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Three Essays on Securitization

Three Essays on Securitization
Author: Adi Mordel
Publisher:
Total Pages: 262
Release: 2010
Genre: Asset-backed financing
ISBN:

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Three Essays on Financial Intermediation and Growth

Three Essays on Financial Intermediation and Growth
Author: Ranajoy Ray Chaudhuri
Publisher:
Total Pages: 117
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

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Abstract: My dissertation explores the impact of financial development, as well as regulatory changes in the financial sector, on economic growth. Recent literature on growth has often focused on the importance of financial intermediation and institutional quality. Advocates of financial development say that the development of the banking sector and stock markets increase the financing available to firms, raising productivity. The "institutions hypothesis" proponents suggest that institutions jointly determine the growth rate and the policy choice, while policies themselves bear no causal connection to growth. Such hypothesis is difficult to test empirically because the change in institutional quality is, with a few historic exceptions, very slow. For the most part, therefore, a country's economic performance can end up being attributed to a random cause. Using a cross-country data set and numerous financial indicators, institutional quality variables and growth measures, I find that this is not true of financial development. Financial variables have a significant effect on growth that is distinct from that of institutions like private property and rule of law. I also consider this issue in the context of the fifty U.S. states. States differ with respect to financial indicators like the number of banks, assets, equity, loans and deposits. They also vary in terms of their regulatory environments. States like Delaware, Texas and Nevada have very high scores for economic freedom; Mississippi, New Mexico and West Virginia have very low ones. The results again underscore the importance of financial deepening in order to achieve economic growth. Taking up from this point, the final essay studies the impact of U.S. banking deregulation on growth. Many states relaxed restrictions on intra-state bank branching beginning in the early 1960s, both by allowing bank holding companies to convert subsidiaries into branches and by permitting statewide de novo branching. This increased competition in the banking sector forced banks to become more efficient. The existing literature suggests that one of the channels through which this worked was bank lending. Different industries have varying degrees of dependence on external financing, and industries that have greater dependence should grow faster in the post-deregulation period. Using a panel data set, I find this not to be the case for the U.S.; industries that borrow less from banks actually grew at a faster rate after deregulation. This could reflect commercial banks losing market share to other sources of external financing, the general decline in the U.S. manufacturing sector and the terms of trade moving in favor of agriculture. I also consider the effect of deregulation on various banking indicators and find the strongest impact to be on the number of commercial banks operating in the state. Contrary to existing research, these regulatory changes slowed down growth in the number of bank branches and offices, as well as other measures of bank performance like assets, equity, loans and deposits. This suggests that the gains from deregulation are short-lived, and also indicate unprofitable smaller banks shuttering their operations and the emergence of credit unions and other alternatives to commercial banks.


Essays on Banking and Financial Intermediation

Essays on Banking and Financial Intermediation
Author: Yuteng Cheng (Ph.D.)
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2022
Genre:
ISBN:

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Chapter 1 uses a mix of theory and data to study the unintended consequences of mandatory retention rules in securitization. The Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Securitization Regulation both impose a 5% mandatory retention requirement in securitization to motivate financial intermediaries to screen and monitor their borrowers more carefully. To better understand the impact of the policy, this chapter studies two related research questions. First, can mandatory retention have unintended consequences? Second, is the current level of retention optimal? To answer those questions, I propose a novel trade-off model in which retention strengthens monitoring but may also encourage banks to shift risk. I go on to provide empirical evidence supporting this unintended consequence: in the data, banks shifted toward riskier portfolios after the implementation of the retention rules embedded in Dodd-Frank. Furthermore, the model provides clear testable predictions about policy and corresponding consequences. I show in the data that stricter retention rules caused banks to monitor and shift risk simultaneously. According to the model prediction, such a simultaneous increase can only occur when the retention level is above optimal, which suggests that the current rate of 5% in the US is too high. Chapter 2Chapter 2 studies the source of fragility of OTC-natured interbank markets. Most research on the fragility of interbank markets -in the sense of multiplicity of equilibria driven by adverse selection-relies on a competitive market structure. By contrast, this chapter accounts for the OTC market nature and the market power of some players. Under adverse selection alone, markets are not fragile; that is, the equilibrium is unique. However, when adverse selection is combined with moral hazard on the borrowers' side, multiple equilibria arise again, and the bad equilibrium exhibits troubled banks gambling for resurrection. An interest rate floor eliminates the bad equilibrium. More generally, policies to reduce fragility should address moral hazard rather than adverse selection. Chapter 3Chapter 3 studies the contracting differences between corporate loans that are sold in the secondary market and that are securitized in the CLO market. With secondary loan sales and CLO markets being the two markets for corporate loan commoditization, empirical studies find that banks add additional restrictive covenants to loans sold and looser covenants to loans securitized. Why is it so? This chapter builds a theoretical model to explain such contracting differences in these two markets. The key mechanism is that the bank alleviates the borrowers' moral hazard problem via public monitoring and charges higher interest rates due to the relaxing of incentives provided. Those high interest rates facilitate loan sales because the information problem embedded in loan sales is lessened. In contrast, adverse selection is less severe in securitization since the bank retains the information-sensitive tranche.