice theory, and 3) institutional theory. A Coasean economic theory of regulation suggests the process is inefficient. Public interest theory suggests that the process is unprincipled and unfair. And institutional theory suggests the process is biased toward protectionism. From a domestic perspective, the extent to which this process is inefficient suggests that it negatively impacts national wealth. From a foreign policy perspective, the extent to which the process is a system of de facto protectionism threatens the legitimacy of the United States' proclaimed commitment to liberalized international trade. The extent to which the process is unprincipled and unfair (that is, characterized by unguided discretion and arbitrariness in procedure or outcome) it undermines the legitimacy of policy and the governmental process itself. And finally, the extent to which systematic bias is institutionalized within the formal rules and organizational behaviors of agencies responsible for administering this process it threatens the international trade policy of the GATT and WTO. Dr. Kevin S. Marshall is Dean and Professor of Law at the University of La Verne College of Law in Ontario, California.